The choices we make in advance of the next financial crisis will have a major impact in determining the magnitude of the economic damage. Our vulnerability to crisis depends on the strength of the protections we build into the financial system through prudential regulation, as well as on the degrees of freedom we create for ourselves to respond to the unanticipated, and the knowledge and experience we bring in managing crises. Is the financial system safer today? With the reforms now in place and with the memory of the crisis still fresh, how confident should we feel about the resilience of the financial system and our ability to protect the US economy from a major financial crisis? Warburg Pincus President and former US Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner attempts to answer these questions in his October 2016 Per Jacobsson Lecture.
The future of finance, and in particular saving it from a popular backlash against the global financial crisis and related crisis management policies, has become a matter of great concern. In this brochure, which presents in written form a lecture from the Per Jacobsson Foundation’s lecture series, former Reserve Bank of India Governor Y. V. Reddy explores three interrelated issues of particular concern to central bankers in the search for good finance for the future: how to ensure that the financial sector serves the society better, how to integrate financial sector policies better with national economic policies, and how to ensure that the financial industry functions as a means and not as an end in itself. The question-and-answer session following the lecture is also included in the brochure.
This paper describes a financial system that should be adopted for the 21st century. The paper highlights that the financial crisis of 2008 has raised fundamental questions about how the financial industry is structured, managed, and regulated. The paper discusses that a well-functioning financial system plays an essential role in generating high levels of saving, promoting the efficient allocation of investment, and smoothing economic fluctuations stemming from nonfinancial causes. By facilitating informed risk taking, it is a key element in achieving optimal levels of productivity growth and rising living standards.
As the Federal Reserve’s statutory objectives are defined as specific goals for the U.S. economy—to pursue maximum sustainable employment and price stability—and its policy decisions are targeted to achieve these dual objectives, there might seem to be little need for its policymakers to pay attention to developments outside the United States. But such an inference would be incorrect: the state of the U.S. economy is significantly affected by the state of the world economy, and of course, actions taken by the Federal Reserve influence economic conditions abroad, which in turn spill back on the evolution of the U.S. economy and therefore must be taken into account in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy choices. This Per Jacobsson Lecture first reviews the effect of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies on the rest of the global economy, particularly emerging market economies. It then addresses prospective outcomes and possible risks associated with the normalization of the Federal Reserve’s policies. Finally, it discusses the Federal Reserve’s responsibilities in the world economy.
This paper discusses that as the IMF had been designed to assist countries with current account deficits, its role came under discussion. It subsequently regained some importance during the Latin American crises in the 1980s and the emerging market crises in the 1990s. It became apparent that an initially national crisis might very quickly assume a global character by spreading through closely linked financial systems. The global financial system and the global real economy are so intertwined that a financial crisis can severely affect the real economy in both emerging and advanced economies. Emerging economies acted as an important stabilizer at the height of the crisis, whereas major advanced economies are now facing a rather modest outlook for growth. The ultimate objective should be to tackle the roots of the crisis instead of just creating ever more instruments to fight the symptoms. Against this backdrop, any attempt to enhance the IMF's capacity for crisis management has to be thoroughly assessed in terms of costs and benefits.
The IMF has been a major participant in the challenge of transforming many African, Asian, and European countries from centrally planned to market economies. The authors of this book, mainly staff members of the IMF, have distilled their firsthand experience with fiscal reform in transition economies into 15 case studies of these countries. In doing so they analyze issues of privatization, fiscal federalism, social safety nets, and the net worth of the Soviet Union. The editor of the volume is Vito Tanzi, Director of the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department.
“Exceptional . . . Deeply researched and elegantly written . . . As a description of the politics and pressures under which modern independent central banking has to operate, the book is incomparable.” —Financial Times The definitive biography of the most important economic statesman of our time, from the bestselling author of The Power Law and More Money Than God Sebastian Mallaby's magisterial biography of Alan Greenspan, the product of over five years of research based on untrammeled access to his subject and his closest professional and personal intimates, brings into vivid focus the mysterious point where the government and the economy meet. To understand Greenspan's story is to see the economic and political landscape of our time—and the presidency from Reagan to George W. Bush—in a whole new light. As the most influential economic statesman of his age, Greenspan spent a lifetime grappling with a momentous shift: the transformation of finance from the fixed and regulated system of the post-war era to the free-for-all of the past quarter century. The story of Greenspan is also the story of the making of modern finance, for good and for ill. Greenspan's life is a quintessential American success story: raised by a single mother in the Jewish émigré community of Washington Heights, he was a math prodigy who found a niche as a stats-crunching consultant. A master at explaining the economic weather to captains of industry, he translated that skill into advising Richard Nixon in his 1968 campaign. This led to a perch on the White House Council of Economic Advisers, and then to a dazzling array of business and government roles, from which the path to the Fed was relatively clear. A fire-breathing libertarian and disciple of Ayn Rand in his youth who once called the Fed's creation a historic mistake, Mallaby shows how Greenspan reinvented himself as a pragmatist once in power. In his analysis, and in his core mission of keeping inflation in check, he was a maestro indeed, and hailed as such. At his retirement in 2006, he was lauded as the age's necessary man, the veritable God in the machine, the global economy's avatar. His memoirs sold for record sums to publishers around the world. But then came 2008. Mallaby's story lands with both feet on the great crash which did so much to damage Alan Greenspan's reputation. Mallaby argues that the conventional wisdom is off base: Greenspan wasn't a naïve ideologue who believed greater regulation was unnecessary. He had pressed for greater regulation of some key areas of finance over the years, and had gotten nowhere. To argue that he didn't know the risks in irrational markets is to miss the point. He knew more than almost anyone; the question is why he didn't act, and whether anyone else could or would have. A close reading of Greenspan's life provides fascinating answers to these questions, answers whose lessons we would do well to heed. Because perhaps Mallaby's greatest lesson is that economic statesmanship, like political statesmanship, is the art of the possible. The Man Who Knew is a searching reckoning with what exactly comprised the art, and the possible, in the career of Alan Greenspan.
The all-encompassing embrace of world capitalism at the beginning of the twenty-first century was generally attributed to the superiority of competitive markets. Globalization had appeared to be the natural outcome of this unstoppable process. But today, with global markets roiling and increasingly reliant on state intervention to stay afloat, it has become clear that markets and states aren't straightforwardly opposing forces. In this groundbreaking work, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin demonstrate the intimate relationship between modern capitalism and the American state. The Making of Global Capitalism identifies the centrality of the social conflicts that occur within states rather than between them. These emerging fault lines hold out the possibility of new political movements that might transcend global markets.
