A scholar, psychologist, physician, and experienced psychoanalyst, Marshall Edelson is uniquely qualified to respond to questions about the scientific status of psychoanalysis. He has written this book both for psychoanalysts and for philosophers of science, intending to bridge gaps in communication between them. It is also a book for anyone interested in the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge.
A scholar, psychologist, physician, and experienced psychoanalyst, Marshall Edelson is uniquely qualified to respond to questions about the scientific status of psychoanalysis. He has written this book both for psychoanalysts and for philosophers of science, intending to bridge gaps in communication between them. It is also a book for anyone interested in the nature of psychoanalytic knowledge.
In his Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique, Adolf Grunbaum claimed that the arguments supporting psychoanalytic hypotheses are both logically invalid and unsound. They are invalid because they violate the cannons of inductive elimination, and unsound because the clinical data is contaminated by the suggestive influence of the analyst.In a spirited defence of psychoanalysis, the author asserts that Grunbaum's argument over suggestibility is not supported by textual evidence and gives her own formulation of Freud's argument to show how the problem of suggestibility can be dealt with. To counter the charge of the invalidity of the repression argument, the author addresses the two specific objections of Grunbaum: first, that repression can be a maintaining rather than an originating cause of neurotic symptoms, and, second, that by eliminating rival candidates it is possible to formulate a valid argument for repression aetiology. This book is a must-read for all those interested in the stature and reputation of psychoanalysis in the scientific world.
In literary theory, the philosophy of law, and the sociology of knowledge, no issue has been more central to current debate than the status of our interpretations. Do they rest on a ground of rationality or are they subjective impositions of a merely personal point of view? In Doing What Comes Naturally, Stanley Fish refuses the dilemma posed by this question and argues that while we can never separate our judgments from the contexts in which they are made, those judgments are nevertheless authoritative and even, in the only way that matters, objective. He thus rejects both the demand for an ahistorical foundation, and the conclusion that in the absence of such a foundation we reside in an indeterminate world. In a succession of provocative and wide-ranging chapters, Fish explores the implications of his position for our understanding of legal, literary, and psychoanalytic interpretation, the nature of professional and institutional culture, and the place of reason in a world that is rhetorical through and through.
This book offers different theoretical approaches about what clinical research is. Clinical Research in Psychoanalysis is a unique contribution to the attempts to bridge the gap between clinicians and researchers and to create a culture of a more rigorous and systematic inquiry. It provides an innovative experience because for the first time different methods and perspectives were used to analyse one same clinical material. This was done by analysts from different working parties of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA), from a range of different schools of psychoanalytic thought. This allows the reader to have a vision of the different methods that are currently being used by some working parties of the IPA and to learn about the strengths of each one for certain situations and types of research. This book revaluates clinical research, intending to make links between the analysts working through the working parties and the different ways of thinking in clinical research. By covering key topics, such as how working parties can facilitate different types of research; the place of metaphor in psychoanalytic research and practice; and the future for psychoanalytic research, this text is a fruitful dialogue between different theoretical conceptions and between clinicians and researchers, that will expand our perspectives on the evidence we find in clinical material and will broaden our views on the patient. This book offers a unique and invaluable experience to psychologists and psychoanalysts who are trying to improve their clinical practice and bring research evidence into their psychoanalytic practice. It is an invaluable contribution to psychoanalytic training of candidates, teachers, and students.
The Practice of Lacanian Psychoanalysis lays out an Aristotelian framework to account for the different types of knowing and not-knowing operative in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. The book proposes a new model for diagnosis, giving preference to fewer over more diagnoses, and seeks to better organize them by distinguishing between structure and surface symptoms. It examines many principles of Lacanian clinical practice, including different types of frames and evidence, the practice of citation and listening, the resistance and desire of the analyst, transference love as a metaphor, the role of negative transference at the end of analysis, and the identification with the sinthome as Lacan's last formulation regarding the end of analysis. The text also suggests that there are three forms of love and hate based on the works of Lacan and Winnicott. Underpinned by extensive practical knowledge of the clinic and case examples for clinicians, analysts, and practicing Lacanian analysts, this book should be of interest to academics, scholars, and clinicians alike.
Marshall Edelson identifies the core theory of psychoanalysis and shows how free association and the case study method can provide rational grounds for believing its clinical inferences about the causal role of unconscious sexual fantasies. "Dr. Edelson has committed himself with gusto, persistence and intelligence [to] a spirited defense of psychoanalysis as science—not necessarily as it is, but as it can be in the best of hands as it should be. . . . It is a defense that I hope can resonate strongly in psychoanalytic ranks. It is also a message that I hope would receive a warm reception in that wider intellectual world where ideas matter and where enlightened social policy and cultural cachet are fostered."—Robert Wallerstein, New York Times Book Review
This by now well-known pioneering dialogue on Freudian analysis is concerned not with therapeutic implications, individual or social, of psychoanalysis or of any other brand of psychology, but solely with the status of psychoanalysis as a scientific theory. Matching talents with a distinguished group of philosophers and social scientists, psychoanalysts made their claims and willingly subject them to the methodological scrutiny common to the sciences and the philosophy of science. This book records one of the few times in the United States that a distinguished group of psychoanalysts met with an equally distinguished group of philosophers of science in a free, critical interchange of view on the scientific status of the field. While a sense of the event’s excitement is captured here, it also had clear results, such as an expanded notion of psychoanalysis as a scientific theory, and a clear realization that certain elements in psychoanalysis are substantially beyond the boundaries of causal inference or the rules of logic. Two opening statements by Heinz Hartmann and Ernest Nagel set the tone for the debate and discussion that followed. These are followed by social scientific statements of Abram Kardiner, Ernest van den Haag, and Alex Inkeles, followed by the philosophers Morris Lazerowitz, Donald C. Williams, and Anthony Flew. Such distinguished scholars as Adolf Grunbaum, Michael Scriven, Gail Kennedy, Arthur Pap, Philipp Frank. Arthur C. Danto, Max Black and others, round out this pioneering effort in the literature of intellectual combat. Sidney Hook applies to his vision of psychoanalysis the same compelling rigor he applied to other would-be advocates of a science beyond ordinary scientific method or safeguards. He nonetheless points out that even therapeutic success is not the last word, but must itself be tested on a variety of measures: statistical no less than analytical. This remains a courageous and disturbing work, one that commands attention among practicing psychiatrists, psychoanalysts—and their would-be patients.
In his extensive description of the heuristic approach to psychoanalytic therapy, Peterfreund discusses the strategies used by both patient and therapist as they move toward discovery and deeper understanding.
Psychoanalysis is often equated with Sigmund Freud, but this comparison ignores the wide range of clinical practices, observational methods, general theories, and cross-pollinations with other disciplines that characterise contemporary psychoanalytic work. Central psychoanalytic concepts to do with unconscious motivation, primitive forms of thought, defence mechanisms, and transference form a mainstay of today's richly textured contemporary clinical psychological practice. In this landmark collection on philosophy and psychoanalysis, leading researchers provide an evaluative overview of current thinking. Written at the interface between these two disciplines, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis contains original contributions that will shape the future of debate. With 34 chapters divided into eight sections covering history, clinical theory, phenomenology, science, aesthetics, religion, ethics, and political and social theory, this Oxford Handbook displays the enduring depth, breadth, and promise of integrating philosophical and psychoanalytic thought. Anyone interested in the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, as well as philosophical challenges to and re-statements of psychoanalysis, will want to consult this book. It will be a vital resource for academic researchers, psychoanalysts and other mental health professionals, graduates, and trainees.
