Smokes. obscurants. and riot-control agents constitute a diverse group of chemical compounds that are released into the environment during training exercises. Concern has been expressed over the use of these compounds and how they may affect threatened and endangered (T & E) species that reside on military installations.
A variety of smokes and obscurants have been developed and used to screen armed forces from view, signal friendly forces, and mark positions. Smokes are produced by burning or vaporizing particular products. Obscurants are anthropogenic or naturally occurring particles suspended in the air. They block or weaken transmission of particular parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as visible and infrared radiation or microwaves. Fog, mist, and dust are examples of natural obscurants. White phosphorus and hexachloroethane smokes are examples of anthropogenic obscurants. The U.S. Army seeks to reduce the likelihood that exposure to smokes and obscurants during training would have adverse health effects on military personnel or civilians. To protect the health of exposed individuals, the Office of the Army Surgeon General requested that the National Research Council (NRC) independently review data on the toxicity of smokes and obscurants and recommend exposure guidance levels for military personnel in training and for the general public residing or working near military-training facilities.
This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas
Advances in information technology have led us to rely on easy communication and readily available information--both in our personal lives and in the life of our nation. For the most part, we have rightly welcomed these changes. But information that is readily available is available to friend and foe alike; a system that relies on communication can become useless if its ability to communicate is interfered with or destroyed. Because this reliance is so general, attacks on the information infrastructure can have widespread effects, both for the military and for society. And such attacks can come from a variety of sources, some difficult or impossible to identify. This, the third volume in the Strategic Appraisal series, draws on the expertise of researchers from across RAND to explore the opportunities and vulnerabilities inherent in the increasing reliance on information technology, looking both at its usefulness to the warrior and the need to protect its usefulness for everyone. The Strategic Appraisal series is intended to review, for a broad audience, issues bearing on national security and defense planning.
At its heart, a counterinsurgency is an armed struggle for the support of the population. Support can be achieved or lost through information engagement, strong representative government, access to goods and services, fear, or violence. This armed struggle also involves eliminating insurgents who threaten the safety and security of the population. However, military units alone cannot defeat an insurgency. Most of the work involves discovering and solving the population's underlying issues, that is, the root causes of their dissatisfaction. Tactics In Counterinsurgency provides the reader with the tactical leadership skills necessary to handle these diverse issues.
This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment.
The annual Conference on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) took place at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC), in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, on October 22-24, 2010.1 The topic for this year's conference was the "PLA's lessons from Other People's Wars." Participants at the conference sought to discern what lessons the PLA has been learning from the strategic and operational experiences of the armed forces of other countries during the past 3 decades. Why did observers of the PLA want to study what Chinese military analysts might learned about non-Chinese wars? The answer is twofold. First, the PLA has not fought an actual war since 1979. Yet, during the last 3 decades, fundamental changes have taken place on the battlefield and in the conduct of war. Since the PLA has not fought since 1979, it had no experience in the changing face of war, and thus could not follow Mao Zedong's admonition to "learn by doing"; instead, it must look abroad for ways to discern the new pattern of warfare in the evolving information age. Studying Chinese military analysts' observations of non-Chinese wars therefore provides us a glimpse of what the PLA takes from others' experience to improve its capability and to prepare itself for dealing with China's national security issues, such as Taiwan, the South and East China Sea disputes, and internal unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, to name the most obvious ones. Second, Chinese military analysts have noticeably more freedom in assessing and commenting on the strength and weakness as well as the success and fail¬ures of other countries' wars. Indeed, for political reasons, Chinese military analysts have to emphasize the heroics and triumphs of the PLA's war experience and downplay setbacks and failures.2 While there is certainly recognition of the daunting challenges-in Korea, for example, accounts readily acknowledge that the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) were totally unprepared logistically and devastated by airpower-there are limits to the levels of candor. To date, there is no critical analysis of the PLA's claimed success or dismissed failure in the Sino-Vietnamese Border War of 1979 by Chinese military analysts (however, there are a few studies done by scholars outside of China3). Studying Chinese military analysts' observation of other people's wars, therefore, provide us key hints as to what Chinese military analysts consider important aspects of current and future military operational success and failure.
Anagram Solver is the essential guide to cracking all types of quiz and crossword featuring anagrams. Containing over 200,000 words and phrases, Anagram Solver includes plural noun forms, palindromes, idioms, first names and all parts of speech. Anagrams are grouped by the number of letters they contain with the letters set out in alphabetical order so that once the letters of an anagram are arranged alphabetically, finding the solution is as easy as locating the word in a dictionary.
In 1997 the National Institute of Mental Health assembled a working group of international experts to address the mental health consequences of torture and related violence and trauma; report on the status of scientific knowledge; and include research recommendations with implications for treatment, services, and policy development. This book, dedicated to those who experience the horrors of torture and those who work to end it, is based on that report.
