Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective: The Need for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs explores whether the U.S. intelligence enterprise will be able to remain effective in today's security environment. Based on the demands currently being placed upon the intelligence community, the analysis concludes that the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence will decline unless it embarks upon an aggressive, transformational course of action to reform various aspects of its operations. In keeping with the emerging literature on this subject, the book asserts that a so-called Revolution in Intelligence Affairs is needed.
How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S. intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies, and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001. Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both at within the United States and abroad. The U.S. government's progress in establishing a system for homeland security is considerable, yet, besides shifts in alert status, most U.S. residents are unaware of the work being done to keep them safe. Describing the system already in place, Hulnick adds further ideas about what more is needed to protect Americans in the ever-changing world of intelligence. To create a truly valuable program, it is suggested the the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down the barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.
A career of nearly three decades with the CIA and the National Intelligence Council showed Paul R. Pillar that intelligence reforms, especially measures enacted since 9/11, can be deeply misguided. They often miss the sources that underwrite failed policy and misperceive our ability to read outside influences. They also misconceive the intelligence-policy relationship and promote changes that weaken intelligence-gathering operations. In this book, Pillar confronts the intelligence myths Americans have come to rely on to explain national tragedies, including the belief that intelligence drives major national security decisions and can be fixed to avoid future failures. Pillar believes these assumptions waste critical resources and create harmful policies, diverting attention away from smarter reform, and they keep Americans from recognizing the limits of obtainable knowledge. Pillar revisits U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and highlights the small role intelligence played in those decisions, and he demonstrates the negligible effect that America's most notorious intelligence failures had on U.S. policy and interests. He then reviews in detail the events of 9/11 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, condemning the 9/11 commission and the George W. Bush administration for their portrayals of the role of intelligence. Pillar offers an original approach to better informing U.S. policy, which involves insulating intelligence management from politicization and reducing the politically appointed layer in the executive branch to combat slanted perceptions of foreign threats. Pillar concludes with principles for adapting foreign policy to inevitable uncertainties.
Shining much-needed light on areas the 9/11 Commission preferred to keep dark, Intelligence Matters chronicles the efforts of a historic joint House-Senate inquiry to get to the bottom of our intelligence failures on that infamous day in 2001. Originally published in 2004 amid the media circus surrounding The 9/11 Commission Report, it told more than a riveting tale-it also provided an unflinching expos of failure, incompetence, and deceit at the highest levels of our government. The Joint Inquiry, co-chaired by Senator Bob Graham (D-Florida), was the first and arguably most effective government body to investigate the horrendous 2001 attacks. Indeed, it helped compel a reluctant George W. Bush to establish the 9/11 Commission. But while both investigations sharply criticized the failures of our nation's intelligence establishment, only Graham's dared to challenge the Bush administration on a number of troubling points-especially the apparent complicity of Saudi officials in the events of 9/11, the subsequent protection provided by President Bush for a large number of Saudis (including members of the bin Laden family), and the run-up to the Iraq War, which Graham voted against. The original work combined a compelling narrative of 9/11 with an insightful eyewitness chronicle of the Joint Inquiry's investigation, conclusions, and recommendations. Sharply critiquing the failures at the CIA, FBI, and the White House and detailing at least twelve occasions when the 9/11 plot could have been stopped, it concluded with a clear plan for overhauling our intelligence and national security establishment. For this paperback edition, Graham has added a substantial new preface and postscript that lucidly examine how effectively the nation has responded-or failed to respond-to the Joint Inquiry's recommendations. This edition restores Intelligence Matters to its rightful place as one of the key texts on the subject of 9/11 and provides a grim reminder of the challenges that remain for us in the war on terror.
This book sets out a new analytic methodology: analysis by contrasting narratives (ACN), which states that defining an enemy and attempting to counter threats can contribute to the manifestation of that threat. Peter de Werd applies ACN to the problem the US faced in understanding and responding to the phenomenon of Al Qaeda in the 1990s. He demonstrates how this approach can fill a gap in intelligence studies by enhancing the understanding of complex intelligence problems and strengthening the practice of intelligence analysis. Adopting a reflexivist theoretical stance, the book underlines the importance of an integrated approach to interpretation and action, and of a continuous dialogue between intelligence and policy.
Counterintelligence Theory and Practice explores issues relating to national security, military, law enforcement, and corporate, as well as private affairs. Hank Prunckun uses his own experience as a counterintelligence professional to provide both a theoretical base and practical explanations for counterintelligence.
Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence-gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars.
While the United States has had some kind of intelligence capability throughout its history, its intelligence apparatus is young, dating only to the period immediately after World War II. Yet, in that short a time, it has undergone enormous changes—from the labor-intensive espionage and covert action establishment of the 1950s to a modern enterprise that relies heavily on electronic data, technology, satellites, airborne collection platforms, and unmanned aerial vehicles, to name a few. This second edition covers the history of United States intelligence, and includes several key features: Chronology Introductory essay Appendixes Bibliography Over 600 cross-referenced entries on key events, issues, people, operations, laws, regulations This book is an excellent access point for members of the intelligence community; students, scholars, and historians; legal experts; and general readers wanting to know more about the history of U.S. intelligence.
