Some of the specific topics addressed include: advances in the theory of large co-operative games; non co-operative models of coalition formation; a survey of the partition function in the formation of coalitions; far-sightedness in coalition formation; coalition stability; coalition formation in industrialized economics, trade theory, environmental economics and public finance.
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
This book develops a new theory of collaborative lobbying and influence to explain how antipoverty advocates gain influence in American social policymaking.
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley, this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown out of Shapley's seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concerns some aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints of the 'ancestral' papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley's original 1953 paper defining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubik applying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley's 1969 paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. The other seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume. The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in the volume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley's other major contributions to game theory. The other chapters cover the reformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have been inspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study of coalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, to problems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utility is not transferable.
Some of the most brutal and long-lasting civil wars of our time involve the rapid formation and disintegration of alliances among warring groups, as well as fractionalization within them. It would be natural to suppose that warring groups form alliances based on shared identity considerations - such as Christian groups allying with Christian groups - but this is not what we see. Two groups that identify themselves as bitter foes one day, on the basis of some identity narrative, might be allies the next day and vice versa. Nor is any group, however homogeneous, safe from internal fractionalization. Rather, looking closely at the civil wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia and testing against the broader universe of fifty-three cases of multiparty civil wars, Fotini Christia finds that the relative power distribution between and within various warring groups is the primary driving force behind alliance formation, alliance changes, group splits and internal group takeovers.
Despite the growing consensus on the need for action to counteract climate change, complex economic and political forces have so far prevented international actors from making much headway toward resolving the problem. Most approaches to climate change are based in economics and environmental science; in this book, Parkash Chander argues that we can make further progress on the climate change impasse by considering a third approach—game theory. Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale.
Hay razones para pensar que llega una cuarta ola de democratización. En la actualidad existen más democracias en el mundo que en ningún periodo anterior. Desde el año 1991, nada menos que cuarenta Estados han emprendido la transición hacia la democracia. La existencia de naciones en vías de democratización o de redemocratización, como los esfuerzos para crear constituciones supraestatales -es el caso de la Unión Europea-, hacen imprescindible avanzar hacia un mejor conocimiento de los procedimientos legislativos y los modelos alternativos de constitución política. La división histórica de las ciencias políticas en distintos campos de estudio ha sesgado el enfoque adoptado por economistas y politólogos sobre numerosos temas y ha supuesto limitaciones artificiales para el análisis de muchas cuestiones sociales relevantes. De ahí la importancia innegable de un estudio unificado de la economía política que explore las fronteras de la interacción entre política y economía. La caracterización de la economía política como síntesis de diversos campos suscitará controversia, a la vez que abre una línea de investigación muy estimulante para elucidar nuestra comprensión sobre las democracias.Este libro recoge los resultados del seminario "La economía política de la democracia", celebrado en Barcelona entre los días 5 y 7 de junio de 2008 con el apoyo de la Fundación BBVA. En él se dieron cita líderes intelectuales en economía y ciencias políticas con el fin de desarrollar planteamientos equilibrados sobre temas comunes de análisis, tales como las estrategias preelectorales, las elecciones, la formación de coaliciones y las prácticas de gobierno, dentro de un único marco integrador. Se prestó una especial atención a campos actuales de desarrollo, entres ellos, la entrada endógena de candidatos, los comportamientos de políticos y votantes, negociaciones y acuerdos, y regímenes políticos.
A classic treatment of game theory from the acclaimed Annals of Mathematics Studies series Princeton University Press is proud to have published the Annals of Mathematics Studies since 1940. One of the oldest and most respected series in science publishing, it has included many of the most important and influential mathematical works of the twentieth century. The series continues this tradition as Princeton University Press publishes the major works of the twenty-first century. To mark the continued success of the series, all books are available in paperback and as ebooks.
A comprehensive view of coalition formation is presented here. Each of the chapters gives a summary of theories and research findings in a specific field of interest, at various levels of human and primate organisation.
