The man and his dream, the man dies but the dream lives on in this work a manual dedicated to a great man who gave so much of himself to the community without any thought of reward for himself in return. North Central Texas Search And Rescue manual is the dedication to this man and the team he chartered through the state of Texas in 1992-3 and covers all its by-laws
After Southeast Asia, analysts and force planners came to the realization that there was a fundamental difference between search and rescue (SAR) in a permissive area and in an area that was not permissive (i.e., under enemy control). This second condition is now called combat search and rescue or CSAR. At the time of Desert Storm, the two forms of rescue were defined thusly: Search and Rescue (SAR): Use of aircraft, surface craft, submarines, personnel, and equipment to locate and recover personnel in distress on land or at sea. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR): A specialized SAR task performed by rescue-capable forces to effect recovery of distressed personnel from hostile territory during contingency operations or wartime.2 The development of this rescue capability has been well established. Dr. Robert Futrell documented our efforts in Korea in The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953. His work was followed by Dr. Earl Tilford's Search and Rescue in South east Asia, which eloquently chronicled the heroic efforts of the rescue crews in that conflict who brought back literally thousands of airmen. It extensively documented what is now considered the "golden age" of rescue. This work is meant to follow in those traditions and will focus on our CSAR efforts in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, or more specifically, the period of Operation Desert Storm, 17 January to 28 February 1991. Overall, CSAR in Desert Storm appears to have been a mixed bag. Because of advances in precision weaponry, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, countermeasures, and training, relatively few coalition aircraft were shot down. Forty-three coalition aircraft were lost in combat, most over high-threat areas. Eighty-seven coalition airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines were isolated in enemy or neutral territory. Of that total, 48 were killed, one is still listed as missing, 24 were immediately captured, and 14 were exposed in enemy territory. Of those who survived, most landed in areas controlled by enemy troops. Of the few actually rescueable, six were not rescued for a variety of reasons, but primarily because of limitations in CENTAF's ability to locate them accurately and in a timely manner.
Jerry Thigpen's study on the history of the Combat Talon is the first effort to tell the story of this wonderfully capable machine. This weapons system has performed virtually every imaginable tactical event in the spectrum of conflict and by any measure is the most versatile C-130 derivative ever produced. First modified and sent to Southeast Asia (SEA) in 1966 to replace theater unconventional warfare (UW) assets that were limited in both lift capability and speed the Talon I quickly adapted to theater UW tasking including infiltration and resupply and psychological warfare operations into North Vietnam. After spending four years in SEA and maturing into a highly respected UW weapons system the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) chose the Combat Talon to lead the night low-level raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay. Despite the outcome of the operation the Talon I cemented its reputation as the weapons system of choice for long-range clandestine operations. In the period following the Vietnam War United States Air Force (USAF) special operations gradually lost its political and financial support which was graphically demonstrated in the failed Desert One mission into Iran. Thanks to congressional supporters like Earl Hutto of Florida and Dan Daniel of Virginia funds for aircraft upgrades and military construction projects materialized to meet the ever-increasing threat to our nation. Under the leadership of such committed hard-driven officers as Brenci Uttaro Ferkes Meller and Thigpen the crew force became the most disciplined in our Air Force. It was capable of penetrating hostile airspace at night in a low-level mountainous environment covertly to execute any number of unconventional warfare missions.
This is the fourth volume in an operational and chronological series covering the U.S. Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. This volume details the change in focus of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps. This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and III MAF’s perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort.
Established in 1911, The Rotarian is the official magazine of Rotary International and is circulated worldwide. Each issue contains feature articles, columns, and departments about, or of interest to, Rotarians. Seventeen Nobel Prize winners and 19 Pulitzer Prize winners – from Mahatma Ghandi to Kurt Vonnegut Jr. – have written for the magazine.
Field Manual (FM) 3-19.50 is a new manual for the Military Police Corps in conducting police intelligence operations (PIO). It describes the doctrine relating to: * The fundamentals of PIO; * The legal documents and considerations affiliated with PIO; * The PIO process; * The relationship of PIO to the Army's intelligence process; * The introduction of police and prison structures, organized crime, legal systems, investigations, crime conducive conditions, and enforcement mechanisms and gaps (POLICE)-a tool to assess the criminal dimension and its influence on effects-based operations (EBO); * PIO in urban operations (UO) and on installations; and * The establishment of PIO networks and associated forums and fusion cells to affect gathering police information and criminal intelligence (CRIMINT).
Los Angeles magazine is a regional magazine of national stature. Our combination of award-winning feature writing, investigative reporting, service journalism, and design covers the people, lifestyle, culture, entertainment, fashion, art and architecture, and news that define Southern California. Started in the spring of 1961, Los Angeles magazine has been addressing the needs and interests of our region for 48 years. The magazine continues to be the definitive resource for an affluent population that is intensely interested in a lifestyle that is uniquely Southern Californian.
This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~
