Marine Corps force protection equipment for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom: hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, hearing held, January 16, 2007.
Marine Corps force protection equipment for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom : hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, hearing held, January 16, 2007.
"Speed and time create tempo. Tempo is the rate of military action and has significance only in relation to that of the enemy ... It is not enough to move faster than the enemy only now and then. When the friendly force is not moving faster, the advantage and initiative passes to the enemy ..." Tempo is a powerful advantage that can make one unit sub come to the will of another unit. However, the Marine Corps is passing the advantage and initiative to the enemy by mandating the amount of gear Marines are required to wear in Iraq and Afghanistan. Personal protective equipment (PPE) and mission critical gear must be reduced in weight because they degrade the unit's capabilities to maneuver and defeat the enemy, which ultimately degrades the Corps' abilities to accomplish the mission. In Vietnam, a Marine's typical load weighed 75 pounds. The difference in weight of a combat-loaded Marine in Vietnam to a marine in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is an increase of 62 pounds. In 2009, a typical Marine's combat load is an average of "137 pounds worth of body armor and gear." Marines pride themselves on their expeditionary nature and ability to adapt to a changing environment. As an organization, the Marine Corps does not need to hinder this mentality, but rather encourage it. Higher level commanders need to make tough decisions and realize that risks must be taken in war. They must give subordinate commanders the autonomy to make the right decisions for their unit. When an estimate of a situation is conducted by a battalion commander and it determines that only a certain level of PPE is required for an operation, allow the commander to make the decision. If general level officers refuse to allow subordinate commanders to make these decisions, the Marine Corps will continue to give the initiative to the enemy.
This volume presents a collection of 38 articles, interviews, and speeches describing many aspects of the U.S. Marine Corps' participation in Operation Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2009. This work is intended to serve as a general overview and provisional reference to inform both Marines and the general public until the History Division completes monographs dealing with major Marine Corps operations during the campaign. The accompanying annotated bibliography provides a detailed look at selected sources that currently exist until new scholarship and archival materials become available. From the Preface - From the outset, some experts doubted that the U.S. Marines Corps would play a major role in Afghanistan given the landlocked nature of the battlefield. Naval expeditionary Task Force 58 (TF-58) commanded by then-Brigadier General James N. Mattis silenced naysayers with the farthest ranging amphibious assault in Marine Corps/Navy history. In late November 2001, Mattis' force seized what became Forward Operating Base Rhino, Afghanistan, from naval shipping some 400 miles away. The historic assault not only blazed a path for follow-on forces, it also cut off fleeing al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and aided in the seizure of Kandahar. While Corps doctrine and culture advocates Marine employment as a fully integrated Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), deployments to Afghanistan often reflected what former Commandant General Charles C. Krulak coined as the "three-block war." Following TF-58's deployment during the initial take down of the Taliban regime, the MAGTF made few appearances in Afghanistan until 2008. Before then, subsequent Marine units often deployed as a single battalion under the command of the U.S. Army Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to provide security for provincial reconstruction teams. The Marine Corps also provided embedded training teams to train and mentor the fledgling Afghan National Army and Police. Aviation assets sporadically deployed to support the U.S.-led coalition mostly to conduct a specific mission or to bridge a gap in capability, such as close air support or electronic warfare to counter the improvised explosive device threat. From 2003 to late 2007, the national preoccupation with stabilizing Iraq focused most Marine Corps assets on stemming the insurgency, largely centered in the restive al-Anbar Province. As a result of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking over command of Afghan operations and Marine Corps' commitments in Iraq, relatively few Marine units operated in Afghanistan from late 2006 to 2007. Although Marines first advocated shifting resources from al-Anbar to southern Afghanistan in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration delayed the Marine proposal for fear of losing the gains made as a result of Army General David H. Petraeus' "surge strategy" in Iraq. By late 2007, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated to the point that it inspired Rolling Stone to later publish the story "How We Lost the War We Won." In recognition of the shifting tides in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration began to transfer additional resources to Afghanistan in early 2008. The shift prompted senior Marines to again push for a more prominent role in the Afghan campaign, even proposing to take over the Afghan mission from the Army. . . .
