The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. The Congressional Record began publication in 1873. Debates for sessions prior to 1873 are recorded in The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States (1789-1824), the Register of Debates in Congress (1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873)
With the need for large-scale amphibious landings to decide the outcome of World War II the US Navy developed several types of specialized unit to reconnoitre potential landing areas, degrade the enemy's ability to resist, and assist the landing forces on to the beaches. The Scouts and Raiders were the forerunners of the SEALs, Beach Jumpers made elaborate simulated landings to distract the enemy, the Naval Combat Demolition Units and Underwater Demolition Teams cleared obstacles to amphibious landings and Naval Group China fought alongside Chinese guerrillas behind Japanese lines. This book uncovers the fascinating history of these units, the unique gear they went into theatre with and the vital roles they carried out throughout the war.
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Before 1941 the United States had no intelligence service worthy of the name. While each military department had its own parochial tactical intelligence apparatus and the State Department maintained a haphazard collection of 'country files' there was no American equivalent to the 400-year-old British espionage establishment or the German Abwehr. No one in Washington was charged with putting the jigsaw puzzle of fact, rumor, and foreign innuendo together to see what pictures might develop or what portions might be missing. Even those matters of vital interest to policy makers remained uncoordinated, unevaluated, uninterrupted, and frequently in the wrong hands. That was in 1941. Four years later the scene was forever altered. The organization which achieved this dramatic turnabout was the Office of Strategic Services, better known by its initials: OSS. Headed by William J. Donovan, a World War 1 hero, Republican politician, and millionaire lawyer, the OSS infiltrated agents into every country of occupied Europe and raised guerillas armies in most. This book examines the small but representative role played by Marines assigned to this country's first central intelligence agency. In so doing, it provides the first serious attempt to chronicle a totally forgotten chapter of Marine Corps history.
