Signaling Games in Political Science
Signaling Games in Political Science

Author: Jeffery S. Banks

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2013-01-11

Total Pages: 109

ISBN-13: 1136643087

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First Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world.

Signaling Games in Political Science
Signaling Games in Political Science

Author: Jeffery S. Banks

Publisher: Routledge

Published: 2013-01-11

Total Pages: 110

ISBN-13: 113664315X

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First Published in 1991. This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalises earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. The monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, regulation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants as well as how it rationalises certain types of political behavior and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an 'incomplete information' world.

Political Game Theory
Political Game Theory

Author: Nolan McCarty

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Published: 2014-10-30

Total Pages: 0

ISBN-13: 9781107438637

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Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

Game Theory
Game Theory

Author: Steve Tadelis

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2013-01-06

Total Pages: 416

ISBN-13: 0691129088

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The definitive introduction to game theory This comprehensive textbook introduces readers to the principal ideas and applications of game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games, reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory, this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives. Game Theory is the ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize informal situations and then analyze them. Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students

Game Theory for Political Scientists
Game Theory for Political Scientists

Author: James D. Morrow

Publisher: Princeton University Press

Published: 2020-05-05

Total Pages: 400

ISBN-13: 0691213208

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Game theory is the mathematical analysis of strategic interaction. In the fifty years since the appearance of von Neumann and Morgenstern's classic Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, 1944), game theory has been widely applied to problems in economics. Until recently, however, its usefulness in political science has been underappreciated, in part because of the technical difficulty of the methods developed by economists. James Morrow's book is the first to provide a standard text adapting contemporary game theory to political analysis. It uses a minimum of mathematics to teach the essentials of game theory and contains problems and their solutions suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in all branches of political science. Morrow begins with classical utility and game theory and ends with current research on repeated games and games of incomplete information. The book focuses on noncooperative game theory and its application to international relations, political economy, and American and comparative politics. Special attention is given to models of four topics: bargaining, legislative voting rules, voting in mass elections, and deterrence. An appendix reviews relevant mathematical techniques. Brief bibliographic essays at the end of each chapter suggest further readings, graded according to difficulty. This rigorous but accessible introduction to game theory will be of use not only to political scientists but also to psychologists, sociologists, and others in the social sciences.

Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups
Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups

Author: Randolph Sloof

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

Published: 2013-11-11

Total Pages: 267

ISBN-13: 1475753071

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In this chapter the topic of this book is introduced. Section 1. 1 provides a brief and rather general motivation for the scientific project undertaken here. Interest groups are a very popular object of scientific inquiry, and they received already considerable research attention from scholars in political science, as well as from researchers in economics. Necessarily, then, this book adds to a literature which is already quite developed. A detailed positioning in this literature of the theoretical material presented in this monograph will be given in Chapter 2. This second chapter will also, by means of a review of the empirical literature, provide a more general overview of the issues deemed to be important when studying the influence of interest groups on public policy. The outline of the entire book is described in greater detail in Section 1. 2. As most issues involved are more easily presented in later chapters, this introductory chapter is kept brief. 1. 1 MOTIVATION Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. Examples abound in both the economics and political science literature, as well as in journalistic accounts and popular publications. On many occasions the authors express concerns about the negative impact of interest groups on the democratic quality of government. "The interests of a small group are served at the expense of the interests of the general public, the taxpayers!", is an often heard popular complaint.

Getting to War
Getting to War

Author: W. Ben Hunt

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

Published: 2010-05-18

Total Pages: 206

ISBN-13: 0472026488

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This book shows how to predict wars. More specifically, it tells us how to anticipate in a timely fashion the scope and extent of interstate conflict. By focusing on how all governments--democratic or not--seek to secure public support before undertaking risky moves such as starting a war, Getting to War provides a methodology for identifying a regime's intention to launch a conflict well in advance of the actual initiation. The goal here is the identification of leading indicators of war. Getting to War develops such a leading political indicator by a systematic examination of the ways in which governments influence domestic and international information flows. Regardless of the relative openness of the media system in question, we can accurately gauge the underlying intentions of those governments by a systematic analysis of opinion-leading articles in the mass media. This analysis allows us to predict both the likelihood of conflict and what form of conflict--military or diplomatic/economic--will occur. Theoretically, this book builds on a forty-year-old insight by Karl Deutsch--that all governments seek to mobilize public opinion through mass media and that careful analysis of such domestic media activity could provide an "early warning network" of international conflict. By showing how to tap the link between conflict initiation and public support, this book provides both a useful tool for understanding crisis behavior as well as new theoretical insights on how domestic politics help drive foreign policy. Getting to War will be of interest to political scientists who study international disputes and national security as well as social scientists interested in media studies and political communication. General readers with an interest in military or diplomatic history--particularly U.S. history--will find that Getting to War provides an entirely new perspective on how to understand wars and international crises. W. Ben Hunt is Assistant Professor of Politics, New York University

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics

Author:

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2016-05-18

Total Pages: 7493

ISBN-13: 1349588024

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The award-winning The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition is now available as a dynamic online resource. Consisting of over 1,900 articles written by leading figures in the field including Nobel prize winners, this is the definitive scholarly reference work for a new generation of economists. Regularly updated! This product is a subscription based product.