This is the second edition of an important introduction to Leibniz's philosophy of logic and language first published in 1972. It takes issue with several traditional interpretations of Leibniz (by Russell amongst others) while revealing how Leibniz's thought is related to issues of great interest in current logical theory. For this new edition, the author has added new chapters on infinitesimals and conditionals as well as taking account of reviews of the first edition.
Why was Leibniz so deeply interested in signs and language? What role does this interest play in his philosophical system? In the essays here collected, Marcello Dascal attempts to tackle these questions from different angles. They bring to light aspects of Leibniz's work on these and related issues which have been so far neglected. As a rule they take as their starting point Leibniz's early writings (some unpublished, some only available in Latin) on characters and cognition, on definition, on truth, on memory, on grammar, on the specific problems of religious discourse, and so on. An effort has been made to relate the views expressed in these writings both to Leibniz' more mature views, and to the conceptions prevailing in his time, as well as in preceding and following periods. The common thread running through all the essays is to what extent language and signs, in their most varied forms, are related to cognitive processes, according to Leibniz and his contemporaries.
Language is what we all share and is our common concern. What is the nature of language? How is language related to the world? How is communication possible via language? What is the impact of language on our reasoning and thinking? Many people are unaware that misunderstandings and conflicts during communication occur as a result of the way we use language. This book introduces the central issues in the history of philosophical investigations about the concept of language. Topics are structured with reference to the world’s foremost philosophers of language. The book will encourage the reader to explore the depths of the concept of language and will raise an awareness of this distinctive human capacity.
The revival of Leibniz studies in the past twenty-five years has cast important new light on both the context and content of Leibniz's philosophical thought. Where earlier English-language scholarship understood Leibniz's philosophy as issuing from his preoccupations with logic and language, recent work has recommended an account on which theological, ethical, and metaphysical themes figure centrally in Leibniz's thought throughout his career. The significance of these themes to the development of Leibniz's philosophy is the subject of increasing attention by philosophers and historians. This collection of new essays by a distinguished group of scholars offers an up-to-date overview of the current state of Leibniz research. In focusing on nature and freedom, the volume revisits two key topics in Leibniz's thought, on which he engaged both contemporary and historical arguments. Important contributions to Leibniz scholarship in their own right, these articles collectively provide readers a framework in which to better situate Leibniz's distinctive philosophy of nature and the congenial home for a morally significant freedom that he took it to provide.
Logical form has always been a prime concern for philosophers belonging to the analytic tradition. For at least one century, the study of logical form has been widely adopted as a method of investigation, relying on its capacity to reveal the structure of thoughts or the constitution of facts. This book focuses on the very idea of logical form, which is directly relevant to any principled reflection on that method. Its central thesis is that there is no such thing as a correct answer to the question of what is logical form: two significantly different notions of logical form are needed to fulfill two major theoretical roles that pertain respectively to logic and to semantics. This thesis has a negative and a positive side. The negative side is that a deeply rooted presumption about logical form turns out to be overly optimistic: there is no unique notion of logical form that can play both roles. The positive side is that the distinction between two notions of logical form, once properly spelled out, sheds light on some fundamental issues concerning the relation between logic and language.
This book, first published in 1975, provides critical and comprehensive introduction to the philosophy of Leibniz. C.D. Broad was Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge from 1933 to 1953 and this book is based on his undergraduate lectures on Leibniz. Broad died in 1971 and Dr Lewy has since edited the book for publication. Leibniz is, of course, recognized as a major figure in all courses in the history of philosophy, but he has perhaps been less well served by textbook writers than most other philosophers. Broad has provided here a characteristically shrewd and sympathetic survey which further confirms his known virtues as an historian and expositor. It is a very clear, detailed and orderly guide to what is notoriously a most difficult (and sometimes disorderly) philosophical system; it provides a masterful introduction to the subject.
Translations of some of Leibniz's most important logical works. A long introduction provides explanatory comment and gives an estimate of Leibniz as a logician.
The selections contained in these volumes from the papers and letters of Leibniz are intended to serve the student in two ways: first, by providing a more adequate and balanced conception of the full range and penetration of Leibniz's creative intellectual powers; second, by inviting a fresher approach to his intellectual growth and a clearer perception of the internal strains in his thinking, through a chronological arrangement. Much confusion has arisen in the past through a neglect of the develop ment of Leibniz's ideas, and Couturat's impressive plea, in his edition of the Opuscu/es et fragments (p. xii), for such an arrangement is valid even for incomplete editions. The beginning student will do well, however, to read the maturer writings of Parts II, III, and IV first, leaving Part I, from a period too largely neglected by Leibniz criticism, for a later study of the still obscure sources and motives of his thought. The Introduction aims primarily to provide cultural orientation and an exposition of the structure and the underlying assumptions of the philosophical system rather than a critical evaluation. I hope that together with the notes and the Index, it will provide those aids to the understanding which the originality of Leibniz's scientific, ethical, and metaphysical efforts deserve.
