This study makes a solid case for the now prevalent contention that the development model of East Asian NICs is less costly (i.e. over inflation levels and more equitable income distribution), more adaptive to fluctuating would market conditions (eg. successful adjustment to the two oil crises) and more sustainable (i.e. high growth rates, even in the turbulent 1970s) than that of the Latin American NICs. In considering these issues, this book examines the major Latin American countries' economic problems and development experiences in light of the more successful stabilization and development experiences of the East Asian countries, Taiwan and South Korea in particular.
The decades after World War II were a golden age across much of the world. It was a time of economic miracles, an era when steady jobs were easy to find and families could see their living standards improving year after year. And then, around 1973, the good times vanished. The world economy slumped badly, then settled into the slow, erratic growth that had been the norm before the war. The result was an era of anxiety, uncertainty, and political extremism that we are still grappling with today. In An Extraordinary Time, acclaimed economic historian Marc Levinson describes how the end of the postwar boom reverberated throughout the global economy, bringing energy shortages, financial crises, soaring unemployment, and a gnawing sense of insecurity. Politicians, suddenly unable to deliver the prosperity of years past, railed haplessly against currency speculators, oil sheikhs, and other forces they could not control. From Sweden to Southern California, citizens grew suspicious of their newly ineffective governments and rebelled against the high taxes needed to support social welfare programs enacted when coffers were flush. Almost everywhere, the pendulum swung to the right, bringing politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan to power. But their promise that deregulation, privatization, lower tax rates, and smaller government would restore economic security and robust growth proved unfounded. Although the guiding hand of the state could no longer deliver the steady economic performance the public had come to expect, free-market policies were equally unable to do so. The golden age would not come back again. A sweeping reappraisal of the last sixty years of world history, An Extraordinary Time forces us to come to terms with how little control we actually have over the economy.
This paper describes major economic developments in Brazil in 1997. A number of issues were analyzed in the paper, including the slow progress being made in the negotiation of the fiscal adjustment programs with the states, the sustainability of the growing current account deficit, as well as the strength of the banking system following macroeconomic stabilization. The paper discusses the post-Real crisis in the states and the state adjustment programs being negotiated with the federal government. Privatization and the associated foreign direct investment flows are also described.
"Many articles have been written about the causes of financial crises in emerging markets... ...Much less attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of alternative policy responses and the ensuing process of recovery of the real economy..." This paper analyzes the adjustment process in the aftermath of speculative attacks in six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand. As implied by the title, the main question to be addressed is whether the tales of adjustment in these Latin American and Asian economies were similar. This comparison is interesting for several reasons. The six countries came under the aegis of adjustment programs supported by international financial institutions, and the associated policy prescriptions have been at the center of attention. Of the six cases, one is an example of a "successful" defense of the currency, while another exemplifies a temporarily successful defense followed by an incomplete adjustment program. The others experienced dramatic currency devaluations. This small sample of episodes of adjustment also offers variety in the magnitude of the ensuing economic decline. While the Mexican and Argentine crises of 1995, and even the Brazilian adjustment after the October 1997 attack against its currency, were certainly costly, the Asian crises have been deeper and the recovery of the real economy has been slower. The paper draws policy implications for reducing the costs of the macroeconomic adjustment after currency crises.
This study surveys recent trends in private market financing for developing countries. In addition to examining developments in flows to developing countries through banking and securites markets, it analyzes the institutional and regulatory framework for developing country finance, institutional investor behavior and pricing of developing country stocks, management of public sector debt and implications of private external borrowing for macroeconomic policy management, and progress in commercial bank debt restructuring in low-income countries
