Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]
Rommel’s Desert Campaigns, February 1941-September 1942: A Study In Operational Level Weakness [Illustrated Edition]

Author: Major Donald E. Kirkland

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2014-08-15

Total Pages: 222

ISBN-13: 1782894217

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Includes the War in North Africa Illustration Pack - 112 photos/illustrations and 21 maps. This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel’s tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel’s operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel’s problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel’s tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel’s failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel’s plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives. Rommel’s weakness at the operational level led to failure to sequence tactical victories to achieve campaign goals. This failure illustrates the importance of understanding how operational art orchestrates tactical activities to achieve strategic objectives within a theater of operations.

Monty and Rommel
Monty and Rommel

Author: Peter Caddick-Adams

Publisher: Abrams

Published: 2013-09-24

Total Pages: 446

ISBN-13: 1468309064

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“An accessible, well-honed study of two fascinating characters” who famously fought each other in numerous battles during WWII, from Egypt to D-Day (Kirkus). Bernard Montgomery and Erwin Rommel faced one another in a series of extraordinary battles that established each man as one of the greatest generals in history. Born four years apart, their lives were remarkably similar. Each came from provincial roots, nearly died in WWI, yet emerged from that great conflict with glowing records. Through their many duels, including their legendary conflicts in North Africa and later at the Normandy D-Day invasion, Peter Caddick-Adams tracks and compares their military talents and personalities. Monty and Rommel explores how each general was raised to power by their war leaders, Churchill and Hitler, and how the innovative military strategy and thought of both permeate down to today's armies.

Rommel, Operational Art And The Battle Of El Alamein
Rommel, Operational Art And The Battle Of El Alamein

Author: Cmdr Mark A. Machin USN

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2015-11-06

Total Pages: 43

ISBN-13: 1786250667

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Field Marshal Rommel’s North African Campaign demonstrates many of the limitations and restricting factors of modern warfare. Examining the Axis Alliance preparation, implementation and sustainment of its operations provides insight applicable to the warfare commander of today. Relevancy is obtained through analysis of the Axis coalition command and control structure, tactical battle operations, strategic strategy, weapon technology, use of intelligence and logistical support network. Rommel’s successful offensive through Libya and Egypt was ended at the Battle of El Alamein due to the critical influence of these factors. His exploits demonstrate excellence of battlefield tactics at the expense of strategic strategy and logistical sustainment.

Joint Operational Warfare
Joint Operational Warfare

Author: Milan N. Vego

Publisher: Government Printing Office

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 1496

ISBN-13: 9781884733628

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Smallholder farmers and pastoralists fulfil an invaluable yet undervalued role in conserving biodiversity. They act as guardians of locally adapted livestock breeds that can make use of even marginal environments under tough climatic conditions and therefore are a crucial resource for food security. But in addition, by sustaining animals on natural vegetation and as part of local ecosystems, these communities also make a significant contribution to the conservation of wild biodiversity and of cultural landscapes. This publication provides a glimpse into the often intricate knowledge systems that pastoralists and smallholder farmers have developed for the management of their breeds in specific production systems and it also describes the multitude of threats and challenges these often marginalized communities have to cope with.

Operational Warfare at Sea
Operational Warfare at Sea

Author: Milan Vego

Publisher: Taylor & Francis

Published: 2017-07-06

Total Pages: 309

ISBN-13: 1315402939

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This book provides a comprehensive analysis of both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea and this 2nd edition has been thoroughly revised, with two completely new chapters.

Operational Leadership As Practiced By Field Marshal Erwin Rommel During The German Campaign In North Africa, 1941-1942
Operational Leadership As Practiced By Field Marshal Erwin Rommel During The German Campaign In North Africa, 1941-1942

Author: Commander Charles M. Gibson

Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing

Published: 2014-08-15

Total Pages: 36

ISBN-13: 1782897259

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The Germans entered the North African theater to alleviate pressure on the Italians and prevent the collapse of the Italian Fascist regime. Rommel arrived in North Africa, and despite orders to establish a blocking force, immediately went on the offensive with the objective of forcing the Allies out of North Africa. After two years of fighting, Rommel and his forces were defeated. This paper analyzes the operational leadership of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel during the North African campaign of 1941-1942. It concludes that Rommel, despite being an accomplished tactical leader, was a poor operational leader. Rommel lacked the proper personality, military education, and military experience to obtain the broad view necessary to become a successful operational leader. His personal relationship with Hitler put Rommel in a position of authority he was not qualified to fulfill. Additionally, his inability as an operational commander to fully comprehend logistics and strategic objectives resulted in the German’s defeat in North Africa. The Joint Force Commander must ensure his operational commanders are more than just tacticians. A successful tactical leader will not automatically become a successful operational leader. Close scrutiny of potential operational commanders is a must to ensure the future leaders of the U.S. military will be able to accomplish military strategic and operational objectives.

Rommel's Desert Campaigns, February 1941 - September 1942: A Study in Operational Level Weakness
Rommel's Desert Campaigns, February 1941 - September 1942: A Study in Operational Level Weakness

Author: Donald E. Kirkland

Publisher:

Published: 1986

Total Pages: 42

ISBN-13:

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This study is a historical analysis to determine why Rommel's tactical success on the battlefield could not accomplish strategic objectives in North Africa. Rommel's operations are reviewed from his arrival in North Africa in February 1941 through his last offensive to destroy the British Eighth Army at Alamein in August-September 1942. The study compares his ability to conduct tactical operations with his apparent inability to plan and execute actions at the operational level of war. Rommel's problems with operational planning are addressed within the scope of campaign planning principles set forth in FM 100-5, Operations, (Final Draft). His planning is expressly judged on how he shaped his operational plans by using the concepts of aims, resources, constraints, and restrictions to conform to strategic guidance. Rommel's tactical execution is contrasted with his operational performance. This comparison is based on the AirLand Battle tenets of agility, initiative, depth, and synchronization. The study concludes that Rommel's failure lies in planning operations that exceeded his resources and conducting needless operations that resulted in the loss of the initiative at the decisive point. Rommel's plans exceeded the strategic objectives desired by the theater strategists. His execution was ultimately defeated by his quest for tactical victories without regard to how they contributed to achieving campaign objectives.

Desert Warfare
Desert Warfare

Author: Alfred Toppe

Publisher: Militarybookshop.CompanyUK

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 114

ISBN-13: 9781780392523

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Firs published in 1991. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II" is an abridgment of a two-volume work that first appeared in 1952. Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript represents a collaborative attempt to determine as many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. Issues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military engagements in North Africa, and the particular problems of terrain and climate in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert Warfare requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain.