Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Author: DIANE Publishing Company
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 1995-07
Total Pages: 267
ISBN-13: 0788119125
DOWNLOAD EBOOKRead and Download eBook Full
Author: DIANE Publishing Company
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
Published: 1995-07
Total Pages: 267
ISBN-13: 0788119125
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: United States. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: United States. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages: 276
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Allan J. McDonald
Publisher: University Press of Florida
Published: 2012-03-11
Total Pages: 1075
ISBN-13: 0813047013
DOWNLOAD EBOOKOn a cold January morning in 1986, NASA launched the Space Shuttle Challenger, despite warnings against doing so by many individuals, including Allan McDonald. The fiery destruction of Challenger on live television moments after launch remains an indelible image in the nation’s collective memory. In Truth, Lies, and O-Rings, McDonald, a skilled engineer and executive, relives the tragedy from where he stood at Launch Control Center. As he fought to draw attention to the real reasons behind the disaster, he was the only one targeted for retribution by both NASA and his employer, Morton Thiokol, Inc., makers of the shuttle's solid rocket boosters. In this whistle-blowing yet rigorous and fair-minded book, McDonald, with the assistance of internationally distinguished aerospace historian James R. Hansen, addresses all of the factors that led to the accident, some of which were never included in NASA's Failure Team report submitted to the Presidential Commission. Truth, Lies, and O-Rings is the first look at the Challenger tragedy and its aftermath from someone who was on the inside, recognized the potential disaster, and tried to prevent it. It also addresses the early warnings of very severe debris issues from the first two post-Challenger flights, which ultimately resulted in the loss of Columbia some fifteen years later.
Author: United States. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages:
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Diane Vaughan
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Published: 1996
Total Pages: 600
ISBN-13: 0226851761
DOWNLOAD EBOOKList of Figures and TablesPreface1: The Eve of the Launch 2: Learning Culture, Revising History 3: Risk, Work Group Culture, and the Normalization of Deviance 4: The Normalization of Deviance, 1981-1984 5: The Normalization of Deviance, 1985 6: The Culture of Production 7: Structural Secrecy 8: The Eve of the Launch Revisited 9: Conformity and Tragedy 10: Lessons Learned Appendix A. Cost/Safety Trade-Offs? Scrapping the Escape Rockets and the SRB Contract Award Decision Appendix B. Supporting Charts and Documents Appendix C. On Theory Elaboration, Organizations, and Historical EthnographyAcknowledgments Notes Bibliography Index Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.
Author: United States. Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident
Publisher:
Published: 1986
Total Pages: 274
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: United States. Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Publisher: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commission
Published: 2003
Total Pages: 260
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKCD-ROM accompanying vol. 1 contains text of vol. 1 in PDF files and six related motion picture files in Quicktime format.
Author: National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Shuttle Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis Audit
Publisher: National Academies
Published: 1988
Total Pages: 158
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKAuthor: Richard C. Cook
Publisher: Thunder's Mouth Press
Published: 2006
Total Pages: 552
ISBN-13:
DOWNLOAD EBOOKThe Reagan Administration pushed hard for NASA to launch shuttle mission 51L, before it was ready. 73 seconds into the launch, the shuttle exploded, killing seven and leaving a nation traumatized. Richard Cook, lead resource analyst at NASA for the Solid Rocket Boosters, was the first to warn of possible catastrophic failure. His memo, detailing astronaut concerns and warnings from the shuttle builders at Morton Thiokol, was ignored by top NASA officials and members of the Reagan administration. In the aftermath, NASA launched an investigation to "discover" the cause of the disaster. Though within NASA there was absolute certainty about the O-ring failure, they began a cover-up by publicly proclaiming that the cause was unknown. A Reagan administration Commission perpetrated the same lie. When Cook realized that the Commission was not interested in the truth, he leaked the original documents to the New York Times, setting off a cascade of disclosures, including revelations by Morton Thiokol engineers that they had tried to stop the launch.--From publisher description.