Mathematical elegance is a constant theme in this treatment of linear programming and matrix games. Condensed tableau, minimal in size and notation, are employed for the simplex algorithm. In the context of these tableau the beautiful termination theorem of R.G. Bland is proven more simply than heretofore, and the important duality theorem becomes almost obvious. Examples and extensive discussions throughout the book provide insight into definitions, theorems, and applications. There is considerable informal discussion on how best to play matrix games. The book is designed for a one-semester undergraduate course. Readers will need a degree of mathematical sophistication and general tools such as sets, functions, and summation notation. No single college course is a prerequisite, but most students will do better with some prior college mathematics. This thorough introduction to linear programming and game theory will impart a deep understanding of the material and also increase the student's mathematical maturity.
Praise for the Second Edition: "This is quite a well-done book: very tightly organized, better-than-average exposition, and numerous examples, illustrations, and applications." —Mathematical Reviews of the American Mathematical Society An Introduction to Linear Programming and Game Theory, Third Edition presents a rigorous, yet accessible, introduction to the theoretical concepts and computational techniques of linear programming and game theory. Now with more extensive modeling exercises and detailed integer programming examples, this book uniquely illustrates how mathematics can be used in real-world applications in the social, life, and managerial sciences, providing readers with the opportunity to develop and apply their analytical abilities when solving realistic problems. This Third Edition addresses various new topics and improvements in the field of mathematical programming, and it also presents two software programs, LP Assistant and the Solver add-in for Microsoft Office Excel, for solving linear programming problems. LP Assistant, developed by coauthor Gerard Keough, allows readers to perform the basic steps of the algorithms provided in the book and is freely available via the book's related Web site. The use of the sensitivity analysis report and integer programming algorithm from the Solver add-in for Microsoft Office Excel is introduced so readers can solve the book's linear and integer programming problems. A detailed appendix contains instructions for the use of both applications. Additional features of the Third Edition include: A discussion of sensitivity analysis for the two-variable problem, along with new examples demonstrating integer programming, non-linear programming, and make vs. buy models Revised proofs and a discussion on the relevance and solution of the dual problem A section on developing an example in Data Envelopment Analysis An outline of the proof of John Nash's theorem on the existence of equilibrium strategy pairs for non-cooperative, non-zero-sum games Providing a complete mathematical development of all presented concepts and examples, Introduction to Linear Programming and Game Theory, Third Edition is an ideal text for linear programming and mathematical modeling courses at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels. It also serves as a valuable reference for professionals who use game theory in business, economics, and management science.
An easily accessible introduction to over three centuries of innovations in geometry Praise for the First Edition “. . . a welcome alternative to compartmentalized treatments bound to the old thinking. This clearly written, well-illustrated book supplies sufficient background to be self-contained.” —CHOICE This fully revised new edition offers the most comprehensive coverage of modern geometry currently available at an introductory level. The book strikes a welcome balance between academic rigor and accessibility, providing a complete and cohesive picture of the science with an unparalleled range of topics. Illustrating modern mathematical topics, Introduction to Topology and Geometry, Second Edition discusses introductory topology, algebraic topology, knot theory, the geometry of surfaces, Riemann geometries, fundamental groups, and differential geometry, which opens the doors to a wealth of applications. With its logical, yet flexible, organization, the Second Edition: • Explores historical notes interspersed throughout the exposition to provide readers with a feel for how the mathematical disciplines and theorems came into being • Provides exercises ranging from routine to challenging, allowing readers at varying levels of study to master the concepts and methods • Bridges seemingly disparate topics by creating thoughtful and logical connections • Contains coverage on the elements of polytope theory, which acquaints readers with an exposition of modern theory Introduction to Topology and Geometry, Second Edition is an excellent introductory text for topology and geometry courses at the upper-undergraduate level. In addition, the book serves as an ideal reference for professionals interested in gaining a deeper understanding of the topic.
The mathematical study of games is an intriguing endeavor with implications and applications that reach far beyond tic-tac-toe, chess, and poker to economics, business, and even biology and politics. Most texts on the subject, however, are written at the graduate level for those with strong mathematics, economics, or business backgrounds. In
This modern, still relevant text is suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and professionals in mathematics, operational research, economics, sociology; and psychology, defence and strategic studies, and war games. Engagingly written with agreeable humor, the book can also be understood by non-mathematicians. It shows basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies, the minimax theorem, non-cooperative and co-operative games, and a ''first class'' account of linear programming, theory and practice. The text is self-contained with comprehensive source references. Based on a series of lectures given by the author in the theory of games at Royal Holloway College, it gives unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of co-operative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skilfully guided tour through the Shapely and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies.
This book on constrained optimization is novel in that it fuses these themes: • use examples to introduce general ideas; • engage the student in spreadsheet computation; • survey the uses of constrained optimization;. • investigate game theory and nonlinear optimization, • link the subject to economic reasoning, and • present the requisite mathematics. Blending these themes makes constrained optimization more accessible and more valuable. It stimulates the student’s interest, quickens the learning process, reveals connections to several academic and professional fields, and deepens the student’s grasp of the relevant mathematics. The book is designed for use in courses that focus on the applications of constrained optimization, in courses that emphasize the theory, and in courses that link the subject to economics.
This book offers a gentle introduction to the mathematics of both sides of game theory: combinatorial and classical. The combination allows for a dynamic and rich tour of the subject united by a common theme of strategic reasoning. Designed as a textbook for an undergraduate mathematics class and with ample material and limited dependencies between the chapters, the book is adaptable to a variety of situations and a range of audiences. Instructors, students, and independent readers alike will appreciate the flexibility in content choices as well as the generous sets of exercises at various levels.
This edited book presents recent developments and state-of-the-art review in various areas of mathematical programming and game theory. It is a peer-reviewed research monograph under the ISI Platinum Jubilee Series on Statistical Science and Interdisciplinary Research. This volume provides a panoramic view of theory and the applications of the methods of mathematical programming to problems in statistics, finance, games and electrical networks. It also provides an important as well as timely overview of research trends and focuses on the exciting areas like support vector machines, bilevel programming, interior point method for convex quadratic programming, cooperative games, non-cooperative games and stochastic games. Researchers, professionals and advanced graduates will find the book an essential resource for current work in mathematical programming, game theory and their applications. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (45 KB). Chapter 1: Mathematical Programming and its Applications in Finance (177 KB). Contents: Mathematical Programming and Its Applications in Finance (L C Thomas); Anti-Stalling Pivot Rule for Linear Programs with Totally Unimodular Coefficient Matrix (S N Kabadi & A P Punnen); A New Practically Efficient Interior Point Method for Convex Quadratic Programming (K G Murty); A General Framework for the Analysis of Sets of Constraints (R Caron & T Traynor), Tolerance-Based Algorithms for the Traveling Salesman Problem (D Ghosh et al.); On the Membership Problem of the Pedigree Polytope (T S Arthanari); Exact Algorithms for a One-Defective Vertex Colouring Problem (N Achuthan et al.); Complementarity Problem Involving a Vertical Block Matrix and Its Solution Using Neural Network Model (S K Neogy et al.); Fuzzy Twin Support Vector Machines for Pattern Classification (R Khemchandani et al.); An Overview of the Minimum Sum of Absolute Errors Regression (S C Narula & J F Wellington); Hedging Against the Market with No Short Selling (S A Clark & C Srinivasan); Mathematical Programming and Electrical Network Analysis II: Computational Linear Algebra Through Network Analysis (H Narayanan); Dynamic Optimal Control Policy in Price and Quality for High Technology Product (A K Bardhan & U Chanda); Forecasting for Supply Chain and Portfolio Management (K G Murty); Variational Analysis in Bilevel Programming (S Dempe et al.); Game Engineering (R J Aumann); Games of Connectivity (P Dubey & R Garg); A Robust Feedback Nash Equilibrium in a Climate Change Policy Game (M Hennlock); De Facto Delegation and Proposer Rules (H Imai & K Yonezaki); The Bargaining Set in Effectivity Function (D Razafimahatolotra); Dynamic Oligopoly as a Mixed Large Game OCo Toy Market (A Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel); On Some Classes of Balanced Games (R B Bapat); Market Equilibrium for Combinatorial Auctions and the Matching Core of Nonnegative TU Games (S Lahiri); Continuity, Manifolds, and Arrow''s Social Choice Problem (K Saukkonen); On a Mixture Class of Stochastic Games with Ordered Field Property (S K Neogy). Readership: Researchers, professionals and advanced students in mathematical programming, game theory, management sciences and computational mathematics.
This book is an introduction to mathematical game theory, which might better be called the mathematical theory of conflict and cooperation. It is applicable whenever two individuals—or companies, or political parties, or nations—confront situations where the outcome for each depends on the behavior of all. What are the best strategies in such situations? If there are chances of cooperation, with whom should you cooperate, and how should you share the proceeds of cooperation? Since its creation by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in 1944, game theory has shed new light on business, politics, economics, social psychology, philosophy, and evolutionary biology. In this book, its fundamental ideas are developed with mathematics at the level of high school algebra and applied to many of these fields (see the table of contents). Ideas like “fairness” are presented via axioms that fair allocations should satisfy; thus the reader is introduced to axiomatic thinking as well as to mathematical modeling of actual situations.
Game theory provides a mathematical setting for analyzing competition and cooperation in interactive situations. The theory has been famously applied in economics, but is relevant in many other sciences, such as political science, biology, and, more recently, computer science. This book presents an introductory and up-to-date course on game theory addressed to mathematicians and economists, and to other scientists having a basic mathematical background. The book is self-contained, providing a formal description of the classic game-theoretic concepts together with rigorous proofs of the main results in the field. The theory is illustrated through abundant examples, applications, and exercises. The style is distinctively concise, while offering motivations and interpretations of the theory to make the book accessible to a wide readership. The basic concepts and results of game theory are given a formal treatment, and the mathematical tools necessary to develop them are carefully presented. Cooperative games are explained in detail, with bargaining and TU-games being treated as part of a general framework. The authors stress the relation between game theory and operations research. The book is suitable for a graduate or an advanced undergraduate course on game theory.
