Introduction to Mechanism Design: with Computer Applications provides an updated approach to undergraduate Mechanism Design and Kinematics courses/modules for engineering students. The use of web-based simulations, solid modeling, and software such as MATLAB and Excel is employed to link the design process with the latest software tools for the design and analysis of mechanisms and machines. While a mechanical engineer might brainstorm with a pencil and sketch pad, the final result is developed and communicated through CAD and computational visualizations. This modern approach to mechanical design processes has not been fully integrated in most books, as it is in this new text.
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.
In the field of mechanism design, kinematic synthesis is a creative means to produce mechanism solutions. Combined with the emergence of powerful personal computers, mathematical analysis software and the development of quantitative methods for kinematic synthesis, there is an endless variety of possible mechanism solutions that users are free to e
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
A planar or two-dimensional (2D) mechanism is the combination of two or more machine elements that are designed to convey a force or motion across parallel planes. For any mechanical engineer, young or old, an understanding of planar mechanism design is fundamental. Mechanical components and complex machines, such as engines or robots, are often designed and conceptualised in 2D before being extended into 3D. Designed to encourage a clear understanding of the nature and design of planar mechanisms, this book favours a frank and straightforward approach to teaching the basics of planar mechanism design and the theory of machines with fully worked examples throughout. Key Features: Provides simple instruction in the design and analysis of planar mechanisms, enabling the student to easily navigate the text and find the desired material Covers topics of fundamental importance to mechanical engineering, from planar mechanism kinematics, 2D linkage analyses and 2D linkage design to the fundamentals of spur gears and cam design Shows numerous example solutions using EES (Engineering Equation Solver) and MATLAB software, with appendices dedicated to explaining the use of both computer tools Follows end-of-chapter problems with clearly detailed solutions
Traditionally, mechanisms are created by designer's intuition, ingenuity, and experience. However, such an ad hoc approach cannot ensure the identification of all possible design alternatives, nor does it necessarily lead to optimum design. Mechanism Design: Enumeration of Kinematic Structures According to Function introduces a methodology for systematic creation and classification of mechanisms. With a partly analytical and partly algorithmic approach, the author uses graph theory, combinatorial analysis, and computer algorithms to create kinematic structures of the same nature in a systematic and unbiased manner. He sketches mechanism structures, evaluating them with respect to the remaining functional requirements, and provides numerous atlases of mechanisms that can be used as a source of ideas for mechanism and machine design. He bases the book on the idea that some of the functional requirements of a desired mechanism can be transformed into structural characteristics that can be used for the enumeration of mechanisms. The most difficult problem most mechanical designers face at the conceptual design phase is the creation of design alternatives. Mechanism Design: Enumeration of Kinematic Structures According to Function presents you with a methodology that is not available in any other resource.
Mechanism Design and Analysis Using PTC Creo Mechanism 4.0 is designed to help you become familiar with Mechanism, a module of the PTC Creo Parametric software family, which supports modeling and analysis (or simulation) of mechanisms in a virtual (computer) environment. Capabilities in Mechanism allow users to simulate and visualize mechanism performance. Capabilities in Mechanism allow users to simulate and visualize mechanism performance. Using Mechanism early in the product development stage could prevent costly redesign due to design defects found in the physical testing phase; therefore, contributing to a more cost effective, reliable, and efficient product development process. The book is written following a project-based learning approach and covers the major concepts and frequently used commands required to advance readers from a novice to an intermediate level. Basic concepts discussed include: model creation, such as body and joint definitions; analysis type selection, such as static (assembly) analysis, kinematics and dynamics; and results visualization. The concepts are introduced using simple, yet realistic, examples. Verifying the results obtained from computer simulation is extremely important. One of the unique features of this textbook is the incorporation of theoretical discussions for kinematic and dynamic analyses in conjunction with simulation results obtained using Mechanism. The theoretical discussions simply support the verification of simulation results rather than providing an in-depth discussion on the subjects of kinematics and dynamics.
It is impossible to understand modern economics without knowledge of the basic tools of gametheory and mechanism design. This book provides a graduate-level introduction to the economic modeling of strategic behavior. The goal is to teach Economics doctoral students the tools of game theory and mechanism design that all economists should know.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
