On trial practice, defense lawyers, and legal ethics, by discussing the murder of Lord William Russell in London, May 5, 1840, and a reconstruction of the trial of his valet, Benjamin François Courvoisier.
The literature and jurisprudence of international criminal law relies on the claim that international crimes are exceptionally grave. They 'shock the conscience of humanity'. They are 'atrocities'. Yet what makes international crimes especially grave is rarely explained. Addressing the balance, Margaret DeGuzman explains what affect the historical occurrences that led to the heavy reliance on the concept of gravity, including the atrocities of the World War II era, and the crimes of Yugoslavia and Rwanda, had on international law. DeGuzman demonstrates how, in later decades, gravity has been used to obscure controversial value choices. This book looks to build the legitimacy of the international criminal law regime by exposing the value choices that the rhetoric of 'gravity' entails, and poses a new framework for assessing the legitimacy of international criminal law. Instead of solely relying on 'gravity', DeGuzman looks to wider values to ensure the continued legitimacy of international criminal law.
This book explores the Christian theological, legal, constitutional, historical, and philosophical meanings of conscience for both scholarly and educated general audiences.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
The book shows that civil disobedience is generally more defensible than private conscientious objection. Part I explores the morality of conviction and conscience. Each of these concepts informs a distinct argument for civil disobedience. The conviction argument begins with the communicative principle of conscientiousness (CPC). According to the CPC, having a conscientious moral conviction means not just acting consistently with our beliefs and judging ourselves and others by a common moral standard. It also means not seeking to evade the consequences of our beliefs and being willing to communicate them to others. The conviction argument shows that, as a constrained, communicative practice, civil disobedience has a better claim than private objection does to the protections that liberal societies give to conscientious dissent. This view reverses the standard liberal picture which sees private 'conscientious' objection as a modest act of personal belief and civil disobedience as a strategic, undemocratic act whose costs are only sometimes worth bearing. The conscience argument is narrower and shows that genuinely morally responsive civil disobedience honours the best of our moral responsibilities and is protected by a duty-based moral right of conscience. Part II translates the conviction argument and conscience argument into two legal defences. The first is a demands-of-conviction defence. The second is a necessity defence. Both of these defences apply more readily to civil disobedience than to private disobedience. Part II also examines lawful punishment, showing that, even when punishment is justifiable, civil disobedients have a moral right not to be punished. Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.
The Kentucky-born son of a Baptist preacher, with an early tendency toward racial prejudice, Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge (1894-1949) became one of the Court's leading liberal activists and an early supporter of racial equality, free speech, and church-state separation. Drawing on more than 160 interviews, John M. Ferren provides a valuable analysis of Rutledge's life and judicial decisionmaking and offers the most comprehensive explanation to date for the Supreme Court nominations of Rutledge, Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas. Rutledge was known for his compassion and fairness. He opposed discrimination based on gender and poverty and pressed for expanded rights to counsel, due process, and federal review of state criminal convictions. During his brief tenure on the Court (he died following a stroke at age fifty-five), he contributed significantly to enhancing civil liberties and the rights of naturalized citizens and criminal defendants, became the Court's most coherent expositor of the commerce clause, and dissented powerfully from military commission convictions of Japanese generals after World War II. Through an examination of Rutledge's life, Ferren highlights the development of American common law and legal education, the growth of the legal profession and related institutions, and the evolution of the American court system, including the politics of judicial selection.
Defines the crisis of the legal profession as a spiritual one rather than an ethical one, and urges lawyers to rethink their careers in terms of a vocation in the context of legal practice.
For the author, a judge is a person with a high ethical and moral capacity who respects their position. When we think of a court, we think about a place where we confront the truth, where every single individual, every judge and prosecutor, every victim and witness, and every accused person, offender, and the condemned, come together to reveal the naked truth. The main objective of criminal proceedings is to uphold a pure juridical system with full ethical conscience in order to protect the rights of all individuals, including members of the general public. Judges of criminal courts are required to be independent in order to pursue the truth and uphold judicial conscience, which is itself an institution based on the professional values of criminal justice. A judge with ample judicial conscience should not be afraid of being attacked or losing their position if they work to uphold and uncover the truth. This implies the independent freedom of judicial justice. If justice is safe, then the safety of the victims and the accused will also be guaranteed. That is why confidence in the professional standards of the ethical requirements of judges of national criminal courts or of the International Criminal Court is heavily contingent upon the judges' honesty, which in turn relates to their practical experiences and ought to be based on the knowledge of the essence of humanity. Professional ethics are particularly vital when evaluating diverse values and the very question of the existence of pluralist systems of national and international criminal justice which deal with core international crimes. The intention of this work is to assess the way in which our administration of national and international criminal justice requires judges to be impartial, pursue the truth, and not be the puppets of ventriloquist politicians.
In our complex, consumerist societies, the intricacy of personal interactions and the number of goods and products available often prevents us from direct knowledge of what lies ‘behind’ food behaviors, ingredients, and the origins of the modern food and agriculture supply chain. Over the last decade or so, scholars, lawyers and engaged lay vegans have had many discussions about vegan rights and discrimination as issues intrinsic to animal rights, but the final frontier remains intact: the direct concerns of other animals. To give effect to the rights of animals, we must recognize and defend the human right—or duty, as many uphold-- to care about them. Including contributors from Australia, the United States, Germany, Italy, France, Canada, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, this book explores the rights of vegans and how vegans can be protected from discrimination. Using an international socio-legal lens, the contributors discuss constitutional issues, vegan legal cases, the concept of protection for vegan ‘belief’ in human rights and equality law, the legal requirement to provide vegan food, animal agriculture and plant-based, vegan food in the context of the human right to food, and the rights of vegans in education and in health care. This book will be of interest to practicing lawyers, legal and critical legal scholars, scholars of vegan, and critical animal studies, and commentors on socio-political issues alike.