Orphaned just years after his birth, and cast into life with a negligent uncle, Benito Juarez seemed destined to live his life as a humble shepherd in a tiny village outside of Oaxaca, Mexico. But young Benito had a passion for learning, and a desire to achieve more. This ambition led him to study to join the clergy, and then into law school. But soon the revolution sweeping across his country led the humble lawyer from a governorship in Oaxaca to an exile in New Orleans, and then back to Mexico, where he became the country's first Indian president. But Juarez's struggles didn't end there. Soon after coming to power, Juarez confronted power-hungry generals within his own country, and the invading influence of Napoleon III, who hoped to make Mexico part of his global empire, ruled over by the installed emperor, Maximilian Hapsburg. Juarez alone, a man who grew up in poverty as part of one of Mexico's oppressed peoples, stood up to the French Empire and reclaimed Mexico for its people. Book jacket.
American response to foreign revolution is the theme of this carefully documented diplomatic history of the attitudes and policies of Presidents Taft and Wilson toward revolt in Mexico. Professor Haley's detailed examination is based on extensive research in the papers of members of both administrations and in State Department records. Part One of his book describes the setting of the Mexican conflict and investigates the Taft administration's response toward protecting American lives and property in Mexico (1910 to 1913). Part Two takes up the outbreak of revolutionary civil war and the Wilson administration's attempt to control the course of events (1913 to 1917). This study of the Mexican experience points up problems presented to the U.S. government by uprisings in any country where there are considerable American interests, and in an epilogue the author suggests ways in which the United States might fashion a new response to revolution abroad. The diplomacy of Taft and Wilson in fact reflected two Americas, "the one fleshy, corporate, and pragmatic, the other ascetic, religious, and idealistic." Economic expansion and the acquisition of foreign markets and investments called into being Taft's "Dollar Diplomacy," which was reflected in Mexico by his emphasis on nonintervention during a relatively tranquil period but tempered by his willingness to place order above reform when it came to protecting and stabilizing American interests there. On the other hand, the "New Diplomacy" of Woodrow Wilson reflected his desire to lead other nations to transcend traditional patterns of action and to conform to the American and British model of political development. When war broke out in Mexico, Wilson tried but failed to persuade the two sides to accept an armistice and a neutral provisional government until national elections could be held to establish a new constitutional government. The author seeks to explain the paradox of Wilson's diplomacy-his constant meddling with unrealistic proposals for mediation and his outright support of the Constitutionalist revolutionaries. These diplomacies, Professor Haley points out, offer lessons with contemporary applicability. The Mexican revolution is linked to other twentieth-century uprisings in several ways: in fierce regulation of private property and of foreign investment, and in emphasis on social welfare rather than on political freedom. Lack of anti-communist sentiment makes the experience particularly useful for those who are interested in determining the influence of communism on America's response to later revolutions. The author concludes that in responding to revolution, foreign governments must choose between intervention by overwhelming force at an early stage (Russia in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, America in the Dominican Republic), and the frustrating pursuit of influence through diplomacy with a smaller range of possibilities and lower priorities. Attempts like Wilson's to find a middle ground of limited intervention in a social revolution invite entanglement and failure. Meanwhile, he adds, Mexican diplomatic skill in exploiting the inconsistencies of Wilson's administration demonstrated a deep understanding of American politics and should provide a model that countries in Latin America would do well to look toward.
DIVA comprehensive overview by leading scholars of Mexican rural history before, during, and after the Revolution, with an extensive chapter by Adolfo Gilly on the recent Chiapas rebellion./div
In the early hours of April 22, 1914, American President Woodrow Wilson sent Marines to seize the port of Veracruz in an attempt to alter the course of the Mexican Revolution. As a result, the United States seemed on the brink of war with Mexico. An international uproar ensued. The governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile offered to mediate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Surprisingly, both the United States and Mexico accepted their offer and all parties agreed to meet at an international peace conference in Niagara Falls, Ontario. For Canadians, the conference provided an unexpected spectacle on their doorstep, combining high diplomacy and low intrigue around the gardens and cataracts of Canada's most famous natural attraction. For the diplomats involved, it proved to be an ephemeral high point in the nascent pan-American movement. After it ended, the conference dropped out of historical memory. This is the first full account of the Niagara Falls Peace Conference to be published in North America since 1914. The author carefully reconstructs what happened at Niagara Falls, examining its historical significance for Canada's relationship with the Americas. From this almost forgotten event he draws important lessons on the conduct of international mediation and the perils of middle-power diplomacy.
Based on first-hand diplomatic, political and journalistic sources, most unpublished, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War investigates the backing of the Second Republic by Mexico during the Spanish Civil War. Significant military, material and financial aid was given by the government of Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940) to the Republic, which involved not only direct sales of arms, but also smuggling operations covertly undertaken by Mexican diplomatic agents in order to circumvent the embargo imposed by the London Committee of Non Intervention. This path-breaking account reveals the operations in Spain of Mexican workers, soldiers, artists and intellectuals -- such as later Nobel Laureate Octavio Paz and the Muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros -- as volunteers and propagandists for the Republican cause. Engagement with the Spanish Civil War also had a profound impact upon Mexico's domestic politics as support for the Republic was equated by Cardenas with his own revolutionary project. The defeat of the Republic in 1939 therefore had far-reaching repercussions for the post-1940 governments. Originally published to critical acclaim in Spanish, the work has been quoted and reviewed by many leading specialists on the Civil War, including Anthony Beevor, angel Vinas, Santos Julia, and Pedro Perez Herrero. This book is essential reading for students and scholars specialising in contemporary European history and politics, Latin American studies, and all those with an interest in the Spanish Civil War and the Mexican Revolution.
This occasional paper is a concise overview of the history of the US Army's involvement along the Mexican border and offers a fundamental understanding of problems associated with such a mission. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the historic themes addressed disapproving public reaction, Mexican governmental instability, and insufficient US military personnel to effectively secure the expansive boundary are still prevalent today.