Estimating the 'coordinated Effects' of Mergers
Estimating the 'coordinated Effects' of Mergers

Author: Peter Davis

Publisher:

Published: 2010

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13:

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Mergers can be blocked if they increase the likelihood of coordination. This paper presents the first empirical coordinated effects merger simulation model in a differentiated productmarket. We study the network server market. We find that the incentives to coordinateactually fell as a result of the merger between Hewlett Packard (HP) and Compaq and show,contrary to conventional economic logic, that incentives to coordinate will ceteris paribusoften fall in this way after a merger. We extend the model to empirically examine the impactof multi-market contact, a competitive fringe, and the presence of an antitrust authorityimposing punishments on tacit colluders in the form of fines.

Mergers with Differentiated Products
Mergers with Differentiated Products

Author: Tommaso M. Valletti

Publisher:

Published: 2020

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13:

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On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.