The Review Journal of Political Philosophy publishes high-quality work in moral and political philosophy, broadly-construed. The Journal prides itself on its eclecticism, not limiting itself to any particular tradition, school of thought, or historical pe.
We can see a theft, hear a lie, and feel a stabbing. These are morally important perceptions. But are they also moral perceptions--distinctively moral responses? In this book, Robert Audi develops an original account of moral perceptions, shows how they figure in human experience, and argues that they provide moral knowledge. He offers a theory of perception as an informative representational relation to objects and events. He describes the experiential elements in perception, illustrates moral perception in relation to everyday observations, and explains how moral perception justifies moral judgments and contributes to objectivity in ethics. Moral perception does not occur in isolation. Intuition and emotion may facilitate it, influence it, and be elicited by it. Audi explores the nature and variety of intuitions and their relation to both moral perception and emotion, providing the broadest and most refined statement to date of his widely discussed intuitionist view in ethics. He also distinguishes several kinds of moral disagreement and assesses the challenge it poses for ethical objectivism. Philosophically argued but interdisciplinary in scope and interest, Moral Perception advances our understanding of central problems in ethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and the theory of the emotions.
The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology brings together philosophers, cognitive scientists, developmental and evolutionary psychologists, animal ethologists, intellectual historians, and educators to provide the most comprehensive analysis of the prospects for moral knowledge ever assembled in print. The book’s thirty chapters feature leading experts describing the nature of moral thought, its evolution, childhood development, and neurological realization. Various forms of moral skepticism are addressed along with the historical development of ideals of moral knowledge and their role in law, education, legal policy, and other areas of social life. Highlights include: • Analyses of moral cognition and moral learning by leading cognitive scientists • Accounts of the normative practices of animals by expert animal ethologists • An overview of the evolution of cooperation by preeminent evolutionary psychologists • Sophisticated treatments of moral skepticism, relativism, moral uncertainty, and know-how by renowned philosophers • Scholarly accounts of the development of Western moral thinking by eminent intellectual historians • Careful analyses of the role played by conceptions of moral knowledge in political liberation movements, religious institutions, criminal law, secondary education, and professional codes of ethics articulated by cutting-edge social and moral philosophers.
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim? This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral psychology, and metaethics, arguing that many traditional conceptions of objectivity fail to capture what is important to our identities as knowers, social beings, and moral agents. A new thesis of ‘perspectival realism’ is offered as a critique of strong objectivity, but in a way that avoids radical subjectivism or relativism. Locally-situated identities can provide their own criteria of epistemic and moral justification, and we may aspire to be impartial in a way that need not sacrifice particular perspectives and relationships. Arguments throughout the book draw heavily on resources from classical Chinese philosophy, and significant attention is given to applications of arguments to concrete issues in applied ethics, cross-cultural anthropology, and political science.
Working in the tradition of analytic philosophy, Alexander Brown argues that many different forms of political communication (or anti-communication) that often infuriate the public can also be ethically or morally objectionable. These forms include question dodging, offering scripted answers, stonewalling, not listening, disseminating propaganda, pandering, being insincere, giving false denials, issuing revisionist interpretations, refusing to take responsibility, never apologising, boasting, and gaslighting. Brown invokes a host of normative reasons including those having to do with epistemic arrogance, interference in autonomy, and violating the right to be heard. This is not to say that, all things considered, politicians should never engage in dubious political communication. Sometimes these are necessary evils. Brown argues, however, that further moral inquiry is needed to show why they are evils, and to determine when the use of these rhetorical tactics can be excessive, unreasonable, or out of place. Key Features: • Identifies and conceptualises forms of dubious political communication • Develops an ethical evaluation of political communication • Considers possible justifications for the use of dubious political communication • Makes practical recommendations on how to regulate unethical political communication
This work is the last in the 10-volume series "Early Responses to Hume", which is an edited and annotated collection of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century critical reactions to Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) . Both a philosopher and historian, he was infamous in his day for his skeptical views on human nature, knowledge, metaphysics, and religion.
'Adult Lives' is a diverse collection of readings from all stages of life which aim to understand how those living and working together in an ageing society relate to each other. It uses a holistic approach to understanding ageing in adulthood that is applicable to all, including those developing policy and in practice.