How National Contradictions Rival Political Ambitions, And Conflicting National Interests Have Affected Indo-China From 1945 To 1985 Is The Theme Of The Book.
Gareth Porter presents a new interpretation of how and why the US went to war in Vietnam. He provides a challenge to the prevailing explanation that US officials adhered blindly to a Cold War doctrine that loss of Vietnam would cause a 'domino effect' leading to communist dominance of the area.
For most Americans, the "exit" from Indochina occurred in 1973, with the withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Vietnam. In fact, the final exit did not occur until two decades later, after the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975, the Cambodian revolution, and a decade of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Only in the early 1990s were the major powers able to negotiate a settlement of the Cambodia conflict and withdraw from the region. This book recounts the diplomacy that brought an end to great power involvement in Indochina, including the negotiations for a UN peace process in Cambodia and construction of a "road map" for normalizing U.S.-Vietnam relations. In so doing, this volume also highlights the changing character of diplomacy at the beginning of the 1990s, when, at least temporarily, an era of military confrontation among the major world powers gave way to political management of international conflicts.
Bringing together a team of cutting-edge researchers based in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Indo-Pacific countries, this book focuses on the tug of war between China’s influence and forces of resistance in Hong Kong, Taiwan and selected countries in its surrounding jurisdictions. China’s influence has met growing defiance from citizens in Hong Kong and Taiwan who fear the extinction of their valued local identities. However, the book shows that resistance to China’s influence is a global phenomenon, varying in motivation and intensity from region to region and country to country depending on the forms of China’s influence and the balances of forces in each society. The book also advances a concentric center-periphery framework for comparing different forms of extra-jurisdictional Chinese influence mechanisms, ranging from economic, military and diplomatic influences to united front operations. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of comparative politics, international relations, geopolitics, Chinese politics, Hong Kong-China relations, Taiwan and Asian politics.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
This work describes riverine combat during the Vietnam War, emphasizing the operations of the U.S. Navy’s River Patrol Force, which conducted Operation Game Warden; the U.S. Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force, the formation that General William Westmoreland said “saved the Mekong Delta” during the Tet Offensive of 1968; and the Vietnam Navy. An important section details the SEALORDS combined campaign, a determined effort by U.S. Navy, South Vietnamese Navy, and allied ground forces to cut enemy supply lines from Cambodia and disrupt operations at base areas deep in the delta. The author also covers details on the combat vessels, helicopters, weapons, and equipment employed in the Mekong Delta as well as the Vietnamese combatants (on both sides) and American troops who fought to secure Vietnam’s waterways. Special features focus on the ubiquitous river patrol boats (PBRs) and the Swift boats (PCFs), river warfare training, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the Black Ponies aircraft squadron, and Navy SEALs. This publication may be of interest to history scholars, veterans, students in advanced placement history classes, and military enthusiasts given the continuing impact of riverine warfare on U.S. naval and military operations in the 21st century. Special Publicity Tie-In: Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam War (Commemoration dates: 28 May 2012 - 11 November 2025). This is the fifth book in the series, "The U.S. Navy and the Vietnam War." TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction The First Indochina War The Vietnam Navy River Force and American Advisors The U.S. Navy and the Rivers of Vietnam SEALORDS The End of the Line for U.S. and Vietnamese River Forces Sidebars: The PBR Riverine Warfare Training Battle Fleet of the Mekong Delta High Drama in the Delta Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Black Ponies The Swift Boat Warriors with Green Faces Suggested Reading
Going beyond the dominant orthodox narrative to incorporate insight from revisionist scholarship on the Vietnam War, Michael G. Kort presents the case that the United States should have been able to win the war, and at a much lower cost than it suffered in defeat. Presenting a study that is both historiographic and a narrative history, Kort analyzes important factors such as the strong nationalist credentials and leadership qualities of South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem; the flawed military strategy of 'graduated response' developed by Robert McNamara; and the real reasons South Vietnam collapsed in the face of a massive North Vietnamese invasion in 1975. Kort shows how the US commitment to defend South Vietnam was not a strategic error but a policy consistent with US security interests during the Cold War, and that there were potentially viable strategic approaches to the war that might have saved South Vietnam.
‘Churchill, Eden and Indo-China, 1951-1955’ offers a systematic approach to pertinent international politics, providing a historiography and assessing the impact of events such as the Cold War and the Second World War within the context of the governments of Churchill and Eden. Revisiting Churchill's wartime helmsmanship in order to shed further light on his post-war administration, Nông Dân provides a greater historical awareness of the broad international context of decolonized Indo-China and South East Asia.
When the Vietnam War ended with the North Vietnamese capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975--27 months after a cease-fire had been signed in Paris--the differences between the United States and Vietnam were far from being resolved. Mutual bitterness regarding the war remained. Newly unified Vietnam wanted normalization of relations and the subsequent economic reconstruction aid promised in the Paris Peace Accords. Understandably wary of such diplomatic relations, the United States requested information regarding soldiers listed as missing in action and assistance with the repatriation of military remains. A series of misconceptions and misunderstandings as well as changes from a regional to a global U.S. foreign policy left both countries bereft of an easy solution. This book describes the negotiations during the late Ford and early Carter administrations (1975-1979) and discusses the repercussions the diplomatic stalemate had on the domestic and international politics of the United States and Vietnam, emphasizing the conflicting priorities and political goals of both countries, at home and abroad. This previously neglected period in United States-Vietnam relations deals with issues such as Hanoi's constant exultation over the victory, American denial of responsibility, the division between the presidents' public declarations and congressional policies, and both sides' use of the MIA issue. Based primarily on recently declassified documents and former U.S. official Douglas Pike's uncensored collection, the work also makes use of media press sources from America, Vietnam, Britain, France and China. Interviews with Vietnamese immigrants and former U.S. politicians provide insight unavailable in written histories. Appendices contain the February 1973 correspondence between President Nixon and the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, six diplomatic notes from 1976, and a January 30, 1979, letter from President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping.