The first full-length study of World War II from the Latin American perspective, this unique volume offers an in-depth analysis of the region during wartime. Each country responded to World War II according to its own national interests, which often conflicted with those of the Allies, including the United States. The contributors systematically consider how each country dealt with commonly shared problems: the Axis threat to the national order, the extent of military cooperation with the Allies, and the war's impact on the national economy and domestic political and social structures. Drawing on both U.S. and Latin American primary sources, the book offers a rigorous comparison of the wartime experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Central America, Gran Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama, and Puerto Rico.
The Good Neighbor Policy was tested to the breaking point by Argentina-U.S. relations during World War II. In part, its durability had depended both upon the willingness of all American republics to join with the United States in resisting attempts by extrahemispheric sources to intervene in New World affairs and upon continuity within the United States foreign-policy establishment. During World War II, neither prerequisite was satisfied, Argentina chose to pursue a neutralist course, and the Latin American policy of the United States became the subject of a bitter bureaucratic struggle within the Roosevelt administration. Consequently, the principles of nonintervention and noninterference, together with “absolute respect for the sovereignty of all states,” ceased to be the guideposts of Washington’s hemispheric policy. In this study, Randall Bennett Woods argues persuasively that Washington’s response to Argentine neutrality was based more on internal differences—individual rivalries and power struggles between competing bureaucratic empires—than on external issues or economic motives. He explains how bureaucratic infighting within the U.S. government, entirely irrelevant to the issues involved, shaped important national policy toward Argentina. Using agency memoranda, State Department records, notes on conversations and interviews, memoirs, and personal archives of the participants, Woods looks closely at the rivalries that swayed the course of Argentine-American relations. He describes the personal motives and goals of men such as Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull, Henry Morgenthau, Harry Dexter White, Henry A. Wallace, and Milo Perkins. He delineates various cliques within the State Department, including the contending groups of Welles Latin Americanists and Hull internationalists—and describes the power struggles between the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Board of Economic Welfare, the Caribbean Defense Command, and other agencies. Of special interest to students of contemporary history will be Woods’s discussion of the careers and views of Juan Peron and Nelson Rockefeller—for American policy contributed in no small way to Peron’s rise, and Rockefeller was the man chiefly responsible for the U.S. rapprochement with Argentina in 1944-45. Woods also gives special attention to the impact of the Wilsonian tradition—especially its contradictions—on policy formation. The last chapter, dealing with Argentina’s admission to the U.N., sheds some light on the origins of the Cold War. Wood’s investigation of the Argentine problem makes a significant contribution toward the understanding of U.S.-Latin American relations in the era of the Good Neighbor Policy, and provides new insights into the evolution of hemispheric policy as a whole during World War II. It reflects the growing emphasis on bureaucratic politics as a principal determinant of U.S. diplomacy.
Though officially neutral until March 1945, Buenos Aires played a key role during World War II as a base for the South American intelligence operations of the major powers. The Hidden War in Argentina reveals the stories of the spymasters, British, Americans and Germans who plotted against each other throughout the Second World War in Argentina. In Buenos Aires, Johannes Siegfried Becker – codename 'Sargo' – was the man responsible for organizing most of the Nazi intelligence gathering in Latin America and the leader of 'Operation Bolivar', which sought to bring South America into the war on the side of the Axis powers. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the US state department pressured every South American country to join it in declaring war on Germany, and J Edgar Hoover authorized huge investments in South American intelligence operations. Argentina continued to refuse to join the conflict, triggering a US embargo that squeezed the country's economy to breaking point. Buenos Aires continued to be a hub for espionage even as the war in Europe was ending – hundreds of high-ranking Nazi exiles sought refuge there. This book is based on newly declassified files and details of the operations of MI6, the Abwehr, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and the FBI, as well as the OSS and the SOE. Most significantly, The Hidden War in Argentina reveals for the first time the coups of Britain's MI6 in South America.
As American interests assumed global proportions after 1945, policy makers were faced with the challenge of prioritizing various regions and determining the extent to which the United States was prepared to defend and support them. Superpowers and developing nations soon became inextricably linked and decolonizing states such as Vietnam, India, and Egypt assumed a central role in the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the twentieth century came to an end, many of the challenges of the Cold War became even more complex as the Soviet Union collapsed and new threats arose. Featuring original essays by leading scholars, Foreign Policy at the Periphery examines relationships among new nations and the United States from the end of the Second World War through the global war on terror. Rather than reassessing familiar flashpoints of US foreign policy, the contributors explore neglected but significant developments such as the efforts of evangelical missionaries in the Congo, the 1958 stabilization agreement with Argentina, Henry Kissinger's policies toward Latin America during the 1970s, and the financing of terrorism in Libya via petrodollars. Blending new, internationalist approaches to diplomatic history with newly released archival materials, Foreign Policy at the Periphery brings together diverse strands of scholarship to address compelling issues in modern world history.
This publication joins two cryptologic history monographs that were published separately in 1989. In part I, the author identifies and presents a thorough account of German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine work in South America as well as a detailed report of the U.S. response to the perceived threat. Part II deals with the cryptographic systems used by the varioius German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine activities.
Historically, Argentina has been one of the strongest, most independent countries of Latin America. It seems odd then, that Argentina should develop a foreign policy during the post-Cold War period characterized by a strong allegiance to the United States. However, the end of the bilateral world left the U.S. foreign policy much less focused at the same time that Argentine foreign policy became much more focused. For Argentina, domestic changes-especially economic and political instability-encouraged the government to redefine U.S.-Argentine relations from prior patterns of conflict and distrust, in order to improve the country's international image and attract foreign support. Covering two decades of history, this book seeks to explain for the first time, the reasons for the emergence of a strong friendship between the United States and Argentina. Beginning with the history of U.S.-Argentine relations up until the end of the Cold War, the text then considers changes in: The international political system The nature of domestic politics and their influence on foreign policy-making in both countries Recent issues in U.S.-Argentine relations The United States and Argentina sets out to explore the nature of U.S.-Argentinean relations by concentrating on the issues which have shaped and stood out in the dialogue between the two countries and how this shifting relationship has been played out in international institutions. This will be the fourth in our Contemporary Inter-American Relations Series.
The rise of Juan Perón to power in Argentina in the 1940s is one of the most studied subjects in Argentine history. But no book before this has examined the role the Peronists’ struggle with the major commercial newspaper media played in the movement’s evolution, or what the resulting transformation of this industry meant for the normative and practical redefinition of the relationships among state, press, and public. In The Fourth Enemy, James Cane traces the violent confrontations, backroom deals, and legal actions that allowed Juan Domingo Perón to convert Latin America’s most vibrant commercial newspaper industry into the region’s largest state-dominated media empire. An interdisciplinary study drawing from labor history, communication studies, and the history of ideas, this book shows how decades-old conflicts within the newspaper industry helped shape not just the social crises from which Peronism emerged, but the very nature of the Peronist experiment as well.
