Lingel et al. present alternative methods to approach U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking and the command and control processes and assess the outcome of different information-collection strategies. They develop new assessment techniques and operational strategies to improve the use of ISR assets in dynamic environments.
The RAND Corporation's Collection Operations Model (COM) is a stochastic, agent-based simulation tool designed to support the analysis of command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) processes and scenarios. Written for the System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation modeling environment, the COM is used to study processes that require the real-time interaction of many players and to answer questions about force mix, system effectiveness, concepts of operations, basing and logistics, and capability-based assessment. It can represent thousands of autonomous, interacting platforms and explore the capabilities of a wide range of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Through its flexible and friendly text-based input tables, the model represents a wide array of sensor capabilities, target properties, terrain and weather effects, and resource limitations. Its final output is a minute-by-minute account of each agent's changing operational picture. Since 2005, the COM has been used to model counterinsurgency, counterpiracy, and maritime surveillance scenarios and two major combat operations, and to study ad hoc collections, sensor cueing, dynamic retasking, and resource allocation. RAND has planned a number of upgrades to the COM, including the addition of space-based assets; a more robust model of sensor data fusion; communications modules that more accurately represent the advantages of a networked force; a more realistic representation of C3ISR workflow; sensor capability to generate false positives; and agent capability to practice deception. These extensions and enhancements are intended to result in a COM that can represent the entire C3ISR process specifically and network-centric operations in general.
To assist in moving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning and execution forward from a fixed target and deliberate planning focus to one centered on emerging targets, the authors propose enhancing the collection management process with a strategies-to-tasks and utility framework. By linking collection targets to operational tasks, objectives, and the top-level commander's guidance with relative utilities, planning for the daily intelligence collections and real-time retasking for ad hoc ISR targets could be enhanced. When current tools are modified to provide this information, planners will be able to link collection targets to top-level objectives for better decision making and optimization of low-density, high-demand collection assets. Similarly, on the Air Operations Center (AOC) floor, intelligence officers will be better able to deal with time-sensitive, emerging targets by rapidly comparing the value of collecting an ad hoc collection with the value of collecting opportunities already planned. To handle the ISR demands posed by the rapidly changing battlefield of the future, this new, more-capable framework may be needed for making the best use of intelligence capabilities against emerging collection opportunities. Future research will focus on quantifying the advantages of this approach in comparison with the current process.
The authors developed a repeatable process to measure the effectiveness of U.S. Central Command intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; evaluate current performance; and plan for, influence, and resource future operations.
This book critically analyses the concept of the intelligence cycle, highlighting the nature and extent of its limitations and proposing alternative ways of conceptualising the intelligence process. The concept of the intelligence cycle has been central to the study of intelligence. As Intelligence Studies has established itself as a distinctive branch of Political Science, it has generated its own foundational literature, within which the intelligence cycle has constituted a vital thread - one running through all social-science approaches to the study of intelligence and constituting a staple of professional training courses. However, there is a growing acceptance that the concept neither accurately reflects the intelligence process nor accommodates important elements of it, such as covert action, counter-intelligence and oversight. Bringing together key authors in the field, the book considers these questions across a number of contexts: in relation to intelligence as a general concept, military intelligence, corporate/private sector intelligence and policing and criminal intelligence. A number of the contributions also go beyond discussion of the limitations of the cycle concept to propose alternative conceptualisations of the intelligence process. What emerges is a plurality of approaches that seek to advance the debate and, as a consequence, Intelligence Studies itself. This book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, criminology and policing, security studies and IR in general, as well as to practitioners in the field.
The Navy has put forth a new construct for its strike forces that enables more effective forward deterrence and rapid response. A key aspect of this construct is the need for flexible, adaptive command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. To assist development of this capability, the Navy asked the NRC to examine C4ISR for carrier, expeditionary, and strike and missile defense strike groups, and for expeditionary strike forces. This report provides an assessment of C4ISR capabilities for each type of strike group; recommendations for C4ISR architecture for use in major combat operations; promising technology trends; and an examination of organizational improvements that can enable the recommended architecture.
Every military activity has informational aspects, but the information environment (IE) is not well integrated into military planning, doctrine, or processes. Better understanding of the IE will improve command and control and situational awareness.
