How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?
How Do Family Ownership, Control, and Management Affect Firm Value?

Author: Belen Villalonga

Publisher:

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 47

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Using proxy data on all Fortune 500 firms during 1994-2000, we establish that, in order to understand whether and when family firms are more or less valuable than nonfamily firms, one must distinguish among three fundamental elements in the definition of family firms: ownership, control, and management. Specifically, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as the CEO of the family firm or as its Chairman with a hired CEO. Control mechanisms including dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings further suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.

The SAGE Handbook of Family Business
The SAGE Handbook of Family Business

Author: Leif Melin

Publisher: SAGE

Published: 2013-11-15

Total Pages: 697

ISBN-13: 1446265935

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The SAGE Handbook of Family Business captures the conceptual map and state-of-the-art thinking on family business - an area experiencing rapid global growth in research and education since the last three decades. Edited by the leading figures in family business studies, with contributions and editorial board support from the most prominent scholars in the field, this Handbook reflects on the development and current status of family enterprise research in terms of applied theories, methods, topics investigated, and perspectives on the field′s future. The SAGE Handbook of Family Business is divided into following six sections, allowing for ease of navigation while gaining a multi-dimensional perspective and understanding of the field. Part I: Theoretical perspectives in family business studies Part II: Major issues in family business studies Part III: Entrepreneurial and managerial aspects in family business studies Part IV: Behavioral and organizational aspects in family business studies Part V: Methods in use in family business studies Part VI: The future of the field of family business studies By including critical reflections and presenting possible alternative perspectives and theories, this Handbook contributes to the framing of future research on family enterprises around the world. It is an invaluable resource for current and future scholars interested in understanding the unique dynamics of family enterprises under the rubric of entrepreneurship, strategic management, organization theory, accounting, marketing or other related areas.

Dynastic Management
Dynastic Management

Author: Francesco Caselli

Publisher:

Published: 2003

Total Pages: 50

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Dynastic management is the inter-generational transmission of control over assets that is typical of family-owned firms. It is pervasive around the World, but especially in developing countries. We argue that dynastic management is a potential source of inefficiency: if the heir to the family firm has no talent for managerial decision making, meritocracy fails. We present a simple model that studies the macreconomic causes and consequences of this phenomenon. In our model, the incidence of dynastic management depends on the severity of asset-market imperfections, on the economy's saving rate, and on the degree of inheritability of talent across generations. We therefore introduce novel channels through which financial-market failures and saving rates affect aggregate total factor productivity. Numerical simulations suggest that dynastic management may be a substantial contributor to observed cross-country differences in productivity.

The Control of Corporate Europe
The Control of Corporate Europe

Author: Fabrizio Barca

Publisher: OUP Oxford

Published: 2001-11-15

Total Pages: 354

ISBN-13: 0191530050

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

The Family Business Map
The Family Business Map

Author: M. Bennedsen

Publisher: Springer

Published: 2014-09-29

Total Pages: 179

ISBN-13: 1137382368

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Combining the expertise of two consultants and academics from East and West, this book provides an international guide for family businesses, showing how to identify and implement the best governance strategies. Packed with case studies and interviews, this is the ultimate guide for family businesses wanting to achieve long-term success.

Corporate Payout Policy
Corporate Payout Policy

Author: Harry DeAngelo

Publisher: Now Publishers Inc

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 215

ISBN-13: 1601982046

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Corporate Payout Policy synthesizes the academic research on payout policy and explains "how much, when, and how". That is (i) the overall value of payouts over the life of the enterprise, (ii) the time profile of a firm's payouts across periods, and (iii) the form of those payouts. The authors conclude that today's theory does a good job of explaining the general features of corporate payout policies, but some important gaps remain. So while our emphasis is to clarify "what we know" about payout policy, the authors also identify a number of interesting unresolved questions for future research. Corporate Payout Policy discusses potential influences on corporate payout policy including managerial use of payouts to signal future earnings to outside investors, individuals' behavioral biases that lead to sentiment-based demands for distributions, the desire of large block stockholders to maintain corporate control, and personal tax incentives to defer payouts. The authors highlight four important "carry-away" points: the literature's focus on whether repurchases will (or should) drive out dividends is misplaced because it implicitly assumes that a single payout vehicle is optimal; extant empirical evidence is strongly incompatible with the notion that the primary purpose of dividends is to signal managers' views of future earnings to outside investors; over-confidence on the part of managers is potentially a first-order determinant of payout policy because it induces them to over-retain resources to invest in dubious projects and so behavioral biases may, in fact, turn out to be more important than agency costs in explaining why investors pressure firms to accelerate payouts; the influence of controlling stockholders on payout policy --- particularly in non-U.S. firms, where controlling stockholders are common --- is a promising area for future research. Corporate Payout Policy is required reading for both researchers and practitioners interested in understanding this central topic in corporate finance and governance.

Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations
Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

Author: Luc Laeven

Publisher: International Monetary Fund

Published: 2007-06

Total Pages: 44

ISBN-13:

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.