Abstract: "The authors assess for 28 developing countries over the period 1980-2001 whether the existence of a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are significantly associated with superior electricity outcomes. Their analysis draws on theoretical and empirical work on the impact of independent central banks and of developing country telecommunications regulators. The authors' empirical analysis concludes that a regulatory law and higher quality governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per capita generation capacity levels. In addition, this positive impact continues to increase for at least three years and probably for over 10 years as experience develops and regulatory reputation grows. The results are robust to alternative dynamic specifications and show no sign of any significant endogeneity "--World Bank web site.
This report encourages governments to “think big” about the relevance of regulatory policy and assesses the recent efforts of OECD countries to develop and deepen regulatory policy and governance.
This publication presents recent OECD papers on risk and regulatory policy. They offer measures for developing, or improving, coherent risk governance policies.
Ch. 1. Regulating infrastructure : a review of the issues, problems, and challenges / Ed Araral [und weitere] -- pt. I. Problems, issues, and perspectives in regulation, regulatory design and outcomes. ch. 2. Infrastructure regulation : what works, why, and how do we know? / Judith Clifton [und weitere]. ch. 3. Does political accountability matter for infrastructure regulation? : the case of telecommunications / Farid Gasmi, Paul Noumba and Laura Recuero Virto. ch. 4. Entry relaxation and an independent regulator : performance impact on the mobile telecoms industry in Asia / Chalita Srinuan, Pratompong Srinuan and Erik Bohlin -- pt. II. Electricity sector regulation & governance. ch. 5. Risk, regulation and governance : institutional processes and regulatory risk in the Thai energy sector / Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ch. 6. Electricity tariff regulation in Thailand : analyses and applications of incentive regulation / Puree Sirasoontorn. ch. 7. Regulating power without a five year plan : institutional changes in the Chinese power sector / Kun-Chin Lin, Mika Purra and Hui Lin. ch. 8. The Indonesian electricity sector : institutional transition, regulatory capacity and outcomes / Mika Purra. ch. 9. Regulating the independent power producers : a comparative analysis of performance of Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Tamil Nadu in India / Rajendra Kumar. ch. 10. Partial privatization and nested regulation : institutional choices in public sector and regulatory reform / Sunil Tankha. ch. 11. The electricity industry reform in Korea : lessons for further liberalization / Junki Kim and Kyuhyun Kim -- pt. III. Water sector regulation & governance. ch. 12. Regulatory independence and contract incompleteness : assessing regulatory effectiveness in water privatization in Manila / Xun Wu, Loit Batac and Nepomuceno A. Malaluan. ch. 13. Can regulation improve the performance of government-controlled water utilities? / David Ehrhardt and Nils Janson. ch. 14. Effects of regulatory quality and political institutions on access to water and sanitation / Andrew B. Whitford, Helen Smith and Anant Mandawat. ch. 15. The regulation of water infrastructure in Italy : origins and effects of an 'hybrid' regulatory system / Alberto Asquer. ch. 16. Measuring effectiveness of regulation across a river system : a welfare approach / Alex Coram and Lyle Noakes. ch. 17. Private sector participation and regulatory reform in water supply : the Southern Mediterranean experience / Edouard Perard. ch. 18. Tempered responsiveness through regulatory negotiations in the water sector : managing unanticipated innovations emerging from participation reforms / Boyd Fuller and Sunil Tankha
More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers-the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems-have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. Just as one goes to a medical doctor for a regular health checkup, it is clear that infrastructure regulation would also benefit from periodic checkups. This book provides a general framework as well as detailed practical guidance on how to perform such "regulatory checkups."
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.
"The authors review a number of studies on the effectiveness of utility regulatory agency and governance arrangements for the electricity industry, particularly for developing countries. They discuss governance criteria and their measurement, both legal frameworks and surveys of regulatory practice. They also discuss the results from econometric studies of effectiveness for regulatory agencies in the electricity and telecommunications industries and compare these with the results from econometric studies of independent central banks and their governance. The authors conclude with a discussion of policy implications and of priorities for information collection to improve understanding of these issues. "--World Bank web site.
By introducing emissions as an input in an aggregate production function, The Impact of Environmental Emissions and Aggregate Economic Activity on Industry: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives enhances an awareness of the trade-off between emissions and growth where the intersection between economy and environment needs it most.
