The book's philosophical account of risk makes precise, justifies, and systematizes a variety of decision principles drawn from various disciplines. Weirich's approach to rational choice yields a theory that explains the rationality of choices complying with decision principles and advances strong normative standards for both attitudes to risks and acts affecting risks. His theory aims to guide decisions about risks in finance, in professional advice to clients, and in government regulation of risks the public bears.
Good decisions account for risks. For example, the risk of an accident while driving in the rain makes a reasonable driver decide to slow down. While risk is a large topic in theoretical disciplines such as economics and psychology, as well as in practical disciplines such as medicine and finance, philosophy has a unique contribution to make in developing a normative theory of risk that states what risk is, and to what extent our responses to it are rational. Weirich here develops a philosophical theory of the rationality of responses to risk. He first distinguishes two types of risk: first, a chance of a bad event, and second, an act's risk in relation to its possible outcomes. He argues that this distinction has normative significance in the sense that one's attitudes towards these types of risks - and how one acts on them - are governed by different general principles of rationality. Consequently, a comprehensive account of risk must not only characterize rational responses to risk but also explain why these responses are rational. Weirich explains how, for a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent's preferences among the acts. As a result, maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. His view takes an act's expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. The book's precise formulation of general standards of rationality for attitudes and for acts, and its rigorous argumentation for these standards, make it philosophical; but while mainly of interest to philosophers, its broader arguments will contribute to the conceptual foundations of studies of risk in all disciplines that study it.
Risk as we now know it is a wholly new phenomenon, the by-product of our ever more complex and powerful technologies. In business, policy making, and in everyday life, it demands a new way of looking at technological and environmental uncertainty. In this definitive volume, four of the world's leading risk researchers present a fundamental critique of the prevailing approaches to understanding and managing risk - the 'rational actor paradigm'. They show how risk studies must incorporate the competing interests, values, and rationalities of those involved and find a balance of trust and acceptable risk. Their work points to a comprehensive and significant new theory of risk and uncertainty and of the decision making process they require. The implications for social, political, and environmental theory and practice are enormous. Winner of the 2000-2002 Outstanding Publication Award of the Section on Environment and Technology of the American Sociological Association
How much does rationality constrain what we should believe on the basis of our evidence? According to this book, not very much. For most people and most bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of beliefs that rationality permits them to have in response to that evidence. The argument, which takes inspiration from William James' ideas in 'The Will to Believe', proceeds from two premises. The first is a theory about the basis of epistemic rationality. It's called epistemic utility theory, and it says that what it is epistemically rational for you to believe is what it would be rational for you to choose if you were given the chance to pick your beliefs and, when picking them, you were to care only about their epistemic value. So, to say which beliefs are permitted, we must say how to measure epistemic value, and which decision rule to use when picking your beliefs. The second premise is a claim about attitudes to epistemic risk, and it says that rationality permits many different such attitudes. These attitudes can show up in epistemic utility theory in two ways: in the way you measure epistemic value; and in the decision rule you use to pick beliefs. This book explores the latter. The result is permissivism about epistemic rationality: different attitudes to epistemic risk lead to different choices of prior beliefs; given most bodies of evidence, different priors lead to different posteriors; and even once we fix your attitudes to epistemic risk, if they are at all risk-inclined, there is a range of different priors and therefore different posteriors they permit.
We have undertaken this volume in the belief that there is now sufficient research completed on environmental risk to justify a retrospective assessment of what is known. Our authors and our intended audience are eclectic indeed. Environ mental risk assessment receives increasing attention in the media today. The populace is practically assaulted with stories, with anecdotes, and with conflicting evidence. It is our hope that these chapters will provide the reader with a comprehensive glimpse of a fast-growing field in public policy. No complete survey of the literature would be possible or meaningful. We offer here instead the integrative thoughts of some of the most respected analysts in the field. We believe that the coverage is coherent, the perspectives are illuminating, and the individual "treatments deserving of careful study. We are grateful to Warren Samuels of Michigan State University who is editor of the Kluwer series on recent economic thought. We are also grateful to our Kluwer editor, Zach Rolnik. Both have been gracious in their toleration of unconscionable delays. IX The Social Response to Environmental Risk Policy Formulation in an Age of Uncertainty 1 ENTITLEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS Daniel W. Bromley* [all rights] are conditional and derivative ... they are derived from the end or purpose of the society in which they exist. They are conditional on being used to the attainment of that end.
Assessment of risk and uncertainty is crucial for natural hazard risk management, facilitating risk communication and informing strategies to successfully mitigate our society's vulnerability to natural disasters. Written by some of the world's leading experts, this book provides a state-of-the-art overview of risk and uncertainty assessment in natural hazards. It presents the core statistical concepts using clearly defined terminology applicable across all types of natural hazards and addresses the full range of sources of uncertainty, the role of expert judgement and the practice of uncertainty elicitation. The core of the book provides detailed coverage of all the main hazard types and concluding chapters address the wider societal context of risk management. This is an invaluable compendium for academic researchers and professionals working in the fields of natural hazards science, risk assessment and management and environmental science, and will be of interest to anyone involved in natural hazards policy.
Advances in Food and Nutrition Research is an eclectic serial established in 1948. The serial recognizes the integral relationship between the food and nutritional sciences and brings together outstanding and comprehensive reviews that highlight this relationship. Contributions detail the scientific developments in the broad areas encompassed by the fields of food science and nutrition and are intended to ensure that food scientists in academia and industry, as well as professional nutritionists and dieticians, are kept informed concerning emerging research and developments in these important disciplines. Series established since 1948 Advisory Board consists of 8 respected scientists Unique series as it combines food science and nutrition research
The third CMR Workshop prov. ided the opportunity for a group of experts from the Industry, academia and the regulatory authorities to meet and discuss ways and means by which risk benefit decisions are made during the various stages of drug development. It became apparent from the discussions that took place in October 1985, at the CIBA Foundation, that decisions are often made with limited data and inadequate methodology. The conclusions drawn from the day's deliberations were as follows: 1. Current methodology for assessing risk and particularly benefits must be improved; 2. Safety must be assessed in association with benefits as it is ultimately the benefit/ risk ratio which should decide the future of medicines; 3. Risks from medicines must always be viewed in relation to the risks from untreated diseases. It seemed to be the consensus of the group that such a meeting was both useful and informative and, hopefully, the publication of these proceedings will stimulate further discussion in this important area which may improve the decision-making process in drug development. The Editors wish to thank the participants for contributing to the Work shop, together with Dr. Cyndy Lumley for providing the initial transcript of the meeting and Mrs Sheila Wright for producing the final version and for carrying out all the additional work that is entailed in producing such a publication. Professor S. R. Walker A. W.
The September 11, 2001 terrorism attack on the United States has led government officials to rethink anti-terrorism policies and researchers to assess the implications for the study of risk and uncertainty. This book draws on the expertise of eminent researchers in several risk-related fields to assess three substantive areas of concern - risk beliefs, insurance market effects, and policy responses. The risk belief analyses consider several key questions. How do people think about the risks of terrorism? What are their attitudes toward these risks? To what extent are these low probability and highly dramatic risks overestimated? Several chapters present original survey results analyzing these different aspects of terrorism risk assessments. These studies also begin to explore how people might be willing to sacrifice civil liberties to reduce the risk of terrorism and whether perceived terrorism risks are affected by the severity of the outcome and by proximity to past terrorist attacks. The insurance industry incurred financial losses generated by the terrorism attack. The risks had not been foreseen and were not reflected in insurance pricing. These new terrorism risks generated considerable uncertainty for insurance markets, leading to insurance stock price declines that are documented in this book. Subsequently, a stock price rebound occurred, particularly for the higher quality firms. A third pair of essays deals with policy responses to terrorism risks. A central theme of these analyses is that protective actions by one party have fundamental effects on the risks posed to others. Making airlines immune to terrorist attack may shift the terrorism attacks elsewhere, diminishing the net improvement in security. The papers included here examine how resources should be targeted given these offsetting effects. Contributors to this volume include J. David Cummins, Neil A. Doherty, Baruch Fischhoff, Geoffrey Heal, Howard Kunreuther, Cass R. Sunstein, W. Kip Viscusi, and Richard J. Zeckhauser, among others.
