Every phase of the Third Reich s foreign policy was determined by its authoritarian leader, Adolf Hitler. Following his rise to power, his political acuity and utter lack of scruple enabled him to achieve numerous diplomatic successes against the well-intentioned but largely ineffectual Anglo-French democracies. First by duplicity, then by bluff and bluster, and finally by brinkmanship, Hitler succeeded in establishing a strengthened and united Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) in preparation for a Second Great War. This book examines in depth the revanchist foreign policy of Hitler s Germany from 1933 to 1939: the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, German rearmament, the introduction of compulsory military service and the enlargement of the German Armed Forces, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the notorious Hossbach Conference, the Austrian Anschluss , the Munich Conference, the brazen seizures of Bohemia-Moravia and the Memel District, the Danzig crisis, the cynical brokering of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the German invasion of Western Poland.
Finally available in a single volume, the masterful study of Hitler's foreign policy and the true origins of the Second World War by the world's top specialist in history of Nazi Germany and World War II. Written over the course of many years and previously available only in two volumes, this complete and updated edition is now being published in a single affordable volume for the first time. ''the course of German foreign policy provides the obvious organizing principle for any account of the origins of World War II. This is not to assert that no other power or other factor bears any substantial share of the responsibility for the outbreak of that war or the developments leading up to it but rather to suggest that a complex question is perhaps best studied by examining its core. [] The years from the beginning of 1933 to the end of 1936 saw a diplomatic revolution in Europe. From a barely accepted equal on the European stage, Germany became the dominant power on the Continent. With the remilitarization of the Rhine and, the stalemate in the Spanish civil war, the forming of the Axis, and the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, this phase was completed. The diplomatic initiative in the world belonged to Germany and its partners. Germany's determination for war became the central issue in world diplomacy.''
In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation-state of 1871. Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third phases: American intervention and “racial purification.” The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.
What Hitler Knew is a fascinating study of how the climate of fear in Nazi Germany affected Hitler's advisers and shaped the decision making process. It explores the key foreign policy decisions from the Nazi seizure of power up to the hours before the outbreak of World War II. Zachary Shore argues persuasively that the tense environment led the diplomats to a nearly obsessive control over the "information arsenal" in a desperate battle to defend their positions and to safeguard their lives. Unlike previous studies, this book draws the reader into the diplomats' darker world, and illustrates how Hitler's power to make informed decisions was limited by the very system he created. The result, Shore concludes, was a chaotic flow of information between Hitler and his advisers that may have accelerated the march toward war.
Christoph Kimmich's German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945: A Guide to Current Research and Resources is a comprehensive guide to archival resources and published materials on the foreign policy of Weimar and Nazi Germany. It catalogues the archives, libraries, and research institutes, both public and private, that house important collections, especially in Germany but also elsewhere in Europe and in the United States, and describes their holdings, terms of access and use, and guides and inventories available. German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945 also includes a substantial annotated bibliography of published sources, ranging from documentary series to significant contemporary accounts, from memoirs to secondary works. The bibliography reflects current scholarship and draws attention to works that are innovative and accessible, It also describes the various series of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial Records and the original trial documents available in archives and libraries. The guide canvasses the vast and growing offering of materials on the Web- digitized print materials, archival inventories, and source materials. In order to expedite work in the archives, the guide also explains the organization and functioning of the German foreign ministry between 1918 and 1945 and how it kept and stored its records. This third edition offers new information on German archives, many of which were consolidated and relocated after German reunification, on recently discovered archival holdings, and on materialsposted on the Web. It is a reference source for both established scholars and young researchers, offering quick and efficient access to the voluminous research and research materials that are now available.
The unpublished followup to Hitler's autobiography never published during the dictator's lifetime includes details of his vision for a foreign policy based on continual aggression that would inevitably result in a confrontation with the United States, which he saw as a major stumbling block to his plans.
These two volumes are designed to explain the origins of World Way II by focusing on the role of German foreign policy under Hitler. New light is shed on German rearmament, on the efforts of Britain and France to avert war, on the annexation of Austria, on the Munich Agreement, and on the final steps to war in 1939. Both specialists and general readers will find much of interest in these two volumes. The German foreign policy, as determined by Adolf Hitler, is analyzed on the basis of comprehensive research in German, British, and American archives. The published documents of France, Italy, Russia, and numerous other countries as well as the extensive literature on the subject and the papers of many participants have been researched to present what still remains the only comprehensive study in any language of the road to way in 1939. This edition adds a new preface relating these volumes to the evidence, the controversies, and the literature of the years since they were first written.
Mexico's relationship with the world during the 1930s is revealed as a fascinating series of calculated responses to domestic political changes and international economic shifts.
“Monumental.” —The New York Times Book Review Pulitzer Prize-finalist Stephen Kotkin has written the definitive biography of Joseph Stalin, from collectivization and the Great Terror to the conflict with Hitler's Germany that is the signal event of modern world history In 1929, Joseph Stalin, having already achieved dictatorial power over the vast Soviet Empire, formally ordered the systematic conversion of the world’s largest peasant economy into “socialist modernity,” otherwise known as collectivization, regardless of the cost. What it cost, and what Stalin ruthlessly enacted, transformed the country and its ruler in profound and enduring ways. Building and running a dictatorship, with life and death power over hundreds of millions, made Stalin into the uncanny figure he became. Stephen Kotkin’s Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 is the story of how a political system forged an unparalleled personality and vice versa. The wholesale collectivization of some 120 million peasants necessitated levels of coercion that were extreme even for Russia, and the resulting mass starvation elicited criticism inside the party even from those Communists committed to the eradication of capitalism. But Stalin did not flinch. By 1934, when the Soviet Union had stabilized and socialism had been implanted in the countryside, praise for his stunning anti-capitalist success came from all quarters. Stalin, however, never forgave and never forgot, with shocking consequences as he strove to consolidate the state with a brand new elite of young strivers like himself. Stalin’s obsessions drove him to execute nearly a million people, including the military leadership, diplomatic and intelligence officials, and innumerable leading lights in culture. While Stalin revived a great power, building a formidable industrialized military, the Soviet Union was effectively alone and surrounded by perceived enemies. The quest for security would bring Soviet Communism to a shocking and improbable pact with Nazi Germany. But that bargain would not unfold as envisioned. The lives of Stalin and Hitler, and the fates of their respective dictatorships, drew ever closer to collision, as the world hung in the balance. Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929–1941 is a history of the world during the build-up to its most fateful hour, from the vantage point of Stalin’s seat of power. It is a landmark achievement in the annals of historical scholarship, and in the art of biography.
