Part one, the "Strategic and Operational Context," provides a framework for understanding the environment where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three. Part two, "Insurgencies," provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two consists of chapters four and five. Part three, "Counterinsurgencies," describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency.
This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
This is Change 1 to the May 2014 version of FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. This version, that was released in late June 2014, has changes in chapters 1, 2, 4, and 7. Overall, FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 is divided into three parts. Part one provides strategic and operational context, part two provides the doctrine for understanding insurgencies, and part three provides doctrine for defeating an insurgency. In short, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 is organized to provide the context of a problem, the problem, and possible solutions.Part one, the “Strategic and Operational Context,” provides a framework for understanding the environment where a counterinsurgency exists. Part one consists of chapters one through three.Part two, “Insurgencies,” provides a doctrinal framework for understanding an insurgency. Part two consists of chapters four and five.Part three, “Counterinsurgencies,” describes how to plan and execute operations to enable a host nation to defeat an insurgency.Chapter 1, “Understanding the Strategic Context” Chapter 2, “Understanding an Operational Environment” Chapter 3, “Culture” Chapter 4, “Insurgency Prerequisites and Fundamentals” Chapter 5, “Insurgency Threat Characteristics” Chapter 6, “Command and Control and Mission Command” Chapter 7, “Planning and Operational Considerations” Chapter 8, “Intelligence” Chapter 9, “Direct Approaches to Counter an Insurgency” Chapter 10, “Indirect Methods for Countering Insurgencies” Chapter 11, “Working with Host-Nation Forces” Chapter 12, “Assessments” Chapter 13, “Legal Considerations”
This manual provides guidance for the organization, planning, and conduct of the full range of military operations on urbanized terrain. This publication was prepared primarily for commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders down to the squad and fire team level. It is written from a Marine air-ground task force perspective, with emphasis on the ground combat element as the most likely supported element in that environment. It provides the level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small-unit combat operations on urbanized terrain. It also provides historical and environmental information that supports planning and training for combat in built-up areas
This two-in one resource includes the Tactical Commanders and Staff Toolkit plus the Liaison Officer Toolkit. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)) enables tactical level Commanders and their Staffs to properly plan and execute assigned DSCA missions for all hazard operations, excluding Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high yield Explosives (CBRNE) or acts of terrorism. Applies to all United States military forces, including Department of Defense (DOD) components (Active and Reserve forces and National Guard when in Federal Status). This hand-on resource also may be useful information for local and state first responders. Chapter 1 contains background information relative to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) including legal, doctinal, and policy issues. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the incident management processes including National Response Framework (NRF), National Incident Management Systems (NIMS), and Incident Command System (ICS) as well as Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Chapter 3 discuses the civilian and military responses to natural disaster. Chapter 4 provides a brief overview of Joint Operation Planning Process and mission analyis. Chapter 5 covers Defense Support of Civilian Authorities (DSCA) planning factors for response to all hazard events. Chapter 6 is review of safety and operational composite risk management processes Chapters 7-11 contain Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) and details five natrual hazards/disasters and the pertinent planning factors for each within the scope of DSCA.
U.S. Marines in Irregular Warfare: Training and Education is a brief history that recounts how the U.S. Marine Corps adapted to fight the Global War on Terrorism during 2000-10. The Marine Corps has a long history of fighting irregular wars, including the Banana Wars in Central America during the 1920s and the Vietnam War during the 1960s. To battle the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps drew upon this experience while also implementing new plans and programs to better prepare Marines to carry out counterinsurgency operations. The Marine Corps updated the curriculum at the Command and Staff College and transformed the annual Combined Arms Exercise into Exercise Mojave Viper: an immersive training program that simulated the urban environments in which Marines would be operating in Southwest Asia. Most importantly, Marines adjusted in the field, as battalion and company commanders drew on their basic training and education to devise innovative tactics to better combat the new threats they now faced. ?us, as this story shows, the Marine Corps did not undergo a radical transformation to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead drew on principles that had defined it as a warfighting organization throughout most of its history. Keywords: United States Marine Corps; United States Marines; U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Marines; Marines; Marine Corps; Global War on Terrorism; global war on terrorism; irregular warfare; military strategy; counterinsurgency; combat; iraq war; Iraq War; Afghanistan; military education; soldier training; combat training and tactics; Southwest Asia
What can the United States learn from other militaries about how better to prepare for full-spectrum operations and deployments? The authors examine the militaries of China, France, the UK, India, and Israel to (1) identify different approaches to readiness, adaptability, and operational issues and (2) assess the ways in which units are trained both for specific and general deployments and for train, advise, and assist missions.
"The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report's recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation's population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities."--(Publisher's website)
In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel--the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.
