Following Pearl Harbor, Admiral Husband Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, and General Walter Short, commander of the U.S. Army's Hawaiian Department, were accused of dereliction of duty and relieved of their commands. Hours after the attack, General Douglas MacArthur, in command of the Philippines, suffered a similar defeat and was awarded the Medal of Honor. This book re-examines the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor to answer the questions: were Kimmel and Short incompetent officers or convenient scapegoats; and was the attack really the surprise the Roosevelt administration led Americans to believe?
On December 7, 1941, Japan waged a surprise attack on the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. It was a major victory for the Japanese Navy, which in less than two hours destroyed 188 American planes, damaged another 159, and sunk or seriously damaged 18 U.S. warships. The battleships Arizona and Oklahoma were sunk. The battleships California, West Virginia and Tennessee were badly damaged and would not rejoin the United States fleet for months. Over 2,400 American military personnel were killed and 1,178 were wounded. The Japanese lost 29 planes and pilots, five midget submarines and one large sub with their crews. Here are 24 personal accounts of servicemen who survived the attack on Pearl Harbor. These accounts cover in detail the location of each man and his experience during and after the actual attack. Also included is general information about Pearl Harbor.
In 1944, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, knowing that high-ranking members of the military had falsely testified before the various bodies investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor, selected a then-unknown major by the name of Henry C. Clausen to undertake a new investigation. From November 1944 to September 1945, Clausen traveled more than 55,000 miles and interviewed over a hundred U.S. and British Army, Navy, and civilian personnel. He was given the authority to go anywhere and question anyone under oath, from enlisted personnel right up to George C. Marshall, the chief of staff. He ultimately presented an 800 page report to Stimson—a report that revealed a massive operational failure by the United States to use the priceless intelligence signals that it had obtained months before Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is the "final judgement"-the story behind Clausen's investigation and a blistering account of his conclusions.
ÒNothing previously published has offered such a close examination of Japanese strategy . . . an in-depth study of the Japanese planning, preparation and execution of the attack with particular focus on factors not thoroughly considered by other historians, if at all . . . detailed analyses that lead to a much better understanding of what the Japanese did, why they did it, and especially how the attack was very nearly an abject failure instead of a stunning success."ÑNaval Institute Proceedings "For seven decades, conventional wisdom has extolled the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as brilliant in its planning and execution . . . this masterful analysis topples that pillar of Pacific War history . . . with its amazing depth of meticulous research and analysis, this forceful book is essential reading for anyone with a serious interest in Pearl Harbor."ÑWorld War II "The first militarily professional description of the Pearl Harbor attack, and for those who are serious about military history and operations, it is a joy to read. . . . a superb military analysis of the attack . . . not only renders all other histories of Pearl Harbor obsolete, it has set the bar high for other histories of the Pacific War."ÑWar In History
Did President Roosevelt and other high-ranking U.S. government officials know about Japanese plans to attack Pearl Harbor, and fail to warn U.S. Navy leadership? Drawing on recently declassified materials and revelations from other writers, this book traces the flow of intelligence and concludes the imminent attack was allowed to happen to win the support of the American public in a war against Japan. An epilogue describes the fate of Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the intelligence he received from Washington before the attack, and the intelligence he did not.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
This title will help readers understand the causes, timeline, and aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The title is complete with glossary, index, and additional facts. This title is at a Level 3 and is written specifically for transitional readers. Aligned to Common Core Standards & correlated to state standards. Dash! is an imprint of Abdo Zoom, a division of ABDO.
Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective offers implications based on the intelligence perspective, providing both historical background and scientific analysis that draws from the author's vast experience. The book is of utmost value to all those engaged in intelligence work, and to those whose operational or political responsibility brings them in touch with intelligence assessments and the need to authenticate and then adopt them or discount them. Similarly, the book will interest any reader intrigued by decision-making processes that influence individuals and nations at war, and sometimes even shape national destiny. --Ehud Barak, Former Prime Minister of Israel
On 4 June 1942, three squadrons of U.S. Navy Dauntless dive bombers destroyed Japan's carrier force sent to neutralize Midway, changing the course of the war in the Pacific. As Thomas Wildenberg convincingly demonstrates in this book, the key ingredient to the navy's success at Midway was the planning and training devoted to the tactic of dive bombing over the previous seventeen years. Examining how political, economic, technical, and operational factors influenced the development of carrier airpower between 1925 and 1942, he shows why dive bombing became the navy's weapon of choice—why it was emphasized over all other methods of aerial warfare and finally brought to bear to stop the Japanese advance. He also pays tribute to the select group of naval aviators and senior leaders whose insights and determination drove the evolution of carrier tactics in this formative period. The title reflects the essence of the story: the development of carrier air power in the U.S. Navy was driven by an unwritten understanding that the years spent on experimentation, training, and innovations were ""destined"" to bring success in a future battle. As part of this work, the author introduces newly discovered information showing that the outcome at Midway was actually predicted by naval aviators years before the battle took place. The book sheds new light on the navy's preparations for war, demonstrating beyond a shadow of a doubt the effectiveness of U.S. naval planning before Pearl Harbor. Destined for Glory is the first book to thoroughly document the development of carrier air power in the United States Navy during the interwar years. Aviation enthusiasts and naval historians alike will find a wealth of previously unpublished data on the development of carrier aircraft and their tactical doctrine. Readers will discover new material related to the evolution of the fighters, torpedo bombers, and scout planes that made up the carrier air groups in World War II. Although several excellent books have been written about the Battle of Midway, none has focused on how the U.S. Navy came to develop the one aerial weapon “dive bombing” which proved to be the decisive instrument of victory. For it was dive bombing, and only dive bombing, that turned the tide of Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Introduced and developed in the interwar years, dive bombing became the corner stone in the navy's efforts to secure command of the air. Although the development of the dive bomber played an extremely important role in the advance of naval aviation during the interwar period, it is only part of a much broader story that illustrates an important lesson for historians: what comes before the battle is as important as the battle itself. It will become evident from reading the text that the aerial successes of 1942 were unequivocally rooted in the tactics and equipment developed during the previous seventeen years.
