This study provides a program overview of acquisition options available for the Commonwealth of Australia's next generation naval surface combatant and identifies internal and external factors that can influence a major ship acquisition program. The authors address questions relating to available ship design and build options; various phases, options, and decisions; and aspects that can contribute to the success of an acquisition program.
Over the past several decades, increases in acquisition costs for U.S. Navy combatants have outpaced the rate of inflation. To understand why, the authors of this book examined two principal source categories of ship cost escalation (economy-driven factors and customer-driven factors) and interviewed various shipbuilders. Based on their analysis, the authors propose some ways the Navy might reduce ship costs in the future.
The diversion of Navy and shipbuilder energies to the analysis and pursuit of claims became a significant factor in the Navy's management planning, organization, and budgeting for ship acquisitions, and has drained the valuable managerial time and attention of the Navy and the shipbuilders away from the problems attendant to construction of Navy ships. In addition, the public acrimony and disputes between the Navy and its shipbuilders raised serious questions about the credibility of both sides in the ship acquisition process. The settlement agreements with General Dynamics/Electric Boat and with Litton Industries/Ingalls in June 1978 are major steps toward the reestablishment of normal business relations. This report examines the crucial elements of these problems in detail and presents the conclusions of the study team regarding changes to the ship acquisition process that will minimize the probability of claims in the future.
A history of the evolution of the Navy's serious problems in parallel with the shipbuilding industry's decline on the world market since World War II. A major portion of the industry's business now comes from government funding. While the number of shipbuilders has decreased, the industry has been dominated by a relatively small number of large corporations for whom shipbuilding is only a minor portion of their corporate business. In turn, the Navy is totally dependent on an industry increasingly inclined to challenge the Navy's procurement an contracting requirements.
The U.S. Navy is about to begin construction of the first Zumwalt-Class destroyer (DDG 1000) amid considerable uncertainties and a high likelihood of cost and schedule growth. Significant cost growth and schedule delays are persistent problems that continue to compromise the Navy¿s shipbuilding goals. This testimony focuses on: (1) the challenges faced by the DDG 1000 program; and (2) the strain such challenges portend for long term shipbuilding plans. Charts and tables.
Trends in the Analysis and Design of Marine Structures is a collection of the papers presented at MARSTRUCT 2019, the 7th International Conference on Marine Structures held in Dubrovnik, Croatia, 6-8 May 2019. The MARSTRUCT series of Conferences started in Glasgow, UK in 2007, the second event of the series having taken place in Lisbon, Portugal in March 2009, the third in Hamburg, Germany in March 2011, the fourth in Espoo, Finland in March 2013, the fifth in Southampton, UK in March 2015, and the sixth in Lisbon, Portugal in May 2017. This Conference series specialises in dealing with Ships and Offshore Structures, addressing topics in the fields of: - Methods and Tools for Loads and Load Effects - Methods and Tools for Strength Assessment - Experimental Analysis of Structures - Materials and Fabrication of Structures - Methods and Tools for Structural Design and Optimisation - Structural Reliability, Safety and Environmental Protection. Trends in the Analysis and Design of Marine Structures is an essential document for academics, engineers and all professionals involved in the area of analysis and design of Ships and Offshore Structures. About the series: The ‘Proceedings in Marine Technology and Ocean Engineering’ series is devoted to the publication of proceedings of peer-reviewed international conferences dealing with various aspects of ‘Marine Technology and Ocean Engineering’. The Series includes the proceedings of the following conferences: the International Maritime Association of the Mediterranean (IMAM) conferences, the Marine Structures (MARSTRUCT) conferences, the Renewable Energies Offshore (RENEW) conferences and the Maritime Technology (MARTECH) conferences. The ‘Marine Technology and Ocean Engineering’ series is also open to new conferences that cover topics on the sustainable exploration and exploitation of marine resources in various fields, such as maritime transport and ports, usage of the ocean including coastal areas, nautical activities, the exploration and exploitation of mineral resources, the protection of the marine environment and its resources, and risk analysis, safety and reliability. The aim of the series is to stimulate advanced education and training through the wide dissemination of the results of scientific research.
As fiscal constraints increasingly shape Navy shipbuilding plans, the pressure to increase efficiency mounts. Modernizing facilities and equipment at shipyards that build Navy ships can lead to improved efficiency, ultimately reducing the cost of constructing ships. This report: (1) identified investments in facilities and equipment at privately-owned shipyards over the last 10 years; (2) determined the Navy's role in financing facilities and equipment investments at these shipyards; and (3) evaluated how the Navy ensures investments result in expected outcomes. The report analyzed shipyard investment data over the past 10 years; interviewed shipyard, corporate, and Navy officials; and reviewed contracts, investment business cases. Illustrations.
Department of Defense policies, procedures, and organizations for program management and oversight of defense acquisition programs do not align well with shipbuilding. Ship acquisition programs have characteristics that deviate from the normal framework in significant ways, resulting in disconnects and some confusion. The authors examine these differences and suggest policies that can better account for them.
Updated 12/10/2020: In December 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that callsfor achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers. The 355-shipgoal was made U.S. policy by Section 1025 of the FY2018 National Defense AuthorizationAct (H.R. 2810/P.L. 115- 91 of December 12, 2017). The Navy and the Department of Defense(DOD) have been working since 2019 to develop a successor for the 355-ship force-level goal.The new goal is expected to introduce a new, more distributed fleet architecture featuring asmaller proportion of larger ships, a larger proportion of smaller ships, and a new third tier oflarge unmanned vehicles (UVs). On December 9, 2020, the Trump Administration released a document that can beviewed as its vision for future Navy force structure and/or a draft version of the FY202230-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The document presents a Navy force-level goal that callsfor achieving by 2045 a Navy with a more distributed fleet architecture, 382 to 446 mannedships, and 143 to 242 large UVs. The Administration that takes office on January 20, 2021,is required by law to release the FY2022 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan in connection withDOD's proposed FY2022 budget, which will be submitted to Congress in 2021. In preparingthe FY2022 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Administration that takes office on January 20,2021, may choose to adopt, revise, or set aside the document that was released on December9, 2020. The Navy states that its original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurement ofeight new ships, but this figure includes LPD-31, an LPD-17 Flight II amphibious ship thatCongress procured (i.e., authorized and appropriated procurement funding for) in FY2020.Excluding this ship, the Navy's original FY2021 budget submission requests the procurementof seven new ships rather than eight. In late November 2020, the Trump Administrationreportedly decided to request the procurement of a second Virginia-class attack submarinein FY2021. CRS as of December 10, 2020, had not received any documentation from theAdministration detailing the exact changes to the Virginia-class program funding linesthat would result from this reported change. Pending the delivery of that information fromthe administration, this CRS report continues to use the Navy's original FY2021 budgetsubmission in its tables and narrative discussions.
