At the direction of President Biden, on February 26, 2021, Secretary of Defense Austin established the 90-Day IRC on Sexual Assault in the Military. The Commission, chaired by Lynn Rosenthal, was charged with conducting "an independent, impartial assessment" of the military's current treatment of sexual assault and sexual harassment. The IRC officially began its review on March 24, 2021. This is the report of this commission. It is published as a convenience to those who may wish to have a quality professionally printed copy of the report.
Vol. 1 of the Peers Inquiry contains the narrative report of the investigation. The report, which is divided into twelve chapters and two annexes, includes the 29 March 1969 letter from Ronald L. Ridenhour reporting the incident to the Secretary of Defense, the mission statement of the Inquiry, findings and recommendations, maps, an extensive table of contents, and a 26-page glossary. Vol. 2 of the Peers Inquiry, entitled "Testimony," is further subdivided into a series of 32 "books," and is comprised of approximately 20,000 pages of testimony and summaries of testimony by over 350 witnesses.
This Congressionally-mandated report identifies areas for further cooperation with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program of the Department of Defense in the specific area of prevention of proliferation of biological weapons. The report reviews relevant U.S. government programs, and particularly the CTR program, and identifies approaches for overcoming obstacles to cooperation and for increasing the long-term impact of the program. It recommends strong support for continuation of the CTR program.
The U. S. Secretary of the Army appointed the Fort Hood Independent Review Committee(FHIRC or Committee) and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Fort Hoodcommand climate and culture, and its impact, if any, on the safety, welfare and readiness of ourSoldiers and units." In addressing this mandate, the FHIRC determined that during the time periodcovered by the Review, the command climate relative to the Sexual Harassment/Assault Responseand Prevention (SHARP) Program at Fort Hood was ineffective, to the extent that there was apermissive environment for sexual assault and sexual harassment.As set forth in this Report, specific Findings demonstrate that the implementation of theSHARP Program was ineffective. During the review period, no Commanding General or subordinateechelon commander chose to intervene proactively and mitigate known risks of high crime, sexualassault and sexual harassment. The result was a pervasive lack of confidence in the SHARP Programand an unacceptable lack of knowledge of core SHARP components regarding reporting and certainvictim services. Under a structurally weak and under-resourced III Corps SHARP Program, theSexual Assault Review Board (SARB) process was primarily utilized to address administrative and notthe actual substantive aspects of the Program. While a powerful tool by design, the SARB processbecame a missed opportunity to develop and implement proactive strategies to create a respectfulculture and prevent and reduce incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment. From the III Corpslevel and below, the SHARP Program was chronically under-resourced, due to understaffing, lack oftraining, lack of credentialed SHARP professionals, and lack of funding. Most of all, it lackedcommand emphasis where it was needed the most: the enlisted ranks.A resonant symptom of the SHARP Program's ineffective implementation was significantunderreporting of sexual harassment and sexual assault. Without intervention from the NCOs andofficers entrusted with their health and safety, victims feared the inevitable consequences of reporting: ostracism, shunning and shaming, harsh treatment, and indelible damage to their career. Many haveleft the Army or plan to do so at the earliest opportunity.As part of the command climate, the issues of crime and Criminal Investigation Division(CID) operations were examined. The Committee determined that serious crime issues on and offFort Hood were neither identified nor addressed. There was a conspicuous absence of an effectiverisk management approach to crime incident reduction and Soldier victimization. A militaryinstallation is essentially a large, gated community. The Commander of a military installation possessesa wide variety of options to proactively address and mitigate the spectrum of crime incidents. Despitehaving the capability, very few tools were employed at Fort Hood to do so. Both the Directorate ofEmergency Services (DES) and the CID have a mandate and a role to play in crime reduction.Each contributed very little analysis, feedback and general situational awareness to the command towardfacilitating and enabling such actions. This was another missed opportunity.The deficient climate also extended into the missing Soldier scenarios, where no onerecognized the slippage in accountability procedures and unwillingness or lack of ability of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to keep track of their subordinates. The absence of any formalprotocols for Soldiers who fail to report resulted in an ad hoc approach by units and Military Police(MP) to effectively address instances of missing Soldiers during the critical first 24 hours, again withadverse consequences.Consistent with the FHIRC Charter, this Report sets forth nine Findings and offers seventyRecommendations.
Between 1942 and 1975, the U.S. Army conducted tests with human subjects to study the effects of a variety of agents, including chemical warfare and biological agents. The potential long-term health effects on the test subjects from their exposures have been evaluated periodically, most recently in a report titled Assessment of Potential Long-Term Health Effects on Army Human Test Subjects of Relevant Biological and Chemical Agents, Drugs, Medications and Substances: Literature Review and Analysis (the Report), which was prepared by a contractor to assist the Army with making determinations about providing medical care to former test subjects. In response to a request by the Army, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine formed a committee that was tasked with examining whether the Report appropriately identified potential long-term health effects from exposure to the test agents and whether an adequate weight-of-evidence approach was used to characterize the strength of the associations between the agents and their potential health effects. The committee was made aware at its first meeting on November 30, 2017, that the Army had already begun to receive applications for medical care and that some determinations may need to be made before the committee's evaluation of the Report was completed. Because of this urgency, the Army developed a process by which applications for medical care will be reviewed, and as a result, the committee was given the additional task of reviewing the Army's Memorandum that describes the approach that will be used by the Army to evaluate agent- and outcome-specific associations. This interim report was prepared to facilitate the Army's deliberations. A review of the Report is presented first, followed by a review of the Memorandum.
One of the hallmarks of a true profession is its ability to assess and regulate itself, especially with respect to adherence to its foundational ethos. Such self-examination is difficult and often causes discomfort within the profession. Nonetheless, it is absolutely necessary to enable members of the profession to render the service for which the profession exists. U.S. military professionals have never shied away from this responsibility, and they do not today, as evidenced by this riveting monograph. Discussing dishonesty in the Army profession is a topic that will undoubtedly make many readers uneasy. It is, however, a concern that must be addressed to better the Army profession. Through extensive discussions with officers and thorough and sound analysis, Drs. Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras make a compelling argument for the Army to introspectively examine how it might be inadvertently encouraging the very behavior it deems unacceptable.
This manual, TRADOC Pamphlet TP 600-4 The Soldier's Blue Book: The Guide for Initial Entry Soldiers August 2019, is the guide for all Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers who join our Army Profession. It provides an introduction to being a Soldier and Trusted Army Professional, certified in character, competence, and commitment to the Army. The pamphlet introduces Solders to the Army Ethic, Values, Culture of Trust, History, Organizations, and Training. It provides information on pay, leave, Thrift Saving Plans (TSPs), and organizations that will be available to assist you and your Families. The Soldier's Blue Book is mandated reading and will be maintained and available during BCT/OSUT and AIT.This pamphlet applies to all active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard enlisted IET conducted at service schools, Army Training Centers, and other training activities under the control of Headquarters, TRADOC.
Recently, World War II veterans have come forward to claim compensation for health effects they say were caused by their participation in chemical warfare experiments. In response, the Veterans Administration asked the Institute of Medicine to study the issue. Based on a literature review and personal testimony from more than 250 affected veterans, this new volume discusses in detail the development and chemistry of mustard agents and Lewisite followed by interesting and informative discussions about these substances and their possible connection to a range of health problems, from cancer to reproductive disorders. The volume also offers an often chilling historical examination of the use of volunteers in chemical warfare experiments by the U.S. militaryâ€"what the then-young soldiers were told prior to the experiments, how they were "encouraged" to remain in the program, and how they were treated afterward. This comprehensive and controversial book will be of importance to policymakers and legislators, military and civilian planners, officials at the Department of Veterans Affairs, military historians, and researchers.
