This volume of the 'Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance Series' is the result of an international conference on the theme 'Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence' held on 25 May 2012 in Groningen, the Netherlands. It is the objective of this book, as of the conference that preceded it, to bring together eminent judges and scholars, from various jurisdictions to reflect on the fundamental principles of judicial and quasi-judicial independence, to help clarify the concepts and to discuss the threats and challenges that call for different safeguards or solutions.
The power of national and transnational constitutional courts to issue binding rulings in interpreting the constitution or an international treaty has been endlessly discussed. What does it mean for democratic governance that non-elected judges influence politics and policies? The authors of Judicial Power - legal scholars, political scientists, and judges - take a fresh look at this problem. To date, research has concentrated on the legitimacy, or the effectiveness, or specific decision-making methods of constitutional courts. By contrast, the authors here explore the relationship among these three factors. This book presents the hypothesis that judicial review allows for a method of reflecting on social integration that differs from political methods, and, precisely because of the difference between judicial and political decision-making, strengthens democratic governance. This hypothesis is tested in case studies on the role of constitutional courts in political transformations, on the methods of these courts, and on transnational judicial interactions.
In countries and supranational entities around the globe, constitutional reform has transferred an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judiciaries. The constitutionalization of rights and the establishment of judicial review are widely believed to have benevolent and progressive origins, and significant redistributive, power-diffusing consequences. Ran Hirschl challenges this conventional wisdom. Drawing upon a comprehensive comparative inquiry into the political origins and legal consequences of the recent constitutional revolutions in Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and South Africa, Hirschl shows that the trend toward constitutionalization is hardly driven by politicians' genuine commitment to democracy, social justice, or universal rights. Rather, it is best understood as the product of a strategic interplay among hegemonic yet threatened political elites, influential economic stakeholders, and judicial leaders. This self-interested coalition of legal innovators determines the timing, extent, and nature of constitutional reforms. Hirschl demonstrates that whereas judicial empowerment through constitutionalization has a limited impact on advancing progressive notions of distributive justice, it has a transformative effect on political discourse. The global trend toward juristocracy, Hirschl argues, is part of a broader process whereby political and economic elites, while they profess support for democracy and sustained development, attempt to insulate policymaking from the vicissitudes of democratic politics.
This book investigates the mechanisms of judicial control to determine an efficient methodology for independence and accountability. Using over 800 case studies from the Czech and Slovak disciplinary courts, the author creates a theoretical framework that can be applied to future case studies and decrease the frequency of accountability perversions.
This open access book deals with Article 7 TEU measures, court proceedings, financial sanctions and the EU Rule of Law Framework to protect EU values with a particular focus on checks and balances in EU Member States. It analyses substantive standards, powers, procedures as well as the consequences and implications of the various instruments. It combines the analysis of the European level, be it the EU or the Council of Europe, with that of the national level, in particular in Hungary and Poland. The LM judgment of the European Court of Justice is made subject to detailed scrutiny.
Winner of the Scribes Book Award “As brilliantly imaginative as it is urgently timely.” —Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Harvard Law School “At no time more than the present, a defense of expertise-based governance and administration is sorely needed, and this book provides it with gusto.” —Frederick Schauer, author of The Proof A highly original framework for restoring confidence in a government bureaucracy increasingly derided as “the deep state.” Is the modern administrative state illegitimate? Unconstitutional? Unaccountable? Dangerous? America has long been divided over these questions, but the debate has recently taken on more urgency and spilled into the streets. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the administrative state can be redeemed so long as public officials are constrained by morality and guided by stable rules. Officials should make clear rules, ensure transparency, and never abuse retroactivity, so that current guidelines are not under constant threat of change. They should make rules that are understandable and avoid issuing contradictory ones. These principles may seem simple, but they have a great deal of power. Already, they limit the activities of administrative agencies every day. In more robust form, they could address some of the concerns of critics who decry the “deep state” and yearn for its downfall. “Has something to offer both critics and supporters...a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate over the constitutionality of the modern state.” —Review of Politics “The authors freely admit that the administrative state is not perfect. But, they contend, it is far better than its critics allow.” —Wall Street Journal
This book explores the effect of the judiciary on the incidence of post-election violence by political actors across Africa and within African countries. It examines how variation in judicial independence can constrain or incentivize election violence among democratizing states. Using case studies and cross-national analysis, the book shows that variation in levels of judicial independence from a non-independent judiciary to a quasi-independent judiciary or from a fully independent judiciary to quasi-independent judiciary increases the likelihood of strategic use of post-election violence by non-state actors. However, the likelihood of post-election violence is significantly reduced in non-independent judiciaries or once countries' judiciaries become fully independent. The author makes the theoretical argument that, within unconsolidated states, non-state actors that view the judiciary as semi-independent are more likely to engage in post-election violence with the purpose of creating political and professional uncertainty in order to influence assertive behaviour from judges in disputed elections. Consequently, the book argues that semi-independent judiciaries or judiciaries that are neither fully controlled by the incumbent nor fully independent from the incumbent can help explain post-election violence among unconsolidated states, all else being equal. This book will be of interest to scholars of election violence, democratic politics, law and politics and African politics.
