The conventional wisdomaboutcreditmarketshas been radically alteredin recent years through the introduction of elements of moral hazard,adverseselectionofrisk,and quality-price relationships. Important empiricalstudies have been published which are leading to vastly different policyimplications. This analysis has not been explicitly extended to informalcredit markets so far, although it is widely recognized that credit transactedoutside the banking circuit is quantitatively huge and qualitatively critical,especially in developing countries.This book combines the new theoretical approach to credit markets withcertain precepts of the New Institutional Economics in order to analyzeinformal credit markets. While the formal financial institutions in developingcountries carry out credit transactions within the limits set by the marketenvironment and by government policies, informal institutions evolve by aparticular selection of modes of economic behavior which are responses tointrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal sector enhances trust bymakingexistingtiesanintegralcomponentofcreditcontracts:thecontractualcomponent of informal credit capitalizes on the personalistic (social andeconomic) relationships between the transacting parties.
A presentation of contributions from some of the world's leading economists, including Ronald Coase and Douglass North. It demonstrates the extent and depth of the New Institutional Economics research programme with special emphasis on the interaction between institutional factors.
The conventional wisdomaboutcreditmarketshas been radically alteredin recent years through the introduction of elements of moral hazard,adverseselectionofrisk,and quality-price relationships. Important empiricalstudies have been published which are leading to vastly different policyimplications. This analysis has not been explicitly extended to informalcredit markets so far, although it is widely recognized that credit transactedoutside the banking circuit is quantitatively huge and qualitatively critical,especially in developing countries.This book combines the new theoretical approach to credit markets withcertain precepts of the New Institutional Economics in order to analyzeinformal credit markets. While the formal financial institutions in developingcountries carry out credit transactions within the limits set by the marketenvironment and by government policies, informal institutions evolve by aparticular selection of modes of economic behavior which are responses tointrinsic imperfections of the market. The informal sector enhances trust bymakingexistingtiesanintegralcomponentofcreditcontracts:thecontractualcomponent of informal credit capitalizes on the personalistic (social andeconomic) relationships between the transacting parties.
During the nineteenth century, Yucat&án moved effectively from its colonial past into modernity, transforming from a cattle-ranching and subsistence-farming economy to a booming export-oriented agricultural economy. Yucat&án and its economy grew in response to increasing demand from the United States for henequen, the local cordage fiber. This henequen boom has often been seen as another regional and historical example of overdependence on foreign markets and extortionary local elites. In The Making of a Market, Juliette Levy argues instead that local social and economic dynamics are the root of the region&’s development. She shows how credit markets contributed to the boom before banks (and bank crises) existed and how people borrowed before the creation of institutions designed specifically to lend. As the intermediaries in this lending process, notaries became unwitting catalysts of Yucat&án&’s capitalist transformation. By focusing attention on the notaries&’ role in structuring the mortgage market rather than on formal institutions such as banks, this study challenges the easy compartmentalization of local and global relationships and of economic and social relationships.
Almost everyone will gain something of value from reading this book. For those who work in the new institutional economics, Pejovich provides a thoughtful treatment of how common-law and civil-law systems affect personal freedoms and rule of law. The book s larger market, however, will comprise educated lay readers, who will gain a deeper appreciation of the foundations of capitalism in the developed world and of the dynamics of interrelated institutional and economic change. Lee J. Alston, The Independent Review . . . a well written, easily read book which casts light on many aspects of law and on questions which are or should be debated in our law schools. . . well laid out and presented. . . Its subject matter makes it essential reading for all those studying comparative law and of course law and economics and even for those studying legislation. It would be more than useful for those engaged in property law, the law of contract and administrative and public law. In other words it would be useful and challenging reading for just about all law teachers and students as well as practitioners who wish to think about the basics of what they are doing. Its easy combination of history, comparative technique, legal fundamentals and economics with no maths would even make it an excellent reader for LAWS 101. Bernard Robertson, New Zealand Law Journal Professor Pejovich has written an impressive lot on comparative economic systems, institutions, policies and broader social aspects of economic development. . . His long work in the field quite predictably made him able to present his views and findings in an ever clearer, more orderly and more profoundly argued way. . . This is one of the rare books in which the author is well aware of what he is talking about and makes sure that the same goes for his readers. Ljubomir Madzar Professor Pejovich has ranged expertly across such seemingly disparate areas as legal systems, culture, economics and public choice theory to give us a thoroughly convincing roadmap for a nation s economic success. The rule of law, enforcement of private contracts, private property rights and an independent judiciary are the basic building blocks. But the common law system, as compared to the civil law system emanating from the European continent, also gets a lot of the credit. This is an erudite, yet happily readable work that takes a lot of the mystery out of differential economic performance among nations. Henry G. Manne, George Mason University School of Law, US Written by one of the pioneers of modern property rights economics this book provides a most insightful, well readable and engaged discussion of the institutional foundations of the Western free enterprise system and the reason for its success, with a special emphasis on the differences between common law and civil law institutions. Readers will especially appreciate the many instructive examples and court cases that serve to illustrate the general argument. Viktor J. Vanberg, Universitaet Freiburg, Germany This is a must-read for anyone who wants to understand why Western capitalism has outperformed all other economic systems. Professor Pejovich explains how the institutions of capitalism, especially those based on common law, make for excellence, even in comparison with Western civil law countries. He presents a compelling theory of how systems evolve through the interactions of formal and informal institutions, an analysis that has deep significance for economic reform proposals throughout the world. John H. Moore, Grove City College, US There are many books on the virtues of capitalism and capitalism as a moral system. Steve Pejovich avoids that mistake. Capitalism, for him, is a system based on human behavior. It survives because it meets the needs that individuals face and provides opportunities that individuals are able to accept. Unlike the utopian visions that have competed against capitalism, it does not impose the vision of a
An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
This book draws on the analytical framework of New Institutional Economics (NIE) to critically examine the role which law and the legal system play in economic development. Analytical concepts from NIE are used to assess policies which have been supported by multilateral development organisations including securing private property rights, reform of the legal system and financial development. The importance of culture in shaping the legal environment, which in turn influences financial sector development, is also assessed using Oliver Williamson’s ‘levels of social analysis’ framework.
Trust and cooperation are at the heart of the two most important approaches to comparative politics - rational choice and political culture. Yet we know little about trust's relationship to political institutions. This book sets out a rationalist theory of how institutions - and in particular informal institutions - can affect trust without reducing it to fully determine expectations. It then shows how this theory can be applied to comparative political economy, and in particular to explaining inter-firm cooperation in industrial districts, geographical areas of intense small firm collaboration. The book compares trust and cooperation in two prominent districts in the literature, one in Emilia Romagna, Italy, and the other in Baden-Württemberg, Germany. It also sets out and applies a theory of how national informal institutions may change as a result of changes in global markets, and shows how similar mechanisms may explain persistent distrust too among Sicilian Mafiosi.
A large percentage of workers and firms operate in the informal economy, outside the line of sight of governments in emerging market and developing economies. This may hold back the recovery in these economies from the deep recessions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic--unless governments adopt a broad set of policies to address the challenges of widespread informality. This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the extent of informality and its implications for a durable economic recovery and for long-term development. It finds that pervasive informality is associated with significantly weaker economic outcomes--including lower government resources to combat recessions, lower per capita incomes, greater poverty, less financial development, and weaker investment and productivity.
