"This book, the outgrowth of a conference organized by the editors at Harvard Law School on April 19, 2008, aims to uncover the drivers behind the backlash against the current international investment regime."--Library of Congress Online Calalog.
Investment treaty arbitration (sometimes called investor-state dispute settlement or ISDS) has become a flashpoint in the backlash against globalization, with costs becoming an area of core scrutiny. Yet "conventional wisdom" about costs is not necessarily wise. To separate fact from fiction, this book tests claims about investment arbitration and fiscal costs against data so that policy reforms can be informed by scientific evidence. The exercise is critical, as investment treaties grant international arbitrators the power to order states-both rich and poor-to pay potentially millions of dollars to foreign investors when states violate the international law commitments made in the treaties. Meanwhile, the cost to access and defend the arbitration can also climb to millions of dollars. This book uses insights drawn from cognitive psychology and hard data to explore the reality of investment treaty arbitration, identify core demographics and basic information on outcomes, and drill down on the costs of parties' counsel and arbitral tribunals. It offers a nuanced analysis of how and when cost-shifting occurs, parses tribunals' rationalization (or lack thereof) of cost assessments, and models the variables most likely to predict costs, using data to point the way towards evidence-based normative reform. With an intelligent interdisciplinary approach that speaks to ongoing reform at entities like the World Bank's ICSID and UNCITRAL, this book provides the most up-to-date study of investment treaty dispute settlement, offering new insights that will shape the direction of investment treaty and arbitration reform more broadly.
International investment arbitration remains one of the most controversial areas of globalisation and international law. This book provides a fresh contribution to the debate by adopting a thoroughly empirical approach. Based on new datasets and a range of quantitative, qualitative and computational methods, the contributors interrogate claims and counter-claims about the regime's legitimacy. The result is a nuanced picture about many of the critiques lodged against the regime, whether they be bias in arbitral decision-making, close relationships between law firms and arbitrators, absence of arbitral diversity, and excessive compensation. The book comes at a time when several national and international initiatives are under way to reform international investment arbitration. The authors discuss and analyse how the regime can be reformed and ow a process of legitimation might occur.
This book provides a comprehensive account of the CETA Investment Chapter’s ability to overcome the legitimacy crisis facing investment arbitration. To do so, it first examines the root causes behind the legitimacy crisis, ultimately arguing that it reflects a fundamental rule of law crisis within investment arbitration. In particular, it asserts that the normative standpoints of the legitimacy crisis form part of the rule of law, the uniting legal principle from which the legitimacy concerns stem. The book contends that the rule of law is not only the principal normative and causal assumption on which the legitimacy concerns are based, but that it could also be utilized as a platform to evaluate the investment arbitration mechanism in CETA's Investment Chapter. Based on this, the book evaluates CETA's Investment Chapter through the rule of law framework in order to provide a convincing account of the latter's ability to overcome the legitimacy crisis facing investment arbitration. It concludes that CETA's Investment Chapter is unlikely to completely solve the legitimacy crisis simply because it is just a patchwork of reforms rather than a comprehensive reinvention of the substantive and procedural law of investment arbitration. Lastly, the book offers meaningful insights into the way the challenges presented by investment arbitration should be addressed. The book is intended for academics researching international investment law and arbitration as well as for policy-makers focusing on reforming investor-state dispute settlement.
Investor-State Arbitration describes the increasing importance of international investment and the necessary development of a new field of international law that defines the obligations of host states and creates procedures for resolving disputes. The authors examine the international treaties that allow investors to proceed with the arbitration of their claims, describe the most-commonly employed arbitration rules, and set forth the most important elements of investor-State arbitration procedure - including tribunal composition, jurisdiction, evidence, award, and challenge of annulment. The authors trace the evolution and rapid development of the field of international investment, including the formation of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the more than 2,000 bilateral investment treaties, most of which were entered into in the last twenty years. The authors explain how this development has led to far greater certainty for foreign investors in dealing with their host countries, as well as how it has incentivized growth in international trade and commerce.
The Selection and Removal of Arbitrators in Investor-State Dispute Settlement examines two essential features in investor-state dispute resolution: how arbitrators are selected and removed. Both topics have received increasing scrutiny and criticism, that have in turn generated calls for reforms. In its first part, Professor Chiara Giorgetti, an expert in international arbitration, explains the selection of arbitrators procedurally and comparatively under the most-often used arbitration rules. She then reviews critically arbitrators’ necessary and desirable qualities, and addresses some important and related policy issues, such as diversity and repeat appointments. In her work, she also includes an assessment of the calls to review how arbitrators are appointed, and specifically the proposal by the European Commission to create a permanent tribunal to resolve international investment disputes, the UNCITRAL Working Groups III Reform Process and the rules amendment proposal undertaken by the Secretariat of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. In its second part, this monograph examines how arbitrators can be removed and reviews first the applicable provisions, under a variety of arbitration rules, to remove arbitrators who fail to possess the necessary qualities. It then also reviews the relevant case-law on challenges. The monograph assesses appointments and removals in a multifaceted and comprehensive way, and includes a critical assessment of the reasons and calls for reform of the ISDS system.