David Hilbert was one of the great mathematicians who expounded the centrality of their subject in human thought. In this collection of essays, Wilfried Sieg frames Hilbert's foundational work, from 1890 to 1939, in a comprehensive way and integrates it with modern proof theoretic investigations.
Hilbert's Programs & Beyond presents the foundational work of David Hilbert in a sequence of thematically organized essays. They first trace the roots of Hilbert's work to the radical transformation of mathematics in the 19th century and bring out his pivotal role in creating mathematical logic and proof theory. They then analyze techniques and results of "classical" proof theory as well as their dramatic expansion in modern proof theory. This intellectual experience finally opens horizons for reflection on the nature of mathematics in the 21st century: Sieg articulates his position of reductive structuralism and explores mathematical capacities via computational models.
Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.
David Hilbert was arguably the leading mathematician of his generation. He was among the few mathematicians who could reshape mathematics, and was able to because he brought together an impressive technical power and mastery of detail with a vision of where the subject was going and how it should get there. This was the unique combination which he brought to the setting of his famous 23 Problems. Few problems in mathematics have the status of those posed by David Hilbert in 1900. Mathematicians have made their reputations by solving individual ones such as Fermat's last theorem, and several remain unsolved including the Riemann hypotheses, which has eluded all the great minds of this century. A hundred years on, it is timely to take a fresh look at the problems, the man who set them, and the reasons for their lasting impact on the mathematics of the twentieth century. In this fascinating new book, Jeremy Gray and David Rowe consider what has made this the pre-eminent collection of problems in mathematics, what they tell us about what drives mathematicians, and the nature of reputation, influence and power in the world of modern mathematics. The book is written in a clear and lively manner and will appeal both to the general reader with an interest in mathematics and to mathematicians themselves.
Hilbert's Program was founded on a concern for the phenomenon of paradox in mathematics. To Hilbert, the paradoxes, which are at once both absurd and irresistible, revealed a deep philosophical truth: namely, that there is a discrepancy between the laws accord ing to which the mind of homo mathematicus works, and the laws governing objective mathematical fact. Mathematical epistemology is, therefore, to be seen as a struggle between a mind that naturally works in one way and a reality that works in another. Knowledge occurs when the two cooperate. Conceived in this way, there are two basic alternatives for mathematical epistemology: a skeptical position which maintains either that mind and reality seldom or never come to agreement, or that we have no very reliable way of telling when they do; and a non-skeptical position which holds that there is significant agree ment between mind and reality, and that their potential discrepan cies can be detected, avoided, and thus kept in check. Of these two, Hilbert clearly embraced the latter, and proposed a program designed to vindicate the epistemological riches represented by our natural, if non-literal, ways of thinking. Brouwer, on the other hand, opted for a position closer (in Hilbert's opinion) to that of the skeptic. Having decided that epistemological purity could come only through sacrifice, he turned his back on his classical heritage to accept a higher calling.
The essays collected in this volume focus on the role of formalist aspects in mathematical theorizing and practice, examining issues such as infinity, finiteness, and proof procedures, as well as central historical figures in the field, including Frege, Russell, Hilbert and Wittgenstein. Using modern logico-philosophical tools and systematic conceptual and logical analyses, the volume provides a thorough, up-to-date account of the subject.
Gerhard Gentzen (1909–1945) is the founder of modern structural proof theory. His lasting methods, rules, and structures resulted not only in the technical mathematical discipline called “proof theory” but also in verification programs that are essential in computer science. The appearance, clarity, and elegance of Gentzen's work on natural deduction, the sequent calculus, and ordinal proof theory continue to be impressive even today. The present book gives the first comprehensive, detailed, accurate scientific biography expounding the life and work of Gerhard Gentzen, one of our greatest logicians, until his arrest and death in Prague in 1945. Particular emphasis in the book is put on the conditions of scientific research, in this case mathematical logic, in National Socialist Germany, the ideological fight for “German logic”, and their mutual protagonists. Numerous hitherto unpublished sources, family documents, archival material, interviews, and letters, as well as Gentzen's lectures for the mathematical public, make this book an indispensable source of information on this important mathematician, his work, and his time. The volume is completed by two deep substantial essays by Jan von Plato and Craig Smoryński on Gentzen's proof theory; its relation to the ideas of Hilbert, Brouwer, Weyl, and Gödel; and its development up to the present day. Smoryński explains the Hilbert program in more than the usual slogan form and shows why consistency is important. Von Plato shows in detail the benefits of Gentzen's program. This important book is a self-contained starting point for any work on Gentzen and his logic. The book is accessible to a wide audience with different backgrounds and is suitable for general readers, researchers, students, and teachers.
The nineteenth century saw a movement to make higher mathematics rigorous. This seemed to be on the brink of success when it was thrown into confusion by the discovery of the class paradoxes. That initiated a period of intense research into the foundations of mathematics, and with it the birth of mathematical logic and a new, sharper debate in the philosophy of mathematics. The Search for Certainty examines this foundational endeavour from the discovery of the paradoxes to the present. Focusing on Russell's logicist programme and Hilbert's finitist programme, Giaquinto investigates how successful they were and how successful they could be. These questions are set in the context of a clear, non-technical exposition and assessment of the most important discoveries in mathematical logic, above all G--ouml--;del's underivability theorems. More than six decades after those discoveries, Giaquinto asks what our present perspective should be on the question of certainty in mathematics. Taking recent developments into account, he gives reasons for a surprisingly positive response.
This textbook provides a concise and self-contained introduction to mathematical logic, with a focus on the fundamental topics in first-order logic and model theory. Including examples from several areas of mathematics (algebra, linear algebra and analysis), the book illustrates the relevance and usefulness of logic in the study of these subject areas. The authors start with an exposition of set theory and the axiom of choice as used in everyday mathematics. Proceeding at a gentle pace, they go on to present some of the first important results in model theory, followed by a careful exposition of Gentzen-style natural deduction and a detailed proof of Gödel’s completeness theorem for first-order logic. The book then explores the formal axiom system of Zermelo and Fraenkel before concluding with an extensive list of suggestions for further study. The present volume is primarily aimed at mathematics students who are already familiar with basic analysis, algebra and linear algebra. It contains numerous exercises of varying difficulty and can be used for self-study, though it is ideally suited as a text for a one-semester university course in the second or third year.