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A review of the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, focusing on the impact and optimal design of competition law and enforcement. Collusion occurs when firms in a market coordinate their behavior for the purpose of producing a supracompetitive outcome. The literature on the theory of collusion is deep and broad but most of that work does not take account of the possible illegality of collusion. Recently, there has been a growing body of research that explicitly focuses on collusion that runs afoul of competition law and thereby makes firms potentially liable for penalties. This book, by an expert on the subject, reviews the theoretical research on unlawful collusion, with a focus on two issues: the impact of competition law and enforcement on whether, how long, and how much firms collude; and the optimal design of competition law and enforcement. The book begins by discussing general issues that arise when models of collusion take into account competition law and enforcement. It goes on to consider game-theoretic models that encompass the probability of detection and penalties incurred when convicted, and examines how these policy instruments affect the frequency of cartels, cartel duration, cartel participation, and collusive prices. The book then considers the design of competition law and enforcement, examining such topics as the formula for penalties and leniency programs. The book concludes with suggested future lines of inquiry into illegal collusion.
Experts examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features. Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The Handbook of Antitrust Economics offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term “antitrust law” and the European “competition law” interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.) After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. Chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to “bidding markets,” network industries, and two-sided markets. Contributors Mark Armstrong, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Paulo Buccirossi, Nicholas Economides, Hans W. Friederiszick, Luke M. Froeb, Richard J. Gilbert, Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Paul Klemperer, Kai-Uwe Kuhn, Francine Lafontaine, Damien J. Neven, Patrick Rey, Michael H. Riordan, Jean-Charles Rochet, Lars-Hendrick Röller, Margaret Slade, Giancarlo Spagnolo, Jean Tirole, Thibaud Vergé, Vincent Verouden, John Vickers, Gregory J. Werden
By examining the issue of collusion in EU and US competition law, this book suggests possible strategies for improving the antitrust enforcement against parallelism, by exploiting the most advanced achievements of economic analysis. The book contains a suggested approach to collusion, in ex ante and ex post perspectives. By moving from the analysis of the state of art, in terms of law, case law, and scholarship, Marilena Filippelli analyses inconsistencies and failures in the current antitrust enforcement toward collusion and develops a workable parameter for the issue of collective dominance. The most innovative part of this work goes beyond the analysis itself of collective dominance and involves the interference of arts. 101 and 102. The conclusion is a re-definition of the relationship between those rulesÑfrom dichotomy to redundancy. Finally, the book highlights the antitrust significance of semi-collusion, as a strategy made of collusion and competition. The author considers economic models equaling, as for the effects, collusion and semi-collusion and the case law supporting the qualification of semi-collusion as a species of collusion. The analysis involves both US and EU systems, under the highly topical economic-oriented approach. It also contains an original view of European antitrust prohibitions. Because of its contents and its approach, this book will be attractive to every academic interested in antitrust law. Moreover, the well-documented research on parallelism, involving law, case law and scholarship, makes this book interesting also for competition authorities and antitrust lawyers.
"Any practitioner, policymaker, or academic, in the field of competition law could hardly ask for a more thoroughly documented work. EC and US antitrust law is examined, and dozens of court decisions are quoted, with complete citations throughout. The books is a gold mine for anyone interested in the important task of extending the reach of competition law and antitrust law in this era of globalization."--BOOK JACKET.
James Friedman provides a thorough survey of oligopoly theory using numerical examples and careful verbal explanations to make the ideas clear and accessible. While the earlier ideas of Cournot, Hotelling, and Chamberlin are presented, the larger part of the book is devoted to the modern work on oligopoly that has resulted from the application of dynamic techniques and game theory to this area of economics. The book begins with static oligopoly theory. Cournot's model and its more recent elaborations are covered in the first substantive chapter. Then the Chamberlinian analysis of product differentiation, spatial competition, and characteristics space is set out. The subsequent chapters on modern work deal with reaction functions, advertising, oligopoly with capital, entry, and oligopoly using noncooperative game theory. A large bibliography is provided.
Reorganized for increased accessibility, The 1997 edition of ANTITRUST ANALYSIS presents coverage of current issues with the same incisive -- and effective -- approach that has earned the book its premier reputation in the field. The distinctive emphasis on textual explanations that has always characterized Antitrust Analysis continues in the Fifth Edition. These strong textual discussions convey essential background information and necessary economic principles. Further, less significant cases have been trimmed. The authors' vast expertise in antitrust and economics is shown in a casebook of truly unrivaled quality. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS, Fifth Edition, opens with a clear introduction To The history of antitrust law and a cogent presentation of important economics material. The authors then explore: horizontal agreements monopolization vertical agreements mergers price discrimination Reflecting ongoing movement in the antitrust arena, Areeda and Kaplow now address new developments in: intellectual property health care international aspects of antitrust law
This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation and on original analyses to deal with such important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices, and price discrimination, and to formulate policy implications on these issues. The interaction between theory and practice is one of the main features of the book, which contains frequent references to competition policy cases and a few fully developed case studies. The treatment is written to appeal to practitioners and students, to lawyers and economists. It is not only a textbook in economics for first year graduate or advanced undergraduate courses, but also a book for all those who wish to understand competition issues in a clear and rigorous way. Exercises and some solved problems are provided.
The first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, with detailed case studies. A cartel forms when competitors conspire to limit competition through coordinated actions. Most cartels are composed exclusively of firms that would otherwise be in competition, but in a hub-and-spoke cartel, those competitors (“spokes”) conspire with the assistance of an upstream supplier or a downstream buyer (“hub”). This book provides the first comprehensive economic and legal analysis of hub-and-spoke cartels, explaining their formation and how they operate to create and sustain a collusive environment. Sixteen detailed case studies, including cases brought against toy manufacturer Hasbro and the Apple ebook case, illustrate the economic framework and legal strategies discussed. The authors identify three types of hub-and-spoke cartels: when an upstream firm facilitates downstream firms to coordinate on higher prices; when a downstream intermediary facilitates upstream suppliers to coordinate on higher prices; and when a downstream firm facilitates upstream suppliers to exclude a downstream rival. They devote a chapter to each type, discussing the formation, coordination, enforcement, efficacy, and prosecution of these cartels, and consider general lessons that can be drawn from the case studies. Finally, they present strategies for prosecuting hub-and-spoke collusion. The book is written to be accessible to both economists and lawyers, and is intended for both scholars and practitioners.
Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.
