Focuses on those government activities funded under the FY 2012 military construction (MC) appropriation, examines trends in MC funding, and outlines MC issues extant in each of the major regions of U.S. military activity. Contents of this report: (1) MC Funding Trends, FY 2010-FY 2012; (2) Appropriations Overview: FY 2012 MC Authorization and Appropriations; MC Funding Levels, FY 2010-FY 2012; (3) Regional Command Construction Issues: Northern Command; Pacific Command: MCAS Futenma Replacement; Guam Redeployment; Korea Transformation; European Command; Africa Command; Central Command; (3) FY 2011 Continuing Appropriations; (4) FY 2012 Appropriations. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.
This independent assessment is a comprehensive study of the strategic benefits, risks, and costs of U.S. military presence overseas. The report provides policymakers a way to evaluate the range of strategic benefits and costs that follow from revising the U.S. overseas military presence by characterizing how this presence contributes to assurance, deterrence, responsiveness, and security cooperation goals.
Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector highlights the role of public finance in the delivery of security and criminal justice services. This book offers a framework for analyzing public financial management, financial transparency, and oversight, as well as expenditure policy issues that determine how to most appropriately manage security and justice services. The interplay among security, justice, and public finance is still a relatively unexplored area of development. Such a perspective can help security actors provide more professional, effective, and efficient security and justice services for citizens, while also strengthening systems for accountability. The book is the result of a project undertaken jointly by staff from the World Bank and the United Nations, integrating the disciplines where each institution holds a comparative advantage and a core mandate. The primary audience includes government officials bearing both security and financial responsibilities, staff of international organizations working on public expenditure management and security sector issues, academics, and development practitioners working in an advisory capacity.
This publication is the second in a series of lessons learned reports which examine how the U.S. government and Departments of Defense, State, and Justice carried out reconstruction programs in Afghanistan. In particular, the report analyzes security sector assistance (SSA) programs to create, train and advise the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) between 2002 and 2016. This publication concludes that the effort to train the ANDSF needs to continue, and provides recommendations for the SSA programs to be improved, based on lessons learned from careful analysis of real reconstruction situations in Afghanistan. The publication states that the United States was never prepared to help create Afghan police and military forces capable of protecting that country from internal and external threats. It is the hope of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F. Sopko, that this publication, and other SIGAR reports will create a body of work that can help provide reasonable solutions to help United States agencies and military forces improve reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Related items: Counterterrorism publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterterrorism Counterinsurgency publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/counterinsurgency Warfare & Military Strategy publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/warfare-military-strategy Afghanistan War publications can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/afghanistan-war
"Forging a Total Force traces the evolution of the Guard and reserve from the Revolutionary War-era militias to today's operational reserve, an integral part of the nation's total force. In the early republic, the ideal of a citizen-solider, capable of taking the field with little or no training, predominated. The realities of modern combat slowly made it clear that a more professional force was required, but policy changes failed to keep up with that changing necessity. The nation struggled to provide adequate training and equipment to the reserve component throughout the Cold War until the idea of a Total Force, which integrated regular and reserve components, emerged and was achieved. It wasn't until the defense buildup of the 1980s that the ideal of a combat-ready reserve became reality. The core of this book focuses on what came next, from 1990 to 2011, with particular emphasis on the decade after 9/11. The Persian Gulf War demonstrated both the effectiveness of the reserve and the challenges it continued to face. The post-Cold War drawdown during the 1990s made the smaller active component more dependent on the reserves than it had been since the nation's founding. The reserve component proved itself yet again in the wars following 9/11, but also became strained as it became clear just how much the nation depended on its Guard and reserve. Finally, the authors detail the policy changes made midstream in an attempt to address issues with the overextended force, such as balancing training and deployment with civilian lives and careers, providing health care to reservists, and integrating the active and reserve components. The authors conclude by detailing the issues policymakers will face as they forge ahead with citizen-soldiers serving as an operational force."--Provided by publisher.
U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilise Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; the Administration notes progress on reconstruction, governance and security in many areas of Afghanistan, particularly the U.S.-led eastern sector of Afghanistan. However, a November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate. This mirrors recent outside studies that contain relatively pessimistic assessments, emphasising a growing sense of insecurity in areas previously considered secure, increased numbers of suicide attacks, and increasing aggregate poppy cultivation, as well as increasing divisions within the NATO alliance about the relative share of combat among the nations contributing to the peacekeeping mission. Both the official U.S. as well as outside assessments are increasingly pointing to Pakistan as failing -- either through lack of attention or eliberatestrategy -- to prevent Taliban commanders from operating from Pakistan. To try to gain momentum against the insurgency, the United States is considering new initiatives including adding U.S. troops to the still combat-intense south, possibly assuming U.S. command of the southern sector, and increasing direct U.S. action against Taliban concentrations inside Pakistan. Politically, the Afghan government remains reasonably stable. The post-Taliban transition was completed with the convening of a parliament in December 2005; a new constitution was adopted in January 2004, successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections took place on September 18, 2005. The parliament has become an arena for factions that have fought each other for nearly three decades to debate and peacefully resolve differences, as well as a centre of political pressure on President Hamid Karzai. Major regional strongmen have been marginalised. Afghan citizens are enjoying personal freedoms forbidden by the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. Presidential elections are to be held in the fall of 2009, with parliamentary and provincial elections to follow one year later. To help stabilise Afghanistan, the United States and partner countries are deploying a 47,000 troop NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that now commands peacekeeping throughout Afghanistan, including the restive south. Of those, 19,000 of the 31,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan are part of ISAF. The U.S. and partner forces also run regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs), and are building an Afghan National Army and National Police. The United States has given Afghanistan over $23 billion (appropriated, including FY2008 to date) since the fall of the Taliban, including funds to equip and train Afghan security forces.
Infrastructure is a priority around the world for all stakeholders. Infrastructure projects can continue for several years, from planning and construction to the provision of services. As development in Asia and the Pacific accelerates, governments must invest more in infrastructure to ensure continued economic growth. This book draws on lessons and case studies from Japan and worldwide, covering broad and long-term infrastructure projects. It describes the principles of developing quality infrastructure and focuses on the various steps of a project--from design, planning, and construction to operation and management. It also discusses overseas development assistance, taking examples from Asian Development Bank and World Bank projects. This book is an important reference tool for policy makers in Asia who are planning and implementing large-scale public infrastructure.
