Bishop & Trout present a new approach to epistemoloy, aiming to liberate the subject from the 'scholastic' debates of analytic philosophy. Rather, they wish to treat epistemology as a branch of the philosophy of science.
Years ago, prompted by Grize, Apostel and Papert, we undertook the study of functions, but until now we did not properly understand the relations between functions and operations, and their increasing interactions at the level of 'constituted functions'. By contrast, certain recent studies on 'constitutive functions', or preoperatory functional schemes, have convinced us of the existence of a sort of logic of functions (springing from the schemes of actions) which is prior to the logic of operations (drawn from the general and reversible coordinations between actions). This preoperatory 'logic' accounts for the very general, and until now unexplained, primacy of order relations between 4 and 7 years of age, which is natural since functions are ordered dependences and result from oriented 'applications'. And while this 'logic' ends up in a positive manner in formalizable structures, it has gaps or limitations. Psychologically, we are interested in understanding the systemƯ atic errors due to this primacy of order, such ·as the undifferentiation of 'longer' and 'farther', or the non-conservations caused by ordinal estimations (of levels, etc.), as opposed to extensive or metric evaluations. In a sense which is psychologically very real, this preoperatory logic of constitutive functions represents only the first half of operatory logic, if this can be said, and it is reversibility which allows the construction of the other half by completing the initial one-way structures.
In the past knowledge was considered static, but epistemologists now take that as soon as an entity of knowledge crystallizes it must dissolve again in the current of new developments of understanding. Here Piaget brings scientific analysis, without philosophical presuppositions, to bear on the understanding of knowledge as a process. This approach to knowledge underlines the benefits of interdisciplinary studies; and Piaget puts forward specific proposals for cooperation between philosophy, linguistics, cybernetics, political economy, demography, logic, epistemology and experimental teaching methods. It is the contention of this great theoretician that such interdisciplinary work could lead to a whole "circle of sciences", in which wide-ranging disciplines would link hands in a general theory of knowledge. -- Back cover.
The baffling and fascinating problem of the mind is a natural subject for Jean Piaget, the eminent Swiss psychologist. The origins, nature, methods, and limits of human knowing are an outgrowth of his long preoccupation with genetic origins and environmental development of logical thought in children. Piaget has lucidly and brilliantly broken new ground and laid down the scientific basis for an entirely new epistemology. In this provocative and seminal contribution to human psychology, he has discarded the assumptions of traditional epistemologies and sets for that knowledge is not an accomplishment but a process; what is learned is not learned for all time but changes and grows with the learner. --
This is the first book to provide a comprehensive overview of the theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of personal epistemology from a psychological and educational perspective. Both theory building and empirical research have grown dramatically in the past decade but, until now, this work has not been pulled together in a single volume. That is the mission of this volume whose state-of-the-art theory and research are likely to define the field for the next 20 years. Key features of this important new book include: *Pioneering Contributors--The book provides current perspectives of each of the major theoreticians and researchers who pioneered this growing field, as well as contributions from new researchers. *Diverse Perspectives--The contributors represent a variety of perspectives, including education, educational psychology, developmental psychology, higher education, and science and mathematics education. *Editorial Integration--Opening and closing chapters by the editors set out key issues confronting the field.
One of the controversial philosophical issues of recent years has been the question of the nature of logical and mathematical entities. Platonist or linguistic modes of explanation have become fashionable, whilst abstrac tionist and constructionist theories have ceased to be so. Beth and Piaget approach this problem in their book from two somewhat different points of view. Beth's approach is largely historico-critical, although he discusses the nature of heuristic thinking in mathematics, whilst that of Piaget is psycho-genetic. The major purpose of this introduction is to summarise some of the main points of their respective arguments. In the first part of this book Beth makes a detailed study of the history of philosophical thinking about mathematics, and draws our attention to the important role played by the Aristotelian methodology of the demon strative sciences. This, he tells us, is characterised by three postulates: (a) deductivity, (b) self-evidence, and (c) reality. The last postulate asserts that the primitive notions of a demonstrative science must have reference to a domain of real entities in order to have significance. On the Aristote lian view discursive reasoning plays a major role in mathematics, whilst pure intuition plays a somewhat subordinate one.
Against the traditional view, Alvin Goldman argues that logic, probability theory, and linguistic analysis cannot by themselves delineate principles of rationality or justified belief. The mind's operations must be taken into account.
Fractal dynamics provide an unparalleled tool for understanding the evolution of natural complexity throughout physical, biological, and psychological realms. This book’s conceptual framework helps to reconcile several persistent dichotomies in the natural sciences, including mind-brain, linear-nonlinear, subjective-objective, and even personal-transpersonal processes. A fractal approach is especially useful when applied to recursive processes of consciousness, both within their ordinary and anomalous manifestations. This novel way to study the interconnection of seemingly divided wholes encompasses multiple dimensions of experience and being. It brings together experts in diverse fields—neuropsychologists, psychiatrists, physicists, physiologists, psychoanalysts, mathematicians, and professors of religion and music composition—to demonstrate the value of fractals as model, method, and metaphor within psychology and related social and physical sciences. The result is a new perspective for understanding what has often been dismissed as too subjective, idiosyncratic, and ineffably beyond the scope of science, bringing these areas back into a natural-scientific framework.
Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a distinguished group of philosophers and psychologists to discuss these important issues. Students and scholars in both fields will find this book to be of great value.
Epistemic cognition, the philosophical core of metacognition, concerns people’s knowledge about the justification and truth of beliefs. Multiple literatures in psychology and education address aspects of epistemic cognition. In the absence of a coherent conceptual framework, however, these literatures mostly fail to communicate with each other and often connect only loosely to genuine epistemology. This complicates any effort to achieve a systematic theoretical understanding of epistemic cognition and its development. Deanna Kuhn writes in her foreword, "Moshman is not the first to take on this challenge, but he fulfills it elegantly and, I think, the most comprehensively and astutely." After reviewing the basics of philosophical epistemology and cognitive psychology, Epistemic Cognition and Development provides a compelling account of developmental change across childhood and beyond in knowledge about knowledge, especially with regard to fundamental conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity, rationality, justification, and truth. This is followed by detailed consideration of domain-specific epistemologies of science, logic, morality, social convention, history, and identity, including associated forms of reasoning. The final section provides theoretical conclusions, educational and social applications, and suggestions for further research.