Security assistance and security cooperation are interrelated missions that rely on military staffs in U.S. embassies in partner countries. In countries threatened by insecurity or instability, actions may be required that are not easily accomplished under current systems. This report examines three options for improving current approaches to security assistance and cooperation. They range from changes in current practices to options requiring new policies, procedures, organizations, or authorities.
The United States conducts a wide range of security cooperation missions and initiatives that can serve as key enablers of U.S. foreign policy efforts to assist and influence other countries. For a relatively small investment, security cooperation programs can play an important role by shaping the security environment and laying the groundwork for future stability operations with allies and partners. Security cooperation, in the form of noncombat military-to-military activities, includes "normal" peacetime activities, such as building the long-term institutional and operational capabilities and capacity of key partners and allies, establishing and deepening relationships between the United States and partner militaries, and securing access to critical areas overseas. Security cooperation also can include conducting quasi-operational efforts, such as helping U.S. partners and allies manage their own internal defense. However, current national security challenges both create significant demands for U.S. security cooperation programs and deplete the resources needed to carry out these missions. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are occupying the regular, reserve, National Guard, and Special Forces trainers and advisors who would normally be called on to train and advise military counterparts. Furthermore, U.S. allies, who often complement the efforts of U.S. advisors and trainers, are also stretched thin by their own deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In an effort to find ways to improve security cooperation planning, coordination, and execution, the U.S. Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an assessment of key facets of U.S. security cooperation -- specifically, the missions, capabilities, and structure needed in the security assistance organizations (SAOs) that coordinate the military aspects of U.S. foreign relations, including security cooperation activities, at U.S. Missions around the world.
In the realm of security cooperation--peacetime activities undertaken by the U.S. armed services with other armed forces and countries--the U.S. Army's current planning process is exceedingly complex and difficult to coordinate, control, and measure. This monograph seeks to help the U.S. Army improve its ability to assess future demand for resources devoted to security cooperation and to evaluate the impact of these demands upon the resources available to the Army.
Since its creation in 1963, United States Southern Command has been led by 30 senior officers representing all four of the armed forces. None has undertaken his leadership responsibilities with the cultural sensitivity and creativity demonstrated by Admiral Jim Stavridis during his tenure in command. Breaking with tradition, Admiral Stavridis discarded the customary military model as he organized the Southern Command Headquarters. In its place he created an organization designed not to subdue adversaries, but instead to build durable and enduring partnerships with friends. His observation that it is the business of Southern Command to launch "ideas not missiles" into the command's area of responsibility gained strategic resonance throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America, and at the highest levels in Washington, DC.
The military engagement team (MET) conducts security cooperation engagements with regional military partners in the designated Army Service component command (ASCC) area of responsibility (AOR). These engagements develop relationships and enhance partner capabilities and interoperability, thereby supporting regional stability and security. The purpose is to expand the ASCC's access and influence in the AOR. The MET utilizes its extensive military and civilian skills to promote conditions for cooperation, regional security, and regional stability one engagement and one relationship at a time.The MET is guided by country plans and coordinated efforts involving the ASCC; regionally aligned forces (RAF); and country desk officers (CDOs), military assistance programs, and the Offices of Military Cooperation within the U.S. Embassy. These programs all fall under the umbrella of international military affairs (IMA). The MET succeeds when it enhances the relationships between the ASCC and regional military partners, increases partner nations' interoperability and capability, and contributes to regional security and stability. There is currently one permanent MET assigned to United States Army Central Command (ARCENT) and stationed in Kuwait. The ARCENT MET is active in the Middle East and Central Asia.
1-1. Purpose: This regulation establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for providing U.S. Army Security Assistance Teams (SAT) to foreign governments and international organizations under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act as amended. This regulation also defines types of SAT teams (fig 1-1), discusses the process for requesting, programming, deploying teams, highlights quality of life and mission sustainment issues associated with team deployment. The SAT consists of U.S. Military, Department of the Army (DA) civilians, or contractor personnel, deployed to a foreign country on temporary duty (TDY) less than 180 days, or permanent change of station (PCS)/ temporary change of station (TCS) more than 179 days status. An exception to this would be deployment in continental United States (CONUS) to support training on major equipment purchases. 1-2. References: Required and related publications and prescribed and referenced forms are listed in appendix A. 1-3. Explanation: of abbreviations and terms Abbreviations and special terms used in this regulation are explained in the glossary. 1-4:. Responsibilities a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics & Technology). The ASA (ALT) acts for the Secretary of the Army (SA) in team policy matters. b. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation. The DASA-DE&C discharges ASA (ALT) responsibilities for SAT and will- (1) Develop, coordinate, and promulgate Army-wide SA policy, including the development of Army-wide input to specific country SA programs in support of Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) missions. (2) Exercise policy responsibility for SAT under international military education and training (IMET); Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and other applicable authority as directed by the Department of Defense (DOD). (3) Receive, staff, and serve as final HQDA decision authority for resourcing requests for Army SAT from authorized command and agencies. (4) Request and coordinate with Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 for tasking responsible Army for approved SAT agencies and commands for execution. (5) Return disapproved requests to the requesting command or agency. (6) Be the final decision authority on discrepancies that occur between U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and AMC on letter of request (LOR) and letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) issues. (7) Use this regulation in conjunction with AR 12-1 and AR 12-15 for guidance in budgeting and programming. c. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The TRADOC will- (1) Serve as the Army lead command for the operation, development, offer and execution of security cooperation training LOAs (LOA are also called cases). (2) Serve as the Army lead for the management and mission execution of HQDA approved SATs. ( 3 ) T a s k T R A D O C , C O N U S A r m y C o m m a n d s ( A C O M s ) ( l e s s U . S . A r m y S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s C o m m a n d (USASOC)) and other Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) to provide personnel, supplies, and equipment to countries and/ or to task training support materiel program of instruction (POI), and foreign disclosure in according with HQDA taskings. (4) Provide centralized financial management and distribution of FMS and IMET program training funds for all operating agencies and training providers. (5) As required, provide case/program funding to combatant commands (COCOMs) or Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) that resource SAT from their internal assets. (6) Maintain security cooperation training execution data sufficient to reply to standard request for information (RFI). (7) Maintains a capability to contract Army SAT. (8) Comply with HQDA tasking suspense and requirements.
This book examines security cooperation between Western states. Security cooperation occurs between Western (i.e. European and North American) states as a coping mechanism, as an imperfect substitute for integration. The book investigates the reasons for cooperation, what Aristotle called the ‘final cause’, as well as the material, formal, and efficient causes of cooperation. Such a causal explanation is based on a Critical Realist philosophy of social science. The book is also based on an embedded multiple-case study; the states studied are the United States, France, and Luxembourg. Within each state, the embedded subcases are three types of state security organizations: the armed forces, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, which have rarely been compared in this way. Comparing different types of states and different types of state security organizations has allowed temporal, spatial, national, and functional variation in cooperation to be identified and theorized. The empirical evidence studied includes participant observations at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and documents such as state policy documents, annual reports by organizations, reports by parliaments and non-governmental organizations, autobiographies, books by investigative journalists, and articles by newspapers and magazines. The book is also based on a score of elite interviews with ambassadors, diplomatic liaisons, ministerial advisors, foreign ministry officials, and military commanders. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, intelligence studies, military studies and International Relations in general.
