Previous studies have acknowledged the tradeoff between relationships and competion in financial intermediation. In this paper we explore the structural determinants of this tradeoff in the investment banking market, by deriving it from the underlying relationship technology.
For academics, regulators and policymaker alike, it is crucial to measure financial sector competition by means of reliable, well-established methods. However, this is easier said than done. The goal of this Handbook is to provide a collection of state-of-the-art chapters to address this issue. The book consists of four parts, the first of which discusses the characteristics of various measures of financial sector competition. The second part includes several empirical studies on the level of, and trends in, competition across countries. The third part deals with the spillovers of market power to other sectors and the economy as a whole. Finally, the fourth part considers competition in banking submarkets and subsectors.
This book aims to provide a thoroughly updated overview and evaluation of the industrial organization of banking. It examines the interplay among bank behaviour, market structure, and regulation from the perspective of a variety of public policy issues, including bank competition and risk, market discipline, antitrust issues, and capital regulation. New to this edition are discussions of the economic foundations of international banking, macroprudential regulation, and international coordination of banking policies. The book can serve as a learning tool and reference for graduate students, academics, bankers, and policymakers with interests in the industrial organization of the banking sector and the impacts of banking regulations.
The aim of this timely work, which appears in the wake of the worst global financial crisis since the late 1920s, is to bring together high quality research-based contributions from leading international scholars involved in constructing a geographical perspective on money. Topics covered include the crisis, the spatial circuits of finance, regulation, mainstream financial markets (banking, equity, etc), through to the various ‘alternative’ and ‘disruptive’ forms of money that have arisen in recent years. It will be of interest to geographers, political scientists, sociologists, economists, planners and all those interested in how money shapes and reshapes socio-economic space and conditions local and regional development.
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
An examination of how the patent system works, imperfections and all, to incentivize innovation Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Lawyers, economists, and politicians who have staked out strong positions in this debate often attempt to validate their claims by invoking the historical record--but they frequently get the history wrong. The Battle over Patents gets it right. Bringing together thoroughly researched essays from prominent historians and social scientists, this volume traces the long and contentious history of patents and examines how they have worked in practice. Editors Stephen H. Haber and Naomi R. Lamoreaux show that patent systems are the result of contending interests at different points in production chains battling over economic surplus. The larger the potential surplus, the more extreme are the efforts of contending parties-now and in the past-to search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction. Patent systems, as human creations, are therefore necessarily ridden with imperfections. This volume explores these shortcomings and explains why, despite all the debate, historically US-style patent systems still dominate all other methods of encouraging inventive activity.
The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.
Investment banks play a critically important role in channeling capital from investors to corporations. Not only do they float and distribute new corporate securities, they also assist companies in the private placement of securities, arrange mergers and acquisitions, devise specialized financing, and provide other corporate financial services. After sketching the history and evolution of investment banking, the authors describe the structure of the industry, focusing on the competitive forces at work within it today. They explore patterns of concentration and analyze the strategic and economic factors that underlie those patterns. The authors directly examine the pairing up of investment banks with their corporate clients. They show that the market is sharply segmented, with banks and corporate clients being matched in roughly rank order, the most prestigious banks with the largest, most powerful clients, and so on. Vigorous competition occurs within each segment, but much less between them. With the industry now confronting a changing regulatory environment, a growing tendency of clients to arrange their own financing, and increasing competition both from within and from commercial banks and foreign institutions, Competition in the Investment Banking Industry is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of investment banking.