Some philosophers think that Paul Feyerabend is a clown, a great many others think that he is one of the most exciting philosophers of science of this century. For me the truth does not lie somewhere in between, for I am decidedly of the second opinion, an opinion that is becoming general around the world as this century comes to an end and history begins to cast its appraising eye upon the intellectual harvest of our era. A good example of this opinion may be found in the admiration for Feyerabend's philosophy of science expressed by Grover Maxwell in his contribution to this volume. Maxwell, recalling his own intellectual transformation, says also that it was Feyerabend who "confirmed my then incipient suspicions that most of the foundations of currently fashionable philosophy and even a great deal of the methodology to which many scientists pay enthusiastic lip service are based on simple mistake- assumptions whose absurdity becomes obvious once attention is directed at them". And lest the reader thinks, as many still do, that however sharp Feyerabend's attacks upon the philosophical establishment may have been, he does not offer a positive philosophy (a complain made by C.A. Hooker and some of the other contributors), Paul Churchland argues otherwise.
A Sceptical Theory of Scientific Inquiry: Problems and Their Progress presents a distinctive re-interpretation of Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’, displaying the kind of spirit found at the L.S.E. before Popper’s retirement. It offers an alternative to interpretations of critical rationalism which have emphasised the significance of research programmes or metaphysics (Lakatos; Nicholas Maxwell), and is closer to the approach of Jagdish Hattiangadi. Briskman gives priority to methodological argument rather than logical formalisms, and takes further his own work on creativity. In addition to offering an important contribution to the understanding of critical rationalism, the book contains interesting engagements with Michael Polanyi and the Meno Paradox. This volume also contains an introduction by the editor, which situates Briskman’s work in the history of the interpretation of ‘critical rationalism’.
How happy it is to recall Imre Lakatos. Now, fifteen years after his death, his intelligence, wit, generosity are vivid. In the Preface to the book of Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos (Boston Studies, 39, 1976), the editors wrote: ... Lakatos was a man in search of rationality in all of its forms. He thought he had found it in the historical development of scientific knowledge, yet he also saw rationality endangered everywhere. To honor Lakatos is to honor his sharp and aggressive criticism as well as his humane warmth and his quick wit. He was a person to love and to struggle with. The book before us carries old and new friends of that Lakatosian spirit further into the issues which he wanted to investigate. That the new friends include a dozen scientific, historical and philosophical scholars from Greece would have pleased Lakatos very much, and with an essay from China, he would have smiled all the more. But the key lies in the quality of these papers, and in the imaginative organization of the conference at Thessaloniki in summer 1986 which worked so well.
Addressing a wide range of topics, from Newton to Post-Kuhnian philosophy of science, these essays critically examine themes that have been central to the influential work of philosopher Michael Friedman. Special focus is given to Friedman's revealing study of both history of science and philosophy in his work on Kant, Newton, Einstein, and other major figures. This interaction of history and philosophy is the subject of the editors' "manifesto" and serves to both explain and promote the essential ties between two disciplines usually regarded as unrelated.
Nowadays, philosophy and methodology of science appear as a combination of novelty and continuity. This blend is clear both in the general approaches to science (those thought of as any science) and in the specific perspectives on every science, either formal or empirical. There are new topics for philosophical reflection, such as key issues in philosophy of medicine and central problems raised by neuroscience. Thus, new contents have brought attention to aspects that previously went almost unnoticed. In addition, there are new angles for philosophical study, such as the repercussion of society on scientific activity (in aims, processes, and results). But the background of the main philosophical and methodological trends of the twentieth century is, in many ways, still in place.
Debating Contemporary Approaches to the History of Science explores the main themes, problems and challenges currently at the top of the discipline's methodological agenda. In its chapters, established and emerging scholars introduce and discuss new approaches to the history of science and revisit older perspectives which remain crucial. Each chapter is followed by a critical commentary from another scholar in the field and the author's response. The volume looks at such topics as the importance of the 'global', 'digital', 'environmental', and 'posthumanist' turns for the history of science, and the possibilities for the field of moving beyond a focus on ideas and texts towards active engagement with materials and practices. It also addresses important issues about the relationship between history of science, on the one hand, and philosophy of science, history of knowledge and ignorance studies, on the other. With its innovative format, this volume provides an up-to-date, authoritative overview of the field, and also explores how and why the history of science is practiced. It is essential reading for students and scholars eager to keep a finger on the pulse of what is happening in the history of science today, and to contribute to where it might go next.
The conventional received opinion of Adam Smith as an isolated figure, the founder of ‘modern’ economics, is thoroughly mistaken and misleading. This is the central premise of this book, first published in 1988, in which the author argues that by placing Smith’s work in its historical context, we discover profound continuities between Smith’s work and that of his predecessors, and his contemporaries. The effect is to re-orientate our perception of Smith and his achievement. No longer the single-handed champion of free markets and competition whose work revolutionised and completely redirected economics. He appears instead as a brilliant contributor to a deep-rooted contemporary debate, someone who can be placed in a line of thinkers that stretches between Machiavelli and Kant.
In Philip K. Dick’s The Minority Report, ‘precogs’, who are imaginary individuals capable of seeing the future are relied upon to stop crime, with a consensus report synthesized from two of three precogs. When the protaganist is indicted for a future murder, he suspects a conspiracy and seeks out the “minority report,” detailing the suppressed testimony of the third precog. Science works a lot like this science fiction story. Contrary to the view that scientists in a field all share the same “paradigm,” as Thomas Kuhn famously argued, scientists support different, and competing, research programs. Statements of scientific consensus need to be actively synthesized from the work of different scientists. Not all scientific work will be equally credited by science as a whole. While this system works well enough for most purposes, it is possible for minority views to fail to get the hearing that they deserve. This book analyzes the support that should be given to minority views, reconsidering classic debates in science and technology studies and examining numerous case studies.