Examining the causes of the acute Latin American debt crisis that began in mid-1982, North American analysts have typically focused on deficiencies in the debtor countries' economic policies and on shocks from the world economy. Much less emphasis has been placed on the role of the region's principal creditors--private banks--in the development of the crisis. Robert Devlin rounds out the story of Latin America's debt problem by demonstrating that the banks were an endogenous source of instability in the region's debt cycle, as they overexpanded on the upside and overcontracted on the downside. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
This book analyzes a neglected but fascinating chapter in Anglo-Latin American relations, the disastrous 1822-25 investment boom. During this brief period, British investors lost £21 million in defaulted Latin America as an area for capital investment for a generation. Today Latin America owes its banking and other anxious international creditors over $400 billion, and amount that is unlikely to be repaid. Valuable lessons can be learned by studying the nineteenth-century antecedents of the current situation. Frank Griffith Dawson explores in depth the origins and consequences of the first Latin American debt crisis, interweaving economic details with the broader historical context of society, government, and diplomacy of the period. His wide-ranging discussion includes descriptions of the vicissitudes of the loans, bond issues, and speculative ventures in mining and agriculture, life styles of the various Latin American agents who were empowered to negotiate loans for the new states, the sometimes dishonest British banking and stock broking figured involved in the transactions, and the unfailing gullibility of the investing public. Dawson’s saga sheds light not only capital-exporting nation, but also on a London, when its institutions first began wholeheartedly to adapt themselves to their roles as the financial arbiters of the world. This readable and entertaining book will be of interest to students of Latin American and European economic history. It will also be instructive reading to politicians, stockbrokers, bankers, and lawyers who are attempting to deal with the consequences of the latest Latin American lending boom.
Carlos Marichal contends that the boom-and-bust cycles of Latin American foreign loans result mainly from the fluctuations of the world economy, rather than from errors made in Latin America itself. Marichal shows that the present debt crisis is only a part of an overall pattern in Latin American history--cycles of loan boom and subsequent debt crisis that are heavily influenced by fluctuations of international trade and capital flows. He also reveals the significant role played by those who implement debt policies. Examining the strategies of both lenders and borrowers, he makes it clear that foreign loan negotiations are not only financial tools but also political instruments with broad economic and social consequences. The book analyzes in detail the four major debt crises that took place in Latin America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marichal's focus is comparative, since the contracting of foreign loans and their repayment were problems common to virtually all nations of the region. He devotes special attention to explaining the links of these debt crises to the international financial panics of 1825, 1873, 1890, and 1929. The epilogue compares the debt crises of the past with the contemporary Latin American debt crisis.
The IMF played a key role in developing and implementing the debt strategy throughout the 1980s. That strategy not only overcame the crisis but also produced successful transformationsof several major economiesin Latin America. Nonetheless, the IMF's role has also been criticized on several grounds. This study examines seven such criticisms.
A clear, authoritative guide to the crisis of 2008, its continuing repercussions, and the needed reforms ahead. The U.S. economy lost the first decade of the twenty-first century to an ill-conceived boom and subsequent bust. It is in danger of losing another decade to the stagnation of an incomplete recovery. How did this happen? Read this lucid explanation of the origins and long-term effects of the recent financial crisis, drawn in historical and comparative perspective by two leading political economists. By 2008 the United States had become the biggest international borrower in world history, with more than two-thirds of its $6 trillion federal debt in foreign hands. The proportion of foreign loans to the size of the economy put the United States in league with Mexico, Indonesia, and other third-world debtor nations. The massive inflow of foreign funds financed the booms in housing prices and consumer spending that fueled the economy until the collapse of late 2008. This was the most serious international economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Menzie Chinn and Jeffry Frieden explain the political and economic roots of this crisis as well as its long-term effects. They explore the political strategies behind the Bush administration’s policy of funding massive deficits with foreign borrowing. They show that the crisis was foreseen by many and was avoidable through appropriate policy measures. They examine the continuing impact of our huge debt on the continuing slow recovery from the recession. Lost Decades will long be regarded as the standard account of the crisis and its aftermath.
This work provides a thorough analytical review of the processes that led to the transformation of many Latin American economies during the last decade. The author examines every aspect of adjustment and reform since 1980 and suggests alternative ways to consolidate the achievements.
A major, new, and comprehensive look at six decades of macroeconomic policies across the region What went wrong with the economic development of Latin America over the past half-century? Along with periods of poor economic performance, the region’s countries have been plagued by a wide variety of economic crises. This major new work brings together dozens of leading economists to explore the economic performance of the ten largest countries in South America and of Mexico. Together they advance the fundamental hypothesis that, despite different manifestations, these crises all have been the result of poorly designed or poorly implemented fiscal and monetary policies. Each country is treated in its own section of the book, with a lead chapter presenting a comprehensive database of the country’s fiscal, monetary, and economic data from 1960 to 2017. The chapters are drawn from one-day academic conferences—hosted in all but one case, in the focus country—with participants including noted economists and former leading policy makers. Cowritten with Nobel Prize winner Thomas J. Sargent, the editors’ introduction provides a conceptual framework for analyzing fiscal and monetary policy in countries around the world, particularly those less developed. A final chapter draws conclusions and suggests directions for further research. A vital resource for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics and for economic researchers and policy makers, A Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America, 1960–2017 goes further than any book in stressing both the singularities and the similarities of the economic histories of Latin America’s largest countries. Contributors: Mark Aguiar, Princeton U; Fernando Alvarez, U of Chicago; Manuel Amador, U of Minnesota; Joao Ayres, Inter-American Development Bank; Saki Bigio, UCLA; Luigi Bocola, Stanford U; Francisco J. Buera, Washington U, St. Louis; Guillermo Calvo, Columbia U; Rodrigo Caputo, U of Santiago; Roberto Chang, Rutgers U; Carlos Javier Charotti, Central Bank of Paraguay; Simón Cueva, TNK Economics; Julián P. Díaz, Loyola U Chicago; Sebastian Edwards, UCLA; Carlos Esquivel, Rutgers U; Eduardo Fernández Arias, Peking U; Carlos Fernández Valdovinos (former Central Bank of Paraguay); Arturo José Galindo, Banco de la República, Colombia; Márcio Garcia, PUC-Rio; Felipe González Soley, U of Southampton; Diogo Guillen, PUC-Rio; Lars Peter Hansen, U of Chicago; Patrick Kehoe, Stanford U; Carlos Gustavo Machicado Salas, Bolivian Catholic U; Joaquín Marandino, U Torcuato Di Tella; Alberto Martin, U Pompeu Fabra; Cesar Martinelli, George Mason U; Felipe Meza, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México; Pablo Andrés Neumeyer, U Torcuato Di Tella; Gabriel Oddone, U de la República; Daniel Osorio, Banco de la República; José Peres Cajías, U of Barcelona; David Perez-Reyna, U de los Andes; Fabrizio Perri, Minneapolis Fed; Andrew Powell, Inter-American Development Bank; Diego Restuccia, U of Toronto; Diego Saravia, U de los Andes; Thomas J. Sargent, New York U; José A. Scheinkman, Columbia U; Teresa Ter-Minassian (formerly IMF); Marco Vega, Pontificia U Católica del Perú; Carlos Végh, Johns Hopkins U; François R. Velde, Chicago Fed; Alejandro Werner, IMF.
Provides a comprehensive analysis of why reforms in Latin America have failed in achieving growth and equity. The book focuses on three strategic areas of reforms of the Washington Consensus: Macroeconomics, Trade and Finance.
This paper provides a brief historical journey of central banking in Latin America to shed light on the debate about monetary policy in the post-global financial crisis period. The paper distinguishes three periods in Latin America’s central bank history: the early years, when central banks endorsed the gold standard and coped with the collapse of this monetary system; a second period, in which central banks turned into development banks under the aegis of governments at the expense of increasing inflation; and the “golden years,” when central banks succeeded in preserving price stability in an environment of political independence. The paper concludes by cautioning against overburdening central banks in Latin America with multiple mandates as this could end up undermining their hard-won monetary policy credibility.
