Centuries ago Sun Tzu wrote ?Know the enemy as you know yourself?. The urgency of this maxim is even greater today. A commander who boldly determines- without knowledge of the enemy or the battleground- to close tit the doe and destroy him wherever he might be, is like a boxer who is in the ring blindfolded. This book is written primarily for commanders, because intelligence is for commanders. Intelligence is not an academic exercise nor is it an end in itself. The prime purpose of intelligence is to help the commander make a decision, and thereby to proceed more accurately and more confidently with the accomplishment of his mission. On the Military Intelligence Branch History Reading List 2012.
Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.
In World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence, military historian James L. Gilbert provides an authoritative overview of the birth of modern Army intelligence. Following the natural division of the intelligence war, which was fought on both the home front and overseas, Gilbert traces the development and use of intelligence and counterintelligence through the eyes of their principal architects: General Dennis E. Nolan and Colonel Ralph Van Deman. Gilbert explores how on the home front, US Army counterintelligence faced both internal and external threats that began with the Army’s growing concerns over the loyalty of resident aliens who were being drafted into the ranks and soon evolved into the rooting out of enemy saboteurs and spies intent on doing great harm to America’s war effort. To achieve their goals, counterintelligence personnel relied upon major strides in the areas of code breaking and detection of secret inks. Overseas, the intelligence effort proved far more extensive in terms of resources and missions, even reaching into nearby neutral countries. Intelligence within the American Expeditionary Forces was heavily indebted to its Allied counterparts who not only provided an organizational blueprint but also veteran instructors and equipment needed to train newly arriving intelligence specialists. Rapid advances by American intelligence were also made possible by the appointment of competent leaders and the recruitment of highly motivated and skilled personnel; likewise, the Army’s decision to assign the bulk of its linguists to support intelligence proved critical. World War I would witness the linkage between intelligence and emerging technologies—from the use of cameras in aircraft to the intercept of enemy radio transmissions. Equally significant was the introduction of new intelligence disciplines—from exploitation of captured equipment to the translation of enemy documents. These and other functions that emerged from World War I would continue to the present to provide military intelligence with the essential tools necessary to support the Army and the nation. World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence is ideal not only for students and scholars of military history and World War I, but will also appeal to any reader interested in how modern intelligence operations first evolved.
Intelligence is often the critical factor in a successful military campaign. This was certainly the case for Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsular War. In this book, author Huw J. Davies offers the first full account of the scope, complexity, and importance of Wellington’s intelligence department, describing a highly organized, multifaceted series of networks of agents and spies throughout Spain and Portugal—an organization that was at once a microcosm of British intelligence at the time and a sophisticated forebear to intelligence developments in the twentieth century. Spying for Wellington shows us an organization that was, in effect, two parallel networks: one made up of Foreign Office agents “run” by British ambassadors in Spain and Portugal, the other comprising military spies controlled by Wellington himself. The network of agents supplied strategic intelligence, giving the British army advance warning of the arrival, destinations, and likely intentions of French reinforcements. The military network supplied operational intelligence, which confirmed the accuracy of the strategic intelligence and provided greater detail on the strengths, arms, and morale of the French forces. Davies reveals how, by integrating these two forms of intelligence, Wellington was able to develop an extremely accurate and reliable estimate of French movements and intentions not only in his own theater of operations but also in other theaters across the Iberian Peninsula. The reliability and accuracy of this intelligence, as Davies demonstrates, was central to Wellington’s decision-making and, ultimately, to his overall success against the French. Correcting past, incomplete accounts, this is the definitive book on Wellington’s use of intelligence. As such, it contributes to a clearer, more comprehensive understanding of Wellington at war and of his place in the history of British military intelligence.
The enigmatic science of military intelligence is examined in this personal record, written by Brig.Gen. Oscar W. Koch, who served during World War II as chief of intelligence for General George S. Patton, Jr., one of the most colorful military leaders in American history. General Koch traces the growth and development of the infant science through detailed accounts of the intelligence role in some of the most celebrated battles of the war, and through his personal remembrances of Patton and his relationships with members of his intelligence staff. His story moves from the African campaign through Sicily, into France on D-Day and on to the Battle of the Bulge, pointing out how the work of the intelligence staff made the differences in the final reckoning. General Kochs book is more than a historical study, however. It is the exciting story of the operations behind the cloak and dagger illusions.
A masterly look at the value and limitations of intelligence in the conduct of war from the premier military historian of our time, John Keegan. Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway. In Intelligence in War, John Keegan illustrates that only when paired with force has military intelligence been an effective tool, as it may one day be in besting al-Qaeda.
How can the United States avoid a future surprise attack on the scale of 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, in an era when such devastating attacks can come not only from nation states, but also from terrorist groups or cyber enemies? Intelligence and Surprise Attack examines why surprise attacks often succeed even though, in most cases, warnings had been available beforehand. Erik J. Dahl challenges the conventional wisdom about intelligence failure, which holds that attacks succeed because important warnings get lost amid noise or because intelligence officials lack the imagination and collaboration to “connect the dots” of available information. Comparing cases of intelligence failure with intelligence success, Dahl finds that the key to success is not more imagination or better analysis, but better acquisition of precise, tactical-level intelligence combined with the presence of decision makers who are willing to listen to and act on the warnings they receive from their intelligence staff. The book offers a new understanding of classic cases of conventional and terrorist attacks such as Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Midway, and the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The book also presents a comprehensive analysis of the intelligence picture before the 9/11 attacks, making use of new information available since the publication of the 9/11 Commission Report and challenging some of that report’s findings.
This open access handbook is a major reference work in the field of Military Sciences. Its main purpose is to inform and enlighten those dealing with the military on the role and contributions of science in describing, understanding and explaining military life, knowledge and doings. The handbook provides a comprehensive thematic introduction to various sub-fields of Military Sciences. The handbook serves a broad audience in various capacities; academics studying the military and the broader defense and security sector, students at military and civilian schools preparing for service in the military, the government or other occupations with linkage to the military, professionals in the armed forces, decision makers in government, contractors who work alongside the military, NGOs whose work is influenced by military operations, journalists who write on matters concerning the sphere of the military or others with a particular interest towards the military as a phenomenon, organization or system of various kinds. About the Section EditorsLt. Col. Dr. Anders McD Sookermany, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: Philosophy of Military Sciences)Lt. Col. Dr. Harald Høiback, Norwegian Armed Forces Museums, Oslo, Norway (Section: Military Operations) Dr. Niels Bo Poulsen, Royal Danish Defence College, Copenhagen, Denmark (Section: Military History)Prof. Dr. Patricia M. Shields, Texas State University, San Marcos, USA (Section: Military and Society)Dr. Carsten F. Rønnfeldt, Norwegian Defence University College, Oslo, Norway (Section: International Relations and the Military)Associate Professor David Last, Royal Military College of Canada, Canada (Section: Military Profession)Dr. Irina Goldenberg, Canadian Department of National Defence, Nepean, Canada (Section: Military Behavioural Sciences)Dr. Michael Holenweger, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Prof. Dr. Martin Elbe, Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, Potsdam, Germany (Section: Military Leadership)Franz Kernic, MILAC at ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland (Section: Military Leadership)Joseph Soeters, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands (Section: Military Management, Economics and Logistics)Prof Margaret Kosal, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA (Section: Military Technology)Dr. Ben Zweibelson, Joint Special Operations University, Tampa, USA (Section: Military Design)Ms. Aubrey Poe (Section: Military Design)
