This book proposes the idea of a 'discourse trap' in which the discourses and associated terminology devised for political or military reasons can entrap policymakers by motivating or constraining their actions.
The notion of a "Thucydides Trap" that will ensnare China and the United States in a 21st century conflict-much as the rising power of Athens alarmed Sparta and made war "inevitable" between the Aegean superpowers of the 5th century BCE-has received global attention since entering the international relations lexicon 6 years ago. Scholars, journalists, bloggers, and politicians in many countries, notably China, have embraced this beguiling metaphor, coined by Harvard political science professor Graham Allison, as a framework for examining the likelihood of a Sino-American war. This case study examines the Thucydides Trap metaphor and the response it has elicited. Hewing closely to what the historian of the Peloponnesian War actually says about the causes and inevitability of war, it argues that, while Thucydides' text does not support Allison's normative assertion about the "inevitable" result of an encounter between "rising" and "ruling" powers, the History of the Peloponnesian War (hereafter, History) does identify elements of leadership and political dynamic that bear directly on whether a clash of interests between two states is resolved through peaceful means or escalates to war. It is precisely because war typically begins with a considered decision by a national command authority to reject other options and mobilize for conflict (and thus always entails an element of choice) that insight from Thucydides' History remains relevant and beneficial for the contemporary strategist, or citizen, concerned in such decisions.Accordingly, this case study concludes that the Thucydides Trap, as conceived and presented by Graham Allison, draws welcome attention both to Thucydides and to the pitfalls of great power competition, but fails as a heuristic device or predictive tool in the analysis of contemporary events. Allison's metaphor offers, at best, a potentially misleading over-simplification of Thucydides' nuanced and problematic account of the origins of the epochal conflict that defined his age. Moreover, it overlooks actual insights from the History that can help political decisionmakers-including, but not limited to, those of the United States and China-either avoid war or, if ignored, pose genuine policy "traps" that can make an avoidable war more likely, and a necessary war more costly.
Now in its Twenty-Second Edition, Hook, Spanier, and Grove’s American Foreign Policy Since World War II has long set the standard in guiding students through the complexities of American foreign policy. The text introduces students to the American "style" of foreign policy, imbued with a distinct sense of national exceptionalism. By giving students the historical context they need, this book allows them to truly grasp the functions and dysfunctions of the nation’s foreign policy agenda with historical insight into modern policy context.
Why do states persist in using force to enhance their deterrent posture, even though it is not clear that it is effective? This book develops an innovative framework to answer this question, viewing deterrence as an idea. This allows the author to explain how countries institutionalize deterrence strategy, and how this internalization affects policy. He argues that the US and Israel have both internalized deterrence ideas and become attached to these practices. For them, deterrence is not just a means to advance 'physical' security, but it constitutes their very selves as deterring actors. As a result, being unable to deter becomes a threat to their identity, evoking strong emotional responses. In recognizing these dynamics, the book provides a fresh perspective on the US war in Iraq (2003) and the Israeli war in Lebanon (2006), both of which can be seen as attempts to repair each country's shaken sense of self.
In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America’s military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors—the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.
This timely study analyses the ways in which competing ideologies and cultural narratives have influenced the Obama administration's decision-making on Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria, situating these decisions within the broader history of American foreign policy.
This edited volume addresses the relationship between the essential nature of war and its character at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The focus is on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, situations that occupy a central role in international affairs and that have become highly influential in thinking about war in the widest sense. The intellectual foundation of the volume is Clausewitz’s insight that though war has an enduring nature, its character changes with time, space, social structure and culture. The fact that war’s character varies means that different actors may interpret, experience and, ultimately, wage war differently. The conflict between the ways that war is conceptualised in the prevailing Western and international discourse, and the manner in which it plays out on the ground is a key discussion point for scholars and practitioners in the field of international relations. Contributions combine insights from social theory, philosophy, sociology and strategic studies and ask directly what contemporary war is, and what the implications are for the future. This book will be of much interest to students of war studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general. Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter is currently completing a PhD in the conflation of war and policing in international conflicts at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the author of 11 books on war and security issues.
America's wars after the 9/11 attacks were marked by a political obsession with terrorist 'sanctuaries' and 'safe havens'. From mountain redoubts in Afghanistan to the deserts of Iraq, Washington's policy-makers maintained an unwavering focus on finding and destroying the refuges, bases and citadels of modern guerrilla movements, and holding their sponsors to account. This was a preoccupation embedded in nearly every official speech and document of the time, a corpus of material that offered a new logic for thinking about the world. As an exercise in political communication, it was a spectacular success. From 2001 to 2009, President George W. Bush and his closest advisors set terms of reference that cascaded down from the White House, through government and into the hearts and minds of Americans. 'Sanctuary' was the red thread running through all of it, permeating the decisions and discourses of the day. Where did this obsession come from? How did it become such an important feature of American political life? In this new political history, Michael A. Innes explores precedents, from Saigon to Baghdad, and traces how decision-makers and their advisors used ideas of sanctuary to redefine American foreign policy, national security, and enemies real and imagined.
This book describes the conduct of the US-led post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. Adopting a long-term perspective, it argues that even though Washington initially had an opportunity to achieve its security goals and give Afghanistan a chance to enter a new era, it compromised any possibility of success from the very moment it let bin Laden escape to Pakistan in December 2001, and found itself locked in a strategic overreach. Given the bureaucratic and rhetorical momentum triggered by the war on terror in America, the Bush Administration was bound to deploy more resources in Afghanistan sooner or later (despite its focus on Iraq). The need to satisfy unfulfilled counter-terrorism objectives made the US dependent on Afghanistan’s warlords, which compromised the country’s stability and tarnished its new political system. The extension of the US military presence made Washington lose its leverage on the Pakistan army leaders, who, aware of America’s logistical dependency on Islamabad, supported the Afghan insurgents – their historical proxies - more and more openly. The extension of the war also contributed to radicalize segments of the Afghan and Pakistani populations, destabilizing the area further. In the meantime, the need to justify the extension of its military presence influenced the US-led coalition into proclaiming its determination to democratize and reconstruct Afghanistan. While highly opportunistic, the emergence of these policies proved both self-defeating and unsustainable due to an inescapable collision between the US-led coalition’s inherent self-interest, hubris, limited knowledge, limited attention span and limited resources, and, on the other hand, Afghanistan’s inherent complexity. As the critical contradictions at the very heart of the campaign increased with the extension of the latter’s duration, scale, and cost, America’s leaders, entrapped in path-dependence, lost their strategic flexibility. Despite debates on troops/resource allocation and more sophisticated doctrines, they repeated the same structural mistakes over and over again. The strategic overreach became self-sustaining, until its costs became intolerable, leading to a drawdown which has more to do with a pervasive sense of failure than with the accomplishment of any noble purpose or strategic breakthrough.
In today's information era, the use of specific words and language can serve as powerful tools that incite violence—or sanitize and conceal the ugliness of war. This book examines the complex, "twisted" language of conflict. Why is the term "collateral damage" used when military strikes kill civilians? What is a "catastrophic success"? What is the difference between a privileged and unprivileged enemy belligerent? How does deterrence differ from detente? What does "hybrid warfare" mean, and how is it different from "asymmetric warfare"? How is shell shock different from battle fatigue and PTSD? These are only a few of the questions that Talking Conflict: The Loaded Language of Genocide, Political Violence, Terrorism, and Warfare answers in its exploration of euphemisms, "warspeak," "doublespeak," and propagandistic terms. This handbook of alphabetically listed entries is prefaced by an introductory overview that provides background information about how language is used to obfuscate or minimize descriptions of armed conflict or genocide and presents examples of the major rhetorical devices used in this subject matter. The book focuses on the "loaded" language of conflict, with many of the entries demonstrating the function of given terms as euphemisms, propaganda, or circumlocutions. Each entry is accompanied by a list of cross references and "Further Reading" suggestions that point readers to pertinent sources for further research. This book is ideal for students—especially those studying political science, international relations, and genocide—as well as general readers.