From 1904-1905, Russia and Japan were locked in conflict arising from rival imperial ambitions in the Far East. Nicholas Papastratigakis offers an integrated analysis of Russian naval strategy in the decade before this Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russians suffered catastrophic defeat. He seeks to determine the extent to which their defeat can be attributed to flawed Tsarist naval strategy in the region. Rooted in rich primary resources from Russian, French and British archives, the book sheds new light on Russia's conduct in international affairs in the pre-World War I era. He places Russian naval strategy in the broader context of Russian military strategy at the turn of the century, and of imperialism and 'navalism' in general. This book will be of enormous interest to scholars and students of naval, military, imperial and Russian history.
From 1904-1905, Russia and Japan were locked in conflict arising from rival imperial ambitions in the Far East. Nicholas Papastratigakis offers an integrated analysis of Russian naval strategy in the decade before this Russo-Japanese War, in which the Russians suffered catastrophic defeat. He seeks to determine the extent to which their defeat can be attributed to flawed Tsarist naval strategy in the region. Rooted in rich primary resources from Russian, French and British archives, the book sheds new light on Russia's conduct in international affairs in the pre-World War I era. He places Russ.
Admiral Gorshkov has transformed the Soviet fleet into a world sea power for the first time in Russian history. He is Russia's most brilliant naval strategist of all time. He has created the modern Soviet navy. His book examines the main components of sea power among which attention is focused on the naval fleet of the present day, capable of conducting operations and solving strategic tasks in different regions of the world's oceans, together with other branches of the armed forces and independently
Offers a candid view of a war that played a significant role in the ultimate demise of the Soviet Union. Presents analysis absolutely vital to Western policymakers, as well as to political, diplomatic, and military historians and anyone interested in Russian and Soviet history. Provides insights regarding current and future Russian struggles in ethnic conflicts both at and within their borders, struggles that could potentially destroy the Russian Federation.
This book examines President Theodore Roosevelt’s use of the United States naval services as supporting components of his diplomatic efforts to facilitate the emergence of the United States as a Great Power at the dawn of the 20th century. After reviewing the development of Roosevelt’s personal philosophy with regard to naval power, the book traverses four chapters that reveal Roosevelt’s use of the Navy and Marine Corps to support American interests during the historically controversial Venezuelan Crisis (1902-03), Panama’s independence movement (1903), the Morocco-Perciaris Incident (1904) and the choice of a navy yard as the sight for the negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War. The voyage of the Great White Fleet and Roosevelt’s actions to technologically transform the American Navy are also covered. In the end the book details how Roosevelt’s actions combined to thrust the United States forward onto the world’s stage as a major player, and cemented T.R’s place in American history as a great president despite the fact that he did not serve during a time of war or major domestic disturbance. This history provides new information that finally lays to rest the controversy of whether Theodore Roosevelt did or did not issue an ultimatum to the German and British governments in December, 1902, bringing the United States to the brink of war with two of the world’s great powers. It also reveals a secret war plan developed during Panama’s independence movement which envisioned the United States Marine Corps invading Colombia to defend the sovereignty of the new Panamanian republic.
Paul Kennedy's classic naval history, now updated with a new introduction by the author This acclaimed book traces Britain's rise and fall as a sea power from the Tudors to the present day. Challenging the traditional view that the British are natural 'sons of the waves', he suggests instead that the country's fortunes as a significant maritime force have always been bound up with its economic growth. In doing so, he contributes significantly to the centuries-long debate between 'continental' and 'maritime' schools of strategy over Britain's policy in times of war. Setting British naval history within a framework of national, international, economic, political and strategic considerations, he offers a fresh approach to one of the central questions in British history. A new introduction extends his analysis into the twenty-first century and reflects on current American and Chinese ambitions for naval mastery. 'Excellent and stimulating' Correlli Barnett 'The first scholar to have set the sweep of British Naval history against the background of economic history' Michael Howard, Sunday Times 'By far the best study that has ever been done on the subject ... a sparkling and apt quotation on practically every page' Daniel A. Baugh, International History Review 'The best single-volume study of Britain and her naval past now available to us' Jon Sumida, Journal of Modern History
An Economist Best Book of the Year A Financial Times Best Book of the Year Winner of the the Pushkin House Russian Book Prize Finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize An Amazon Best Book of the Month (History) One of the world’s leading scholars offers a fresh interpretation of the linked origins of World War I and the Russian Revolution "Lieven has a double gift: first, for harvesting details to convey the essence of an era and, second, for finding new, startling, and clarifying elements in familiar stories. This is history with a heartbeat, and it could not be more engrossing."—Foreign Affairs World War I and the Russian Revolution together shaped the twentieth century in profound ways. In The End of Tsarist Russia, acclaimed scholar Dominic Lieven connects for the first time the two events, providing both a history of the First World War’s origins from a Russian perspective and an international history of why the revolution happened. Based on exhaustive work in seven Russian archives as well as many non-Russian sources, Dominic Lieven’s work is about far more than just Russia. By placing the crisis of empire at its core, Lieven links World War I to the sweep of twentieth-century global history. He shows how contemporary hot issues such as the struggle for Ukraine were already crucial elements in the run-up to 1914. By incorporating into his book new approaches and comparisons, Lieven tells the story of war and revolution in a way that is truly original and thought-provoking.
For seven weeks in 1929, the Republic of China and the Soviet Union battled in Manchuria over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad. It was the largest military clash between China and a Western power ever fought on Chinese soil, involving more that a quarter million combatants. Michael M. Walker's The 1929 Sino-Soviet War is the first full account of what UPI's Moscow correspondent called "the war nobody knew"—a "limited modern war" that destabilized the region's balance of power, altered East Asian history, and sent grim reverberations through a global community giving lip service to demilitarizing in the wake of World War I. Walker locates the roots of the conflict in miscalculations by Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang about the Soviets' political and military power—flawed assessments that prompted China's attempt to reassert full authority over the CER. The Soviets, on the other hand, were dominated by a Stalin eager to flex some military muscle and thoroughly convinced that war would win much more than petty negotiations. This was in fact, Walker shows, a watershed moment for Stalin, his regime, and his still young and untested military, disproving the assumption that the Red Army was incapable of fighting a modern war. By contrast, the outcome revealed how unprepared the Chinese military forces were to fight either the Red Army or the Imperial Japanese Army, their other primary regional competitor. And yet, while the Chinese commanders proved weak, Walker sees in the toughness of the overmatched infantry a hint of the rising nationalism that would transform China's troops from a mercenary army into a formidable professional force, with powerful implications for an overconfident Japanese Imperial Army in 1937. Using Russian, Chinese, and Japanese sources, as well as declassified US military reports, Walker deftly details the war from its onset through major military operations to its aftermath, giving the first clear and complete account of a little known but profoundly consequential clash of great powers between the World Wars.
