The Main Supply Estimates are the means by which the Government requests resources from Parliament to meet its expenditure plans for the coming financial year, setting out a resource-based Estimate for each Department and for public service pension schemes. The Committee's report focuses on the Estimates for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 2007-08 (HCP 438, session 2006-07; ISBN 9780102944969). It identifies no issues which require to be debated by the House of Commons before the House is asked to agree to the Main Estimates, but the report highlights the fact that MoD's request for resources of £33.7 billion in the Main Estimates does not include the expected costs of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and so greatly underestimates the total expected cost of the MoD's activities in 2007-08. It argues that the MoD should include estimated costs of military operations in its Main Estimates, instead of waiting for the Supplementary Estimates as it does at present, as it is unacceptable that the MoD is incurring costs on military operations, without parliamentary approval and without even providing Parliament with an outline of the anticipated costs.
Response to 10th report, HC 379 session 2006-07 (ISBN 9780215032997). The Ministry of Defence's spring supplementary estimates are contained in HC 293 (ISBN 9780102944457) published in February 2007
This report is the Committee's annual review of how the FCO is managing its resources. This year a key area off interest has been the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review because the Committee think it is one of the tightest in Whitehall and it risks jeopardising some of the FCO's important work. Apart from this the other subjects covered are: measuring performance; operational efficiency; management and leadership; FCO services; diplomatic representation overseas; transparency and openness; public diplomacy; British council; BBC World Service.
This is the first annual scrutiny by the Treasury Committee of the Chancellor of Exchequer's Departments. The Committee sets out a number of conclusions and recommendations, including: that the Treasury should include within its' annual reports a summary of the results of the annual surveys of stakeholder opinion and the Treasury's response to stakeholders; the Committee recommends that the Treasury set itself a target to ensure that the Public Service Agreements finalised as part of the next Spending Review in 2009 or 2010 include a clear statement about the resources to be allocated across Government to the delivery of each Agreement; the Committee criticises the Treasury's failure to meet its objective for the appointment of professionally-qualified Finance Directors in all Departments by December 2006 and that a relevant accountancy qualification be described as an essental criterion in all future post advertisements; the Committee views the Value for Money Delivery Agreements across Government as disappointing, and wants the Government to develop programmes that measure quality of service and efficiency effectively; the Committee commends the Royal Mint's return to profitability but is concerned about the ambitious target set for next year; that the Office of Government Commerce has failed to publish a regular annual report; the Committee expresses surprise that HM Revenue and Customs had approved a 60% increase in senior civil service bonus payments over a period of poor performance and headcount reductions, also the Committee highlights the problems experienced in VAT registrations and the failure of HMRC to meet its processing target of VAT receipts as well as poor administration of tax credits.
The mission of the MoD's (Ministry of Defence's) Defence Equipment and Support (DE & S) organisation is to equip and support our Armed Forces for operations now and in the future. Support to current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has taken priority and the organisation has performed well. The Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) system remains highly effective in enabling vital equipment to be provided quickly to the two theatres to meet rapidly changing threats, but there are concerns that UORs represent a partial failure to equip our forces for predicted expeditionary operations, and on their effects on the core budget in future years. DE & S' performance in procuring longer-term equipment declined significantly in 2007-08. The forecast costs for the 20 largest defence projects increased by £205 million and the forecast delays increased by some 100 months in the year. The improvements promised by both the long-standing application of the principles of 'smart procurement' and the more recent formation of the DE & S organisation appear not to have materialised. The FRES (Future Rapid Effect System) programme has been a fiasco, being poorly conceived and managed from the outset. The Committee condemns the failure to date to publish an updated version of the Defence Industrial Strategy and considers that its continuing absence increases the risk that the UK Defence Industrial Base will not be able to meet the future requirements of our Armed Forces. Finally, the UK's future military capability depends on the investment made today in Research and Development. Sufficient funding for defence research needs to be ring-fenced and the MoD must recognise the very high priority of research and reverse the recent cut in research spending.
The Defence Committee report recommends that when troops are committed to operations in future there must be robust plans to coordinate military and reconstruction efforts from the earliest stages. The next Government should lay out the requirements of the "Comprehensive Approach" (the combination of civilian and military actors in a counter-insurgency operation) in order better to preserve all the lessons learned in the complex operations of Iraq and Afghanistan, many of them having been painfully re-learned from Bosnia, Kosovo and even Malaya. The Committee looks to the recently formed Stabilisation Unit (owned by the Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence) to maintain a capacity to deploy significant numbers of personnel for post-conflict reconstruction and to ensure that vital knowledge and skills gained during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan are retained and built on. The Comprehensive Approach requires close work with local nationals to build up their capability and confidence in all fields including security, governance, law and order and development. This must include women at all levels. The Government needs to find better ways to draw on the expertise of NGOs without compromising the effectiveness and safety of aid workers on the ground.
The Ministry of Defence needs the capability to transport personnel, equipment and stores from the UK to operational theatres across the globe. This capability, known as Strategic Lift, can by delivered by sea, land or air, and its annual cost to the MoD is almost £800 million a year. The Committee's report examines the progress of the MoD in delivering the Strategic Lift requirements set out in the Strategic Defence Review and whether these requirements need to be revisited given the experience of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Findings include that good progress has been made in improving strategic sea-lift, particularly in relation to Ro-Ro ships and the acquisition of Landing Platform Dock (Auxiliary) vessels. However, strategic air-lift is a particular concern given the age of many of the aircraft, and the report looks at the progress of two major equipment programmes designed to deliver new transport aircraft (the A400M transport aircraft) and new tanker aircraft (the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft).