Analyzes the impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on urban neighborhoods in Mass. Explores the topic using a data set that matches race and income info. with property-level, transaction data. Much of the subprime lending in the state was concentrated in urban neighborhoods and that minority homeownerships created with subprime mortgages have proved exceptionally unstable in the face of rapid price declines. Subprime lending did not, as commonly believed, lead to a substantial increase in homeownership by minorities but instead generated turnover in properties owned by minority residents. The particularly dire foreclosure situation in urban neighborhoods actually makes it somewhat easier for policymakers to provide remedies. Illus.
LONGLISTED FOR THE 2019 NATIONAL BOOK AWARD FINALIST, 2020 PULITZER PRIZE IN HISTORY By the late 1960s and early 1970s, reeling from a wave of urban uprisings, politicians finally worked to end the practice of redlining. Reasoning that the turbulence could be calmed by turning Black city-dwellers into homeowners, they passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, and set about establishing policies to induce mortgage lenders and the real estate industry to treat Black homebuyers equally. The disaster that ensued revealed that racist exclusion had not been eradicated, but rather transmuted into a new phenomenon of predatory inclusion. Race for Profit uncovers how exploitative real estate practices continued well after housing discrimination was banned. The same racist structures and individuals remained intact after redlining's end, and close relationships between regulators and the industry created incentives to ignore improprieties. Meanwhile, new policies meant to encourage low-income homeownership created new methods to exploit Black homeowners. The federal government guaranteed urban mortgages in an attempt to overcome resistance to lending to Black buyers – as if unprofitability, rather than racism, was the cause of housing segregation. Bankers, investors, and real estate agents took advantage of the perverse incentives, targeting the Black women most likely to fail to keep up their home payments and slip into foreclosure, multiplying their profits. As a result, by the end of the 1970s, the nation's first programs to encourage Black homeownership ended with tens of thousands of foreclosures in Black communities across the country. The push to uplift Black homeownership had descended into a goldmine for realtors and mortgage lenders, and a ready-made cudgel for the champions of deregulation to wield against government intervention of any kind. Narrating the story of a sea-change in housing policy and its dire impact on African Americans, Race for Profit reveals how the urban core was transformed into a new frontier of cynical extraction.
Takes a skeptical look at a leading argument about what is causing the foreclosure crisis and what should be done to stop it. The authors focus on two key decisions: the borrower's choice to default on a mortgage and the lender's subsequent choice whether to renegotiate or modify the loan. Unaffordable loans, defined as those with high mortgage payments relative to income at origination, are unlikely to be the main reason that borrowers decide to default. The efficiency of foreclosure for investors is a more plausible explanation for the low number of modifications to date. Policies designed to reduce foreclosures should focus on ameliorating the effects of job loss rather than modifying loans to make them more affordable on a long-term basis. Illustrations.
Over the past decade, a new mortgage market offering loans at low interest rates and for little or no money down has given low-income people an opportunity to pursue the American dream of homeownership. The resulting wave in home buying promised to stabilize neighborhoods and families, boost the economy, and reduce crime. In many ways, the optimists were correct, but now, less than fifteen years later, the subprime mortgage market is collapsing, threatening to take the rest of the housing sector along with it.Subprime Mortgages: America's Latest Boom and Bust analyzes how the subprime market emerged, why it is in crisis, and how we can reform public policy to avert disaster. An attendant examination of the rental market also offers recommendations for shoring up what may be the best housing option for some families.
Analyzes data and trends in the residential housing market and reviews the academic lit. and industry press on the root causes of the current foreclosure crisis (FC). Provides a review of policy responses and recommended actions to mitigate the FC and help prevent similar crises from occurring in the future. Contents: (1) Trends in Delinquencies and Foreclosures: Regional Trends in Foreclosures; (2) Lit. Review: General Lit. on Causes of Foreclosures and Delinquencies; Lit. Assessing Causes of the Current FC; Factors Enabling Expanded Risky Lending; (3) Policy Responses to the FC: Efforts To Address Rising Foreclosures; Efforts To Reduce the Risk of High Rates of Mortgage Foreclosures in the Future; Mortgage Market Reform. Illus.
The fiasco that sank millions of Americans, including one journalist, who thought he knew better. A veteran New York Times economics reporter, Ed Andrews was intimately aware of the dangers posed by easy mortgages from fast-buck lenders. Yet, at the promise of a second chance at love, he succumbed to the temptation of subprime lending and became part of the economic catastrophe he was covering. In surprisingly short order, he amassed a staggering amount of debt and reached the edge of bankruptcy. In Busted, Andrew bluntly recounts his misadventures in mortgages and goes one step further to describe the brokers, lenders, Wall Street players, and Washington policymakers who helped bring that money to his door. The result is a penetrating and often acerbic look at the binge and bust that nearly bankrupted the United States. Enabled by know-nothing complacency in Washington, Wall Street wizards used "collateralized debt obligations," "conduits," and other inscrutable financial "innovations" to put American home financing into hyperdrive. Millions of Americans abandoned the safety of thirty-year, fixed-rate mortgages and loaded up on debt. While regulators insisted that the markets knew best, Wall Street firms fragmented and repackaged unsound loans into securities that the rating agencies stamped with triple-A seals of approval. Andrews describes a remarkably democratic debacle that made fools out of people up and down the financial food chain. From a confessional meeting with Alan Greenspan to a trek through the McMansion bubble of the OC, he maps the arc of the Frankenstein loans that brought the American economy to the brink. With on-the-ground reporting from the frothiest quarters of the crisis, Andrews locates what is likely to be the high-water mark in America's long-term embrace of higher borrowing, higher risk-taking, and the fervent belief in the possibility of easy profits.
Subprime mortgage lending expanded in New York City between 2004 and mid-2007, and delinquencies on these subprime loans have been rising sharply. The authors describe the main features of this lending and model the performance of these loans. These subprime loans are found to be clustered in neighborhoods where average borrower credit quality is low and, unlike prime mortgage loans, where African-Americans and Hispanics constitute relatively large shares of the population. The authors estimate a model of the likelihood that these loans will become seriously delinquent and find a significant role for credit quality of borrowers, debt-to-income and loan-to-value ratios at the time of loan origination, and estimates of the loss of home equity. Illus.
7. Community Reinvestment from 1988 to the End of the Twentieth Century: Struggles for Bank and Regulator Accountability -- 8. The Predatory Lending Policy Debate -- 9. The Community Reinvestment Act and Fair Lending Policy in the Twenty-first Century -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index
