This book addresses how to conduct policy analysis in the field of national security, including foreign policy and defense strategy. It is a philosophical and conceptual book for helphing people think deeply, clearly, and insightfully about complex policy issues. This books reflects the viewpoint that the best policies normally come from efforts to synthesize competing camps by drawing upon the best of each of them and by combining them to forge a sensible whole. While this book is written to be reader-friendly, it aspires to in-depth scholarship.
For more than forty years, the United States has maintained a public commitment to nuclear disarmament, and every president from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama has gradually reduced the size of America's nuclear forces. Yet even now, over two decades after the end of the Cold War, the United States maintains a huge nuclear arsenal on high alert and ready for war. The Americans, like the Russians, the Chinese, and other major nuclear powers, continue to retain a deep faith in the political and military value of nuclear force, and this belief remains enshrined at the center of U.S. defense policy regardless of the radical changes that have taken place in international politics. In No Use, national security scholar Thomas M. Nichols offers a lucid, accessible reexamination of the role of nuclear weapons and their prominence in U.S. security strategy. Nichols explains why strategies built for the Cold War have survived into the twenty-first century, and he illustrates how America's nearly unshakable belief in the utility of nuclear arms has hindered U.S. and international attempts to slow the nuclear programs of volatile regimes in North Korea and Iran. From a solid historical foundation, Nichols makes the compelling argument that to end the danger of worldwide nuclear holocaust, the United States must take the lead in abandoning unrealistic threats of nuclear force and then create a new and more stable approach to deterrence for the twenty-first century.
“An excellent contribution to the debate on the future role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in American foreign policy.” ―Contemporary Security Policy This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds—including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author’s experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real-world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them. “Well-researched and carefully argued.” ―Foreign Affairs
Concern about the threat posed by nuclear weapons has preoccupied the United States and presidents of the United States since the beginning of the nuclear era. Nuclear Security draws from papers presented at the 2013 meeting of the American Nuclear Society examining worldwide efforts to control nuclear weapons and ensure the safety of the nuclear enterprise of weapons and reactors against catastrophic accidents. The distinguished contributors, all known for their long-standing interest in getting better control of the threats posed by nuclear weapons and reactors, discuss what we can learn from past successes and failures and attempt to identify the key ingredients for a road ahead that can lead us toward a world free of nuclear weapons. The authors review historical efforts to deal with the challenge of nuclear weapons, with a focus on the momentous arms control negotiations between U.S. president Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. They offer specific recommendations for reducing risks that should be adopted by the nuclear enterprise, both military and civilian, in the United States and abroad. Since the risks posed by the nuclear enterprise are so high, they conclude, no reasonable effort should be spared to ensure safety and security.
Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often--and predictably--greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes. How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast--a significant achievement--but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not. Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.
Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, Second Edition is a comprehensive reference covering the cutting-edge technologies used to trace, track and safeguard nuclear material. Sections cover security, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, and how to prevent nuclear terrorism. International case studies of security at nuclear facilities and illegal nuclear trade activities provide specific examples of the complex issues surrounding the technology and policy for nuclear material protection, control and accountability. New case studies include analyses of nuclear programs of important countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Kazakhstan, among others. This is a thoroughly updated, must-have volume for private and public organizations involved in driving national security, domestic and international policy issues relating to nuclear material security, non-proliferation, and nuclear transparency.
The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volume--based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)--describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.
Karsten Frey gives an analytic account of the dynamics of India's nuclear build up, putting forward a new comprehensive model which goes beyond the classic strategic model of accepting motives of arming behaviour, and incorporates the dynamics in India's nuclear programme.
A Brookings Institution Press and the Center for International Security and Cooperation publication What role should nuclear weapons play in today's world? How can the United States promote international security while safeguarding its own interests? U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy informs this debate with an analysis of current nuclear weapons policies and strategies, including those for deterring, preventing, or preempting nuclear attack; preventing further proliferation, to nations and terrorists; modifying weapons designs; and revising the U.S. nuclear posture. Presidents Bush and Clinton made major changes in U.S. policy after the Cold War, and George W. Bush's administration made further, more radical changes after 9/11. Leaked portions of 2001's Nuclear Posture Review, for example, described more aggressive possible uses for nuclear weapons. This important volume examines the significance of such changes and suggests a way forward for U.S. policy, emphasizing stronger security of nuclear weapons and materials, international compliance with nonproliferation obligations, attention to the demand side of proliferation, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign policy.
James B. Conant (1893-1978) was one of the titans of mid-20th-century American history, attaining prominence and power in multiple fields. Usually remembered as an educational leader, he was president of Harvard University for two tumultuous decades, from the Depression to World War II to the Cold War and McCarthyism. To take that job he gave up a scientific career as one of the country’s top chemists, and he left it twenty years later to become Eisenhower’s top diplomat in postwar Germany. Hershberg’s prize-winning study, however, examines a critical aspect of Conant’s life that was long obscured by government secrecy: his pivotal role in the birth of the nuclear age. During World War II, as an advisor to Roosevelt and then Truman (on the elite “Interim Committee” that considered how to employ the bomb against Japan), Conant was intimately involved in the decisions to build and use the atomic bomb. During and after the Manhattan Project, he also led efforts to prevent a postwar nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union that, he feared, threatened the survival of civilization — an apocalyptic prospect he glimpsed in the first instant of the new age, when he witnessed the first test of the new weapon at Alamogordo on July 16, 1945. “... a vivid inquiry... a model of historiography; evocative reading...[Conant was] central to atomic policy and progress; the bomb would be as much Conant’s as it was anyone’s in Government. His inner response to that burden responsibility has long been obscured, but it is illumined here.” — Philip Morrison, The New York Times Book Review “In his splendid portrait of Conant, James Hershberg has illuminated the life of a pivotal figure in the making of U.S. nuclear, scientific, educational and foreign policy for almost a half-century. But the book is much more: It is not only an insightful narration of Conant’s life; it is also a brilliant and important account of the making of the nuclear age, a chronicle that contains much that is new... Hershberg’s superb study... is a chronicle of Conant’s moral journey and we are the wiser for his having charted Conant’s path.” — S.S. Schweber, Washington Post Book World “James G. Hershberg ably comes to grips with Conant and his hazardous times... His book is vibrantly written and compelling, and it breaches Conant’s shield of public discretion in masterly fashion, making extensive use of unpublished interviews, diaries, reports, and correspondence pried from private and governmental repositories. It is a huge, ambitious work — a history of the Cold War as Conant encountered it as well as a study of the man.” — Daniel J. Kevles, The New Yorker “... a well-written, comprehensive, nonjudgmental but sensitive biography... Conant was involved in so many and such critical events that students of almost any aspect of our public life over the past half-century will find useful the new material and helpful insights in this book... This fine biography of one of the most important and complicated of America’s twentieth-century leaders immediately establishes James Hershberg as one of America’s outstanding young historians.” — Stephen E. Ambrose,Foreign Affairs “... magnificent... Any reader interested in nuclear weapons, Cold War history or American politics from FDR to JFK will find this biography riveting.” — Priscilla McMillan, Chicago Tribune “... masterful... The prose is clear, the narrative forceful and the author’s judgments are balanced and judicious. This is simply splendid biography... The highest praise one can give for a book of this sort is that the historian has not shrunk from speaking truth to power. This book quietly but insistently does so. It should be read by the public at large as one of the definitive texts on the cold war and the nuclear age... Hershberg’s triumph is that he has prevailed over all the official lies to give us one more layer of the historical truth.” — Kai Bird, The Nation “... riveting... an impressive achievement... honest and comprehensive in its scholarship, the author has shown himself to be a historian of notable achievement and promise.” — McGeorge Bundy, Nature “Hershberg’s outstanding, balanced biography lifts the self-imposed secrecy surrounding a key architect of U.S. Cold War policy and of the nuclear age.” —Publisher’s Weekly “... [an] impressive and substantial achievement. [Hershberg] has used the life of one strategically placed individual to illuminate the most important issues surrounding America’s role and conduct in the nuclear age. His book will be invaluable to scholars assessing the impact and legacy of the group who acquired the epithet ‘wise men’ now that the Cold War has receded.” — Carol S. Gruber, Science “... definitive... a far more textured picture than one finds in Conant’s own guarded and unrevealing autobiography... an important and rewarding book... illuminating... Conant led a remarkable and eventful life in remarkable and eventful times. James Hershberg has explored that life, and those times, in exhaustive and revealing detail.” — Paul Boyer, The New Republic “James G. Hershberg has achieved the impossible. He has written a huge biography of a Harvard president that is fascinating, informative and as valuable a piece of American history as anything I have read in years... Mr. Hershberg has brought us back vividly to an age that seems remote, so long ago, but the questions about nuclear proliferation are the same, even while the answers are still ambiguous. As we watch men struggling with unanticipated post-Cold War problems and civil wars sprouting like Jason’s men at arms, it is good to read this story about a complex man who deserves an important place in our history because he helped make that history possible.” — Arnold Beichman, The Washington Times “... engrossing... A magisterial study of an awesome and intriguing public career.” —Kirkus Reviews “... entertaining... thought-provocative.” — Dick Teresi, The Wall Street Journal “Hershberg’s book helps us more clearly understand the postwar Establishment and offers a challenging appraisal of the role of elites, of universities and of the state.” — Gar Alperovitz, In These Times “Hershberg deserves great credit for cracking a tough New England walnut, analyzing this very important public figure, demonstrating how he fit into his own time and showing us what we can learn from the man.” — Daniel R. Mortensen, The Friday Review of Defense Literature “... a compelling account... an engaging examination of one of the central figures of the nuclear age. It succeeds in showing ‘one man’s intersection with great events and issues’ and in the process illuminates those issues for us all.” — American Historical Review “... well-written... Conant’s participation in one of our country’s most dynamic periods is, thanks to Hershberg, now much better understood.” — Library Journal “A reader of the book will enter the realm of the greats, the shapers of worlds created by the atomic blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki... Conant was no bit player in Cold War history... [the book is] very successful in weaving Conant’s subsurface persona in with his ups and downs as a prominent and committed public figure. And it leaves out little detail in describing top-level decisions involving the Cold War geopolitics of nuclear weaponry. Conant was a participant in most of these decisions—with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman themselves, their Secretaries of War and State, and, of course, all the major scientific figures of the time.” — Chemical & Engineering News “A wonderfully rich portrait that emerges from a carefully documented account of Conant’s role in the development of the atomic bomb and post-war nuclear policy... An extraordinarily well written text... Hershberg lays bare the person behind the persona — warts, dimples and all.” — Stanley Goldberg, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
