This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it. Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of reference, in particular of naming, and of identity. From a critique of the dominant tendency to assimilate names to descriptions and more generally to treat their reference as a function of their Fregean sense, surprisingly deep and widespread consequences may be drawn. The largely discredited distinction between accidental and essential properties, both of individual things (including people) and of kinds of things, is revived. So is a consequent view of science as what seeks out the essences of natural kinds. Traditional objections to such views are dealt with by sharpening distinctions between epistemic and metaphysical necessity; in particular by the startling admission of necessary a posteriori truths. From these, in particular from identity statements using rigid designators whether of things or of kinds, further remarkable consequences are drawn for the natures of things, of people, and of kinds; strong objections follow, for example to identity versions of materialism as a theory of the mind. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here published with a substantial new Preface by the author.
In this work I have tried to present HusserI's Philosophy of thinking and meaning in as clear a manner as I can. In doing this, I had in mind a two-fold purpose. I wanted on the one hand to disentangle what I have come to regard as the central line of thought from the vast mass of details of the Logische Unter suchungen and the Formale und transzendentale Logik. On the other hand, I tried to take into consideration the immense developments in logic and semantics that have taken place since HusserI's major logical studies were published. It is my belief that no one to day can look back upon the philosophers of the past except in the light of the admirable progress achieved and consolidated in the fields of logic and semantics in recent times. Fortunately enough, from this point of view HusserI fares remarkably well. He certainly anticipated many of those recent investigations. What is more, a true understanding and appraisal of his logical studies is not possible except in the light of the corresponding modern investigations. This last consider ation may provide us with some explanation of the rather puzzling fact that orthodox HusserIian scholarship both within and outside Germany has not accorded to his logical studies the central importance that they, from all points of view, unmis takeably deserve.
Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length--and over a long period of time--on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. Dear Carnap, I enclose a copy of a paper which I am ready to send off for publication. . . . I am anxious to have you look this over as soon as possible, to see whether you have reason to suppose the system contradictory: for it looks dangerous. Dear Quine: I read your paper very carefully and with the highest interest. . . . So far, I do not see any contradiction in the system itself . . . but I share your feeling that the whole looks rather dangerous. Rudolf Carnap and W. V. Quine, two of the twentieth century's most important philosophers, corresponded at length--and over a long period of time--on matters personal, professional, and philosophical. Their friendship encompassed issues and disagreements that go to the heart of contemporary philosophic discussions. Carnap (1891-1970) was a founder and leader of the logical positivist school. The younger Quine (1908-) began as his staunch admirer but diverged from him increasingly over questions in the analysis of meaning and the justification of belief. That they remained close, relishing their differences through years of correspondence, shows their stature both as thinkers and as friends. The letters are presented here, in full, for the first time. The substantial introduction by Richard Creath offers a lively overview of Carnap's and Quine's careers and backgrounds, allowing the nonspecialist to see their writings in historical and intellectual perspective. Creath also provides a judicious analysis of the philosophical divide between them, showing how deep the issues cut into the discipline, and how to a large extent they remain unresolved. Dear Carnap, I enclose a copy of a paper which I am ready to send off for publication. . . . I am anxious to have you look this over as soon as possible, to see whether you have reason to suppose the system contradictory: for it looks dangerous. Dear Quine: I read your paper very carefully and with the highest interest. . . . So far, I do not see any contradiction in the system itself . . . but I share your feeling that the whole looks rather dangerous.
This book develops a theory of enriched meanings for natural language interpretation that uses the concept of monads and related ideas from category theory, a branch of mathematics that has been influential in theoretical computer science and elsewhere. Certain expressions that exhibit complex effects at the semantics/pragmatics boundary live in an enriched meaning space, while others live in a more basic meaning space. These basic meanings are mapped to enriched meanings only when required compositionally, which avoids generalizing meanings to the worst case. Ash Asudeh and Gianluca Giorgolo show that the monadic theory of enriched meanings offers a formally and computationally well-defined way to tackle important challenges at the semantics/pragmatics boundary. In particular, they develop innovative monadic analyses of three phenomena - conventional implicature, substitution puzzles, and conjunction fallacies - and demonstrate that the compositional properties of monads model linguistic intuitions about these cases particularly well. The analyses are accompanied by exercises to aid understanding, and the computational tools used are available on the book's companion website. The book also contains background chapters on enriched meanings and category theory. The volume is interdisciplinary in nature, with insights from semantics, pragmatics, philosophy of language, psychology, and computer science, and will appeal to graduate students and researchers from a wide range of disciplines with an interest in natural language understanding and representation.
Chapter 1. Werte beim frühen Carnap. Von den Anfängen bis zum Aufbau.- Chapter 2. Die Entwicklung von Carnaps Aufbau 1920-1928.- Chapter 3. Carnap's Opposition to Logic of the Geisteswissenschaften.- Chapter 4. Rudolf Carnap. Philosoph der neuen Sachlichkeit.- Chapter 5. Carnap und das Bauhaus.- Chapter 6. Was bedeutet Carnaps "Reinigung" der Erkenntnistheorie?.- Chapter 7. Realism and Anti-Realism in Young Carnap.- Chapter 8. Eigenpsychisches und Fremdpsychisches. Rudolf Carnaps Verhältnis zur Psychologie zwischen 1928 und 1932.- Chapter 9. Physikalistische Graphologie als Avantgarde der Psychologie oder Physikalismus auf Abwegen.- Chapter 10. Carnap and the Members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Carnap's Warsaw Lectures (1930) in the Polish context.- Chapter 11. Rudolf Carnap und Kurt Gödel: Die beiderseitige Bezugnahme in ihren philosophischen Selbstzeugnissen.- Chapter 12. Building a New Thursday Circle. Carnap and Frank in Prague.
