This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multi-year, multi-billion dollar program at the heart of the Army¿s transformation efforts. It was to be the Army¿s major R&D, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive commun. and info. network. The FCS program has been characterized as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together. Contents of this report: (1) Program Origins; (2) Program Overview; Current FCS Program Status; Army¿s Modernization Strategy; Budget Issues; (3) Issues for Congress: MGV Cancellation; Army Modernization Strategy and Spin Outs; Proposed Ground Combat Vehicles. Illustrations.
The Future Combat System (FCS) was a multiyear, multibillion dollar program at the heart of the Army's transformation efforts. It was to be the Army's major research, development, and acquisition program consisting of 14 manned and unmanned systems tied together by an extensive communications and information network. FCS was intended to replace current systems such as the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. The FCS program has been characterized by the Army and others as a high-risk venture due to the advanced technologies involved and the challenge of networking all of the FCS subsystems together so that FCS-equipped units could function as intended. The FCS program exists in a dynamic national security environment which ultimately played a role in determining the program's fate. Some questioned if FCS, envisioned and designed prior to September 11, 2001 to combat conventional land forces, was relevant in current and anticipated future conflicts where counterinsurgency and stabilization operations are expected to be the norm. The Army contended, however, that FCS was relevant throughout the "entire spectrum of conflict" and that a number of FCS technologies and systems were effectively used in counterinsurgency and stabilization campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates announced that he intended to significantly restructure the FCS program. The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to accelerate the spin out of selected FCS technologies to all brigade combat teams (BCTs) but will recommend canceling the manned ground vehicle (MGV) component of the program, which was intended to field eight separate tracked combat vehicle variants built on a common chassis that would eventually replace combat vehicles such as the M-1 Abrams tank, the M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and the M-109 Paladin self-propelled artillery system. Secretary Gates was concerned that there were significant unanswered questions in the FCS vehicle design strategy and that despite some adjustments to the MGVs, they did not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Secretary Gates also critical that the FCS program did not include a role for Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles that have been used successfully in current conflicts. After re-evaluating requirements, technology, and approach, DOD will re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. Plans for transition from the FCS program to a new program where the Army intends to modernize all BCTs with remaining FCS technologies will likely be of critical congressional interest. The developments of a new Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) to replace the canceled MGVs could also be subject to congressional debate and oversight
To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) -- which the Army calls the ¿greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken¿ -- is expected to meet the Army¿s transformational objectives. For FCS¿ first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5-1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (Nov. 2008). This testimony is about FCS¿ key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks. Illustrations.
The U.S. Army's Future Combat Systems program aimed to field an ambitious system of systems, with novel technologies integrated via an advanced wireless network. The largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army's history, it was cancelled in 2009, and some of its efforts transitioned to follow-on programs. This report documents the program's complex history and draws lessons from its experiences.
In today's environment of rapidly evolving conflicts, the Army's goal is to have units that have the combat power of heavy units but that can be transported anywhere in the world in a matter of days. To address concerns about the armored vehicle fleet's aging and the difficulties involved in transporting it as well as to equip the Army more suitably to conduct operations overseas on short notice using forces based in the United States the service created the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program in 2000. A major modernization effort, the program is designed in part to develop and purchase vehicles to replace those now in the heavy forces; the new vehicles would be much lighter, thereby easing the deployment of units equipped with them. In the analysis presented in this report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined the current status of the Army's fleet of armored vehicles and assessed the speed of deployment of the service's heavy forces. It also evaluated the FCS program, considering the program's costs as well as its advantages and disadvantages and comparing it with several alternative plans for modernizing the Army's heavy forces.
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) are expected to play a key role in the Army's Objective Force structure. These UGVs would be used for weapons platforms, logistics carriers, and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition among other things. To examine aspects of the Army's UGV program, assess technology readiness, and identify key issues in implementing UGV systems, among other questions, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology asked the National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study of UGV technologies. This report discusses UGV operational requirements, current development efforts, and technology integration and roadmaps to the future. Key recommendations are presented addressing technical content, time lines, and milestones for the UGV efforts.
This report looks at budget requests for the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) program, Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program, and brigade combat teams (BCTs). It ends with a discussion of potential issues for Congress.
