An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
As economic reform in developing countries has shifted from macroeconomic stabilization to liberalization, opportunities for legislators to influence the process and outcome of reform have increased and their role has become more important. This book focuses attention on differences in institutional structure, in political parties and electoral rules, to show how they create incentives that can explain the varying ways in which legislators respond to policy initiatives from the executive branch. In Argentina and the Philippines, presidents proposed similar fiscal reforms in the 1990s: expanding tax bases, strengthening tax administration, and redesigning tax revenue-sharing with subnational governments. Drawing on archival research and interviews with policy makers, Kent Eaton follows the path of legislation in these three areas from initial proposal to final law to reveal how it was shaped by the legislators participating in the process. Obstacles to the adoption of reform, he demonstrates, are greater in candidate-centered systems like the Philippines&’ (where the cultivation of personal reputations is paramount) than in party-centered systems like Argentina&’s (where loyalty to party leaders is emphasized). To test his argument further, Eaton looks finally at other kinds of reform ventured in these two countries and at tax reforms attempted in some other countries.
In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chinese communist political institutions are more flexible and less centralized than their Soviet counterparts were. Shirk pioneers a rational choice institutional approach to analyze policy-making in a non-democratic authoritarian country and to explain the history of Chinese market reforms from 1979 to the present. Drawing on extensive interviews with high-level Chinese officials, she pieces together detailed histories of economic reform policy decisions and shows how the political logic of Chinese communist institutions shaped those decisions. Combining theoretical ambition with the flavor of on-the-ground policy-making in Beijing, this book is a major contribution to the study of reform in China and other communist countries. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1994. In the past decade, China was able to carry out economic reform without political reform, while the Soviet Union attempted the opposite strategy. How did China succeed at economic market reform without changing communist rule? Susan Shirk shows that Chine
In the same way that no economy starts out with the best set of economic policies, no economy starts out with the best institutions to support the policy-making process. Instead, they inherit institutions that reflect their own unique culture and history. The task of structural reform has to be addressed, therefore, in the context of domestic economic and political institutions and processes. Examining the nature of structural economic reform and the institutional circumstances in which it succeeds or is inhibited, this volume is less about the content of structural reform and more about how to get there. The chapters develop principles governing the types of institutions that are likely to assist the structural reform process, and then examine the application of those principles within a number of case studies. Finally, the volume presents some ideas about how regional cooperation could help to build and support those institutions that in turn support domestic structural reforms. Consisting of theoretical chapters and country specific case studies, this book draws on experience with structural reform across a range of Asian economies at different stages of economic development. As such it will be of interest to students and scholars of Asian Economics and Development Economics.
Policymakers around the world have increasingly agreed that macroeconomic discipline, microeconomic liberalization, and outward orientation are prerequisites for economic success. But what are the political conditions that make economic transformation possible? At a conference held at the Institute for International Economics, leaders of economic reform recounted their efforts to bring about change and discussed the impact of the political climate on the success of their efforts. In this book, these leaders explore the political conditions conducive to the success of policy reforms. Did economic crisis strengthen the hands of the reformers? Was the rapidity with which reforms were instituted crucial? Did the reformers have a "honeymoon" period in which to transform the economy? The authors answer these and other questions, as well as providing first-hand accounts of the politically charged atmosphere surrounding reform efforts in their countries.
The quest for freedom from hunger and repression has triggered in recent years a dramatic, worldwide reform of political and economic systems. Never have so many people enjoyed, or at least experimented with democratic institutions. However, many strategies for economic development in Eastern Europe and Latin America have failed with the result that entire economic systems on both continents are being transformed. This major book analyzes recent transitions to democracy and market-oriented economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing in a quite distinctive way on models derived from political philosophy, economics, and game theory, Professor Przeworski also considers specific data on individual countries. Among the questions raised by the book are: What should we expect from these experiments in democracy and market economy? What new economic systems will emerge? Will these transitions result in new democracies or old dictatorships?
In this book, Miles Kahler examines both global and regional institutions and their importance in the world economy. Kahler explains the variation in these institutions and assesses the role they play in sustaining economic cooperation among nations.